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Abstract 
Contentious coalitions, movement divisions, and strategic action fields: factors motivating 
an unlikely alliance of environmental organizations and gas companies 
 
Corinne Ogrodnik, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2020 
 
 
 
 
My dissertation explores the factors motivating the formation of a contentious alliance of 
environmental movement organizations and major gas corporations. Utilizing Fligstein and 
McAdam’s (2012) theoretical framework of strategic action fields, I argue that a field-level 
analysis helps to contextualize the strategic decision-making environmental organizations engaged 
in as they surveyed broader societal and political conditions for deciding whether to support or 
oppose the coalition for advancing their goals. Additionally, I engage aspects of Whittier’s (2018) 
typology of frenemy relationship structures to link the interaction of environmental actors with the 
dynamics of contention that occurred within the field as a result of the collaboration. 
By situating organizational factors, such as resource mobilization and the framing 
processes of individual groups, in a wider network of potential alliance and conflict systems 
(Klandermans 1997) and proximate fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012), my analysis shows that, 
as new collective action frames, identities, and practices emerged within the environmental field, 
uncertainty seeped into the shared understanding of the cultural processes and mission upon which 
the environmental field had been built. Additionally, my analysis also reveals that participating 
organizations valued the coalition as an important addition to their tactical repertoire and a 
necessary strategy to advance the movement’s goals in a politically constrained environment and 
globalizing world.  
v 
Through this project, I seek to contribute to the emerging body of work focused on the 
intersection of social movement, organizational theory and field level analyses. My research also 
contributes to the literature on social movement coalitions. Despite the scholarly attention to the 
formation of coalitions among social movement organizations (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010), 
little work examines factors that influence organizations to pursue extra-movement, and in some 
cases, contentious, alliances (Whittier 2018). Finally, my study corroborates key aspects of 
Whittier’s (2018) frenemy typology. Understanding the coalition as an adversarial collaborative 
relationship among ideologically opposed actors helps to contextualize the alliance structure as a 
phenomenon distinct from social movement coalitions.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Coalition work is a key strategy of social movement organizations. The formation of 
alliances between organizations enables groups with similar objectives to pool their limited 
resources and expand their capacity for pursuing broader goals (Staggenborg 1986). Scholarship 
on movement coalitions emphasizes the importance of compatible organizational ideologies and 
preexisting social ties as central factors that facilitate organizational collaboration. Additionally, 
this scholarship demonstrates that the presence of political threats, as well as political 
opportunities, tend to engender social movement coalitions (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010).   
Coalition building in the environmental movement is subject to the ebb and flow of “issue 
attention cycles” that either motivate or discourage opportunities for collective action (Downs 
1972; Dalton 2015; Ogrodnik and Staggenborg 2016). Environmental problems are particularly 
challenging social issues to resolve, not only because of their inherent complexity, but also because 
they tend to create competing perceptions about their relative risks to society. Generating sufficient 
attention to environmental issues requires the formation of strategic alliances that overcome classic 
problems of collective action. When environmental issues arise in society, typically actors with 
similar goals and overlapping networks coalesce for specific campaigns to address environmental 
problems (Della Porta and Rucht 2002; see also Dalton 2003). Occasionally, however, there are 
issues that arise with sufficient scale and intensity to motivate collective action across a variety of 
sectors in society.  
In the early 2010’s, technological advancements in hydraulic fracturing for shale gas 
development was such an issue. With the invention of new extraction methods, shale gas 
development had the potential to generate $30 billion in economic activity for the country, while 
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threatening the contamination of environmental systems in the regions where the development was 
occurring (Burwen and Flegal 2013). No consensus emerged at the national level on how to 
balance economic opportunities with environmental protection, and states were left largely on their 
own to develop regulatory programs to oversee the development. Pennsylvania and other states in 
the Appalachian Basin held vast reserves of shale gas, galvanizing significant attention from both 
the gas industry and the environmental movement to the development occurring in the region.  
 
 
Figure 1. Shale Plays in the United States Lower 48 
 
With most states adopting lax regulatory frameworks to facilitate the development, the 
environmental movement sprang into action to address its environmental impacts. While the 
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majority of environmental organizations pursued their expected patterns for action and new activist 
groups emerged, the formation of an unlikely alliance between several environmental 
organizations and major gas companies generated significant contention within the environmental 
movement. The coalition, called the Center for Sustainable Shale Development, was formed for 
the purpose of creating environmental performance standards for the gas industry to voluntarily 
implement during the development. Though some viewed the coalition to be a positive step 
forward in a constrained political environment on shale gas development, many perceived the 
coalition to be a public relations gimmick aimed at providing green cover to dangerous industry 
practices.     
Recent scholarship in social movement studies has sought to direct attention to the 
complementary literatures of social movement analysis and organization theory for enhancing an 
appreciation of extra-movement factors that may influence the formation of social movement 
alliances (Davis et al. 2005; Fligstein and McAdam 2012). This scholarship emphasizes that each 
tradition’s central ideas are complementary and, when used in combination, can provide a 
comprehensive framework for examining periods of conflict and change within a social movement 
or organizational field to better explain the formation of movement coalitions (Davis et al. 2005; 
Fligstein and McAdam 2012; McAdam and Scott 2005). For example, McAdam and Scott (2005) 
suggest that the focus in the social movement literature on process and challenging groups links 
with organization theory’s preoccupation with structure and formal organizations to enable a 
thorough investigation of episodes of contention or periods of relative stability among 
organizations within a movement. Additionally, Bert Klandermans (1992, 1997) underscores the 
idea that social movement organizations are embedded within “multiorganizational fields” 
(Zurcher and Kirkpatrick 1976; Curtis and Zurcher 1973) influenced by both potential alliance and 
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conflict systems in those fields, and that organizations can strategically exploit shifting boundaries 
of those systems for their benefit and action. Further, in their seminal essay in organization studies, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 148) conclude that the “activities of a diverse set of organizations” 
can generate a “recognized area of institutional life.” They contend that the value of this 
perspective is that it directs attention not only to competition and cooperation among networks of 
organizations, but also to “the totality of relevant actors” and the impact that these actors have on 
the formation of alliances within an organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 148).  
Fligstein and McAdam (2011; 2012) seek to merge these parallel ideas in social movement 
and organizational theory in their concept of “strategic action fields.” Urging scholars to move 
beyond the analytical categories of social movements and organizations, they aim to shift attention 
to the primary phenomena of interest that underlie both fields of study: collective strategic action 
and the arenas in which it occurs. While perspectives in organizational studies underscore the 
tendency of fields to gravitate toward stability (Dimaggio and Powell 1983), and social movement 
studies highlight episodes of conflict and change (McAdam and Scott 2005), Fligstein and 
McAdam (2012) seek to combine both perspectives in arguing that while fields may generally 
reflect stability, that stability is a fragile balance constantly negotiated among organizations in the 
field. 
I situate my dissertation research on a contentious coalition of environmental movement 
organizations and major gas corporations within these overlapping literatures of social movement 
analysis and organizational theory, utilizing Fligstein and McAdam’s concept of a strategic action 
field as my analytical framework. My research shows that although a movement-centered approach 
to analyzing the coalition’s formation and its associated contention might narrowly emphasize the 
ideological differences and divergent strategies of environmental movement organizations (Bosso 
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2005; Ogrodnik and Staggenborg 2016), a field-level analysis offers a more nuanced and 
comprehensive examination of both organizational and macro-level factors to explain the 
motivations for joining or opposing the coalition and the contention in the movement that ensued 
as a result. 
Furthermore, I engage aspects of Whittier’s (2018) framework to help define key 
dimensions that inform the development of social movement alliances across ideological 
boundaries. According to Whittier (2018:5-6), studying the formation of contentious 
collaborations requires that analysts “move beyond the concept of a coalition” to appreciate the 
unique tensions activists must navigate when participating in uneasy alliances. She (2018: 7) 
argues that while “most coalitions grow from compatible ideology or shared collective identity,” 
fraught collaboration between otherwise opposed actors is based on more narrowly defined goals 
than is typical for social movement coalitions. Defining alliances of this nature as ‘frenemy’ 
relationships, Whittier (2018) claims that a new typology for analysis is required in which the 
congruence of ideology/identity and collaborative interaction are separated. Her typology is 
described below: 
 
 Congruent 
Neither congruent 
nor opposed 
 
Opposed 
Interaction toward 
shared goal 
 
Coalition Pragmatic coalition Frenemies 
No direct interaction 
 
Spillover Disengaged Detente 
Opposition 
 
Niche 
competitors 
Pragmatic opponents Opposing movements 
Figure 2. Frenemy Typology 
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When ideologically opposed actors interact toward a shared goal, frenemies must navigate 
the reputational risks, disputes over co-optation from outside actors, and movement factionalism 
that tend to surface in the face of such alliances (Whittier 2018). Moreover, to understand the 
motivations for the emergence of these relationships, a wide range of social movement dimensions 
such as organizations, leaders, grassroots participation, and collective action frames must be 
considered (Whittier 2018). Such factors will be examined in the analysis of my case. 
1.1 Description of my case 
Technological advancements in natural gas drilling and lax regulatory environments 
facilitated the rapid development of shale gas (“fracking”) in various regions of the country during 
the early 2000’s. Parts of Appalachia in particular, with its vast reserves of natural gas, witnessed 
an explosion of development in a span of just a few years (Burwen and Flegal 2013). The state of 
Pennsylvania has been at the epicenter of this development, not only because of extensive shale 
deposits and “exponential growth” in gas drilling that has occurred across the state, but also 
because of its prominence as a “first mover” in enacting statewide legislation to encourage 
development of the industry (Rabe and Borick 2013). By the time environmental activists 
mobilized in opposition to the development and its impacts in the early 2010’s, fracking was 
already an established part of Pennsylvania and the surrounding region’s energy and economic 
portfolios (Mazur 2016). Such factors contributed to a division in goals among organizations in 
the environmental movement active in the Appalachian region, with some groups calling for 
stronger regulations to monitor the process and others insisting on a moratorium on any further 
development.  
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1.1.1 Political climate in Pennsylvania around shale gas development  
Given the traditional dependence of environmental organizations on the state for enacting 
policies to minimize environmental damage and enforce protections (Dalton et al. 2003), a brief 
overview of the recent history of Pennsylvania shale gas regulation contextualizes the political 
climate that environmental organizations had to contend with to advance their goals. For starters, 
shale gas extraction creates the familiar conundrum of energy development in that it has the 
“capacity to generate substantial localized economic benefits” but it also presents “a sprawling 
range of environmental concerns that involve every environmental medium (air, land, and water)” 
(Rabe and Borick 2013: 322). With little statutory direction from the federal government, shale 
gas regulation has largely been left to the states, with Pennsylvania being one of the first to adopt 
statewide legislation to encourage the development. With Marcellus Shale deposits covering over 
two thirds of the geographical area of Pennsylvania, it was estimated the state would provide over 
half of the nation’s natural gas reserves (Burwen and Flegal 2013). After the first successful 
extraction of shale gas in Pennsylvania in 2005, a “gas rush” ensued over the course of the 
following several years with 7,000 wells drilled before 2013, and no consensus emerging among 
political leaders in the state for how to balance economic development with environmental 
concerns (Wilber 2012).  
Divisions in goals for fracking were exacerbated by opposing viewpoints among 
Democrats and Republicans within the Pennsylvania legislature on the extent and necessity of 
environmental protections needed for the development. Governor Rendell, a Democrat elected in 
2003, was unsuccessful in moving much shale gas legislation forward due to a divided state 
legislature; however, he managed to support some incremental regulatory reforms through the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. Governor Corbett, Rendell’s Republican 
8 
successor, was elected to office in 2010 on a campaign that expressed aggressive support for shale 
gas development and minimal governmental interference in the process. Accepting more than $1 
million from the oil and gas industry for his campaign, his largest source of funding, Corbett 
closely aligned with the industry, promising a favorable regulatory environment to encourage 
widespread development (Rabe and Borick 2013).  
In February of 2012, Corbett signed the Pennsylvania Unconventional Gas Well Impact 
Fee, also known as Act 13, into law. Some of the main provisions in the law include the lowest 
“impact fee” for the industry as compared to any other state in the country, which also came to be 
used as a “state-level mechanism to deter any local government from taking environmental 
precautions beyond those set forth in the legislation, through the threat of withdrawing revenues 
in the event of ‘noncompliance’” (Rabe and Borick 2013: 330). The law also took steps to curtail 
local control over land-use decisions, including well siting and set-back distances from property 
lines and bodies of water, in addition to prohibiting any municipality from challenging state 
regulations regarding shale gas well permits. Further, the law included minimal requirements for 
industry disclosure of chemicals used during drilling and supported the creation of a commission 
of gubernatorial appointees as the lead implementers to provisions of the law. In short, Act 13 
under the Corbett administration was “seemingly designed to minimize any threats to rapid 
resource development” across the state (Rabe and Borick 2013: 332), leading to an exponential 
increase in the number of wells drilled during Corbett’s time in office (www.fractracker.org) and 
little concern for the development’s environmental impacts. 
While Corbett sought to appease burgeoning environmental concerns about fracking by 
forming a 30-member Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission, the group included only four 
representatives from environmental groups and was dominated by industry representatives. This 
9 
industry-leaning Commission contributed to the development-friendly legislative package put 
forward in Act 13, Pennsylvania’s overarching oil and gas legislation (Rabe and Borick 2013: 
328). Such factors galvanized the environmental community, inspiring most well-established 
environmental organizations active in the region to create advocacy programs and lobby the state 
for greater protections, as well as prompting the formation of citizen groups who sought to protest 
the development. Some concerned citizens pursued additional strategies, namely the formation of 
an environmental-industry alliance, to try to address the development.  
1.1.2 Origins of the environmental-industry coalition 
As former president of the Pennsylvania-based environmental group, PennFuture, John 
Hanger stepped into the role of Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection (PADEP) in September 2008, just as the gas drilling boom was accelerating in the 
region. During his time as Secretary of the PADEP under Governor Rendell, Hanger initiated 
stronger regulations for the protection of water and environmental resources during gas 
development operations. After Rendell’s successor, Governor Corbett, took office, John Hanger 
stepped down as Secretary of the PADEP. Once out of office and with eyes on a future 
gubernatorial race, Hanger sought to act on recommendations put forth in a federal shale gas 
committee report and create regional centers of ‘standards and excellence’ to provide oversight to 
the development occurring in the region (Interview, October 9, 2015).  
Given his former roles as Secretary of the PADEP and president of PennFuture, John 
Hanger had occupied positions in both the environmental and state fields and had worked closely 
with industry in his regulatory role. Hanger’s prior experiences had helped him build extensive 
networks, as well as engendered his legitimacy as a trusted actor in each of the environmental, 
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industry, and state fields. Because of his ambitions in the upcoming Pennsylvania gubernatorial 
race, he sought to highlight the Corbett administration’s cozy relationship with the gas industry 
and take initiative to create an alternative mechanism for implementing environmental protections 
to address the gas development occurring within the region. To this end, Hanger approached a 
select few foundations, several environmental organizations, a handful of major gas companies, 
and professional allies to form a coalition with the purpose of creating environmental performance 
standards for the gas industry to voluntarily implement in the region during development. 
According to an industry coalition participant: 
My understanding was that John Hanger came away from his time as Secretary of PA DEP 
thinking that the polarization (about fracking) had become very damaging. That the chance 
of finding reasonable ground on risk, how to tackle the issues of risk and production were 
difficult to get to in the environment in which we had sunk. So, he brought what I thought 
was the right group of people, which was essential, figuring out who was willing to reach 
out, to compromise (Interview, August 26, 2014). 
Under the coalition’s original name, the Institute for Gas Drilling Excellence, two 
foundations – the Heinz Endowments and William Penn Foundation, five gas companies – 
Chevron, CONSOL Energy, EQT Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, and Range Resources, and five 
environmental organizations – Citizens for Pennsylvania’s Future (PennFuture), Clean Air Task 
Force (CATF), Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Group Against Smog and Pollution (GASP), 
and Pennsylvania Environmental Council (PEC), all joined the alliance. Several of the 
environmental organizations that joined, in particular PennFuture, GASP and PEC, had been 
supported by the Heinz Endowments at one time or another, and thus were extended the invitation 
to join the coalition. Additionally, EDF and CATF were organizations that possessed technical 
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expertise in shale gas drilling, as well as maintained an openness to dialoguing with industry in 
other forums, and therefore were asked to participate in the alliance.  
Between March of 2011 and March of 2013, organizations within the coalition negotiated 
fifteen environmental performance standards for the industry to voluntarily implement during gas 
development operations across the region. Part way through the negotiations, coalition participants 
changed the name of the Institute to the Center for Sustainable Shale Development (CSSD).  
Participants in the coalition recognized the uniqueness of such a collaboration, as 
evidenced by the following statements on the CSSD’s website: 
The Center for Sustainable Shale Development (CSSD) is an unprecedented, collaborative 
effort of environmental organizations, philanthropic foundations, energy companies and 
other stakeholders committed to safe, environmentally responsible shale resource 
development. 
Based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the CSSD is an independent 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organization whose mission is to support continuous improvement and innovative practices 
through performance standards and third-party certification. Focused on shale development 
in the Appalachian Basin, the Center provides a forum for a diverse group of stakeholders 
to share expertise with the common objective of developing solutions and serving as a 
center of excellence for shale gas development (www.sustainableshale.org).  
Implementation of the performance standards is supported by a third-party auditing 
program to certify gas industry participants who are in compliance with the standards. Fifteen 
initial performance standards were developed to focus on the protection of air, climate and water 
resources. According to the coalition’s website, the standards “represent consensus on what is 
achievable and protective of human health and the environment” from coalition participants 
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(www.sustainableshale.org). The following are key conditions that the performance standards seek 
to address: 
Air & Climate Performance Standards 
• Limitations on the flaring of methane gas at well sites 
• Use of Green Completions to clear debris out of wells & limit methane loss 
• Reduced engine emissions for vehicles serving sites 
• Emissions controls on the release of volatile organic chemicals in storage tanks 
Surface & Ground Water Performance Standards 
• Maximize water recycling to reduce demand of fresh water  
• Develop groundwater protection plan to treat wastewater created during development 
• Implement closed loop drilling to eliminate surface wastewater storage pits 
• Improve well casing design to mitigate risks of rupture in deep wells 
• Establish groundwater monitoring to detect potential contamination 
• Regulate wastewater disposal practices  
• Improve the impoundment integrity of surface wastewater pits to mitigate leaching 
• Reduce the toxicity of fracturing fluids 
Participants indicated that the areas identified were chosen because of the potential degree 
of harm certain development practices could have on human and environmental health, and the 
lack of sufficient regulation to address these practices. See Appendix A for a detailed list of the 
Performance Standards. Indeed, participating companies have all implemented these practices and 
become certified by the CSSD; however, the overall environmental impacts of the CSSD will not 
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be evaluated in this thesis. While some environmental organizations viewed the coalition as a 
positive step forward in providing oversight to an industry that had few constraints in the current 
political environment, other environmental actors were outraged by the alliance. An evaluation of 
the factors underlying this contention within the environmental movement is the focus of my 
dissertation project.  
1.2 My research focus 
Writing almost 30 years ago, Christopher Bosso (1991: 151) suggested that the 
environmental movement had come to reflect such a multiplicity of groups and approaches that 
“calling it a movement obscures the real vibrancy and diversity that lies within it.” More recently, 
other scholars argue that attempting to evaluate the activities of environmental organizations 
through a “movement-centric” lens can undermine attention to the range of cultural orientations 
and logics that constitute environmental ideology and activism (Yearly 2005).  
Walder (2009) argues that movement-centered analyses tend to neglect the fundamental 
question of how the broader social structure shapes the political orientations of social movements 
and the actors within them. Such an approach underappreciates the “fuller constellation of political 
and economic forces and actors” that may influence divergent decision-making and behavior 
among organizations in a social movement field, even as it obscures the role of other important 
actors in episodes of contention (McAdam and Boudet 2012). Additionally, Whittier’s (2018: 199) 
focus on characteristic features of frenemy alliance structures underscores several factors atypical 
of social movement coalitions: the existence of reputational risks to participants, the use of hybrid 
frames for action, frenemy interaction based on a single issue, use of emotional narratives to justify 
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frenemy relationships, and the existence of incongruent collective identities, ideologies and 
networks. My study rests on these premises, as early attempts to understand the motivations of 
environmental organizations that either joined or opposed the coalition, and the contention within 
the movement that ensued as a result, left unanswered questions and motivated my search for a 
broader framework within which to evaluate my case.  
1.2.1 A field-level research framework 
To be sure, a movement-centric analytical lens would have led me to conclude that 
instrumental goals reflecting narrow organizational concerns explained the rationale for either 
joining or opposing the coalition. It would have also led me to conclude that the ensuing contention 
was primarily a result of the adversarial orientation of challenger groups to the ‘mainstream’ tactics 
of more formalized environmental organizations (McAdam and Boudet 2012). A field level 
perspective, however, broadened my analysis and contextualized the strategic decision-making 
that environmental organizations engaged in as they surveyed broader societal and political 
conditions that presented opportunities and constraints for advancing movement goals. This 
perspective also allowed me to situate organizational factors, such as resource mobilization and 
the framing processes of individual groups, in a wider network of potential alliance and conflict 
systems (Klandermans 1997) and proximate fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012) to demonstrate 
that the combination of these forces influenced the formation of the coalition and shaped the 
contention that arose in the environmental movement as a result (Davis and Zald 2005). 
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1.2.2 The strategic action field of environmental organizations 
Generally speaking, actors in the field of environmental organizations share the same goal 
of mitigating environmental pollution and problems. Taking a closer look, the field largely consists 
of, on the one hand, a network of national organizations that operate primarily via professionalized 
and conventional political channels, and, on the other hand, grassroots groups that are rooted 
locally and engage in more disruptive and less conventional political activities (Bosso 2005). 
National groups are primarily concerned with larger policy issues, so their strategies tend to 
revolve around “insider tactics” and conventional political activities like legislative advocacy and 
lobbying (Dalton 2015). Grassroots groups, on the other hand, typically engage in more disruptive 
strategies such as protests and sit-ins (Cable and Cable 1995; Rootes 2007). Their activities are 
centered on “outsider tactics” and they eschew working via conventional political channels.  
Despite the distinctive ideologies and tactics of organizations within the environmental 
movement, there exists an understanding among environmental actors about the movement’s 
general purpose, repertoires of action, and rules of the game for all organizations in the field to 
adhere to (Dalton et al. 2003). These underlying assumptions and the shared goals that exist among 
organizations within the environmental movement constitute their arena of activity as a strategic 
action field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012).   
1.2.3 External actors to the environmental strategic action field  
The state is a key external actor to the strategic action field of environmental organizations 
(Fligstein and McAdam 2011; 2012). This is because most environmental groups focus their 
advocacy efforts on the state, albeit through diverse methods, in pressing for regulations and laws 
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to better protect the environment. Organizations also tend to measure progress of the movement in 
terms of the quality and quantity of environmental policies enacted and enforced (Dalton et al. 
2003). Industry groups represent an additional important external actor to the strategic action field 
of environmental organizations. Environmental organizations have historically maintained an 
adversarial orientation to industry groups and often lobby the state to monitor industry for 
advancing environmental goals. Fiorino (2006) argues that during the 1980’s and 90’s, political 
struggles at the national level between pro- and anti-regulation forces led to ongoing conflict 
between the government, industry and civil society over the best way to mediate environmental 
problems. Industry lobbied for greater flexibility in compliance to support operational innovation 
and efficiency in a changing global landscape, while concerned citizens demanded greater 
regulatory oversight over actors they mistrusted.  
Geopolitical forces and supply problems in the global energy sector during the 1980’s 
facilitated the federal government’s interest in supporting the development of a domestic energy 
supply, and shale gas development held significant promise to fulfill this goal (Burwen and Flegal 
2013). Yet rapidly changing technology in this sector undermined the ability for the government 
to regulate the emerging industry efficiently and helped fuel arguments that compliance with 
federal laws stagnated the industry’s growth potential in an increasingly competitive international 
marketplace. Further, as the source of environmental problems became more complex and varied 
in a developing global economy, questions arose over the capacity of the command-and-control 
approach to effectively handle environmental regulation (Fiorino 2006).  
It was in this political climate that the Clinton Administration announced the “Streamlining 
Environmental Regulation” initiative and Congress commissioned three reports detailing the 
shortcomings of conventional environmental regulation in the mid 1990’s. By the early 2000’s, 
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the federal government mandated the EPA to adopt a new approach to regulation, enabling greater 
flexibility in enforcing environmental laws and relying on the expertise of private firms to guide 
future rulemaking (Fiorino 2006). Indeed, while the government also extended privileges to citizen 
groups for engaging in public comment forums on proposed laws and regulations, most 
environmental decision-making processes neglected to engage public stakeholders in any 
substantive manner (King and Soule 2007). As a result, some organizations in the environmental 
movement shifted their attention away from the state and began directly targeting corporations in 
the private sector through boycotts and other means to advance environmental goals (Davis and 
Zald 2005; Gereffi et al. 2001).  
1.2.4 Environmental-industry alliances  
After several successful national boycott and protest campaigns aimed at Nestle, Chevron 
and The Home Depot in the 1990’s improved the companies’ environmental performance, directly 
targeting corporations gained legitimacy as a movement tactic. By exposing the environmentally 
exploitative practices of these corporations, environmental activists were successful in getting 
some targeted companies to adopt more responsible behaviors (Bartley and Child 2014). However, 
the impact of targeted campaigns that rely on the use of negative tactics is limited. While a direct 
target may be ‘named and shamed’ into adopting more sustainable practices, such a strategy has 
little impact on fostering change among other operators in targeted industries, or on moving the 
needle for regulatory oversight across an entire industry (Bartley and Child 2014). As 
environmental groups waged adversarial campaigns against specific companies, “it set in motion 
a series of battles between companies and their critics, which led to a demand for more credible 
and standardized systems for evaluating claims about the social or environmental impacts of 
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industry operations” (Bartley 2003: 441). Moreover, after the 1992 United Nations Commission 
on Environment and Development failed to produce a binding agreement on global environmental 
management, some environmental actors began exploring alternatives. Out of these efforts came 
a focus on more cooperative methods of direct targeting and private certification programs like the 
Forest Stewardship Council and the Rain Forest Alliance became a part of the environmental 
movement’s repertoire of action (Bartley 2003).  
Despite the emergence of a number of environmental certification schemes by the early 
2000’s, environmental-industry alliances had yet to gain traction as a legitimate tactic for the 
environmental movement (Cashore et al. 2004). By entering into cooperative alliances with 
industry, some environmental actors worry that collaborating with “the enemy” compromises the 
ability of the movement as a whole to challenge industry practices. Collaboration also raises some 
concerns about accountability problems for organizations in the environmental field who may be 
lured into such alliances with financial incentives in exchange for acquiescence and green cover 
to industry practices. Whittier (2018: 2) argues this is a common feature of frenemy relationships, 
such that activist critics of these alliances “often assume that ‘getting in bed with the enemy’ 
inevitably leads to defeat and cooptation.” 
Concerns of this nature can undermine the fragile stability of a field and create a “crisis” 
of collective identity and misunderstanding about the appropriate “rules” for organizational 
practice in a field. These factors can create factionalism within the movement (Whitter 2018), 
ultimately calling into question the boundaries of organizational membership to a field, and the 
capacity of a field to achieve its valued ends (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). When uncertainty of 
this scope seeps into the agreed upon rules for field membership and behavior, conflict that ensues 
has the potential to unravel established relationships and incite protracted conflict among field 
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members. These forces can eventually threaten the survival of the field as a whole. Such concerns 
are the focus my research. 
1.3 Dissertation outline 
Whittier (2018) claims that the “story of social change is a story of frenemies,” thus making 
these alliance structures important objects of study. Moreover, the importance of environmental 
protection in the modern world and the environmental movement’s critical role in advancing this 
imperative, requires that analysts pay attention to the emergence of new structures like 
environmental-industry alliances. My dissertation seeks to evaluate the constellation of factors – 
organizations, leaders, collective identity, frames and resources – that led to the formation of the 
environmental-industry alliance, and to consider the nature of the conflict that occurred within the 
environmental field as a result of the coalition. 
This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. In the following chapter, I discuss the 
theoretical foundations that inform my research methodology and describe the data collected to 
support my analysis. Data for my project includes twenty-seven in-depth semi-structured 
interviews conducted between August 2014 and December 2015, organizational documents from 
environmental groups represented in my sample, and media documents from news outlets in which 
the coalition is discussed. Seventeen of the interviews are with key-decision makers (i.e. executive 
directors, regional directors, and attorneys) from nine environmental organizations active in the 
Pennsylvania region that either participate in, support but do not participate in, or oppose the 
coalition, as well as four interviews with informants from three gas companies that participate in 
the coalition, two interviews with board members of the coalition, one interview with the current 
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and one with the former director of the coalition, and two interviews with government 
representatives. I used a qualitative analysis software program to systematically analyze the data. 
In chapter three, I offer an overview of the intersection of the social movement, 
organizational theory, and strategic action field literatures. In this discussion, I examine literature 
that highlights the idea that though the social movement and organization literatures have largely 
been developed independently of one another, not only are there parallel concepts in each, but the 
body of work in each research tradition complements that of the other tradition (Davis et al. 2005; 
Fligstein and McAdam 2012; McAdam and Scott 2005). In particular, I explain that perspectives 
in organizational studies underscore the tendency of fields to gravitate toward stability (Dimaggio 
and Powell 1983), and social movement studies highlight episodes of conflict and change 
(McAdam and Scott 2005). I argue that Fligstein and McAdam (2012) combine both perspectives 
in arguing that while fields may generally reflect stability, that stability is a fragile balance 
constantly negotiated between organizations in the field.  
In the third chapter, I also present a conceptualization of the strategic action field of the 
environmental movement. While actors in the environmental movement all seek to address 
environmental pollution and problems, a closer look at the goals, ideologies, and preferred 
strategies of groups in the environmental movement reveals a broad field of diverse organizations, 
ideologies and capacities (Bosso 2005; Ogrodnik and Staggenborg 2016).  
In the fourth chapter, I situate the details of my case in the literatures described in earlier 
chapters, analyzing the contention that ensued among environmental organizations as a result of 
the formation of the environmental-industry coalition. I demonstrate that the coalition disrupted 
rules upon which the environmental field had been settled and incited fear among some groups 
about their capacity to maneuver and adapt to changes occurring within their field. By choosing to 
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engage in coalition work with industry, the alliance created uncertainty about established field 
rules, violated the movement’s collective identity, and threatened the viability of the 
environmental field as a whole to deal with the impacts of shale gas development.  
In chapter five, I analyze the influence of framing processes and the perception of political 
opportunities and threats as motivations for supporting or opposing the coalition. While challenger 
groups perceived the formation of the coalition as a threat to their organizational capacity and to 
advancing movement goals on fracking, participating organizations welcomed it as an opportunity 
to fashion a “winning coalition” that could generate new repertoires of collective action (Fligstein 
and McAdam 2012: 107). Overall, I find that participating organizations perceive the coalition to 
be an important tool for advancing the environmental movement’s goals by helping to create and 
implement environmental protections for shale gas development within a constrained political 
climate. 
In the sixth chapter, I analyze the impact of resource mobilization and organizational 
learning on the motivation of environmental organizations to join or oppose the coalition. I 
demonstrate that, while financial support may have inspired the initial decision to participate in 
the coalition, organizations remained invested in the coalition even after the elimination of 
foundation funding. Representatives of these organizations expressed the view that cooperatively 
engaging with industry increases their credibility vis-a-vis the state, thus improving their ability to 
gain access to elite political circles to advance future campaigns. On the other hand, I illustrate 
how environmental-industry alliances threaten environmental groups that are resource poor 
relative to other organizations in their field, as these groups are reliant on larger organizations for 
sustaining the viability of the field, as well as their own survival on some occasions. Accordingly, 
when organizations in the environmental field choose to ally with industry instead of other actors 
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in the field, I argue that uncertainty settles in regarding the ability for resource poor groups to 
coalesce with other organizations to secure their own existence and advance mutual goals.   
In the final chapter, I demonstrate how a field level perspective contextualizes the strategic 
decision-making that environmental organizations engage in as they survey broader societal and 
political conditions that present opportunities and constraints for advancing movement goals, in 
addition to supporting the organizational imperatives of resource mobilization and maintenance. 
A field level framework engenders a deeper appreciation for the underlying structures that incite 
the contention of challenger groups, transcending the traditional focus on their contempt for 
institutionalized politics to an emphasis on the uncertainty these groups face when organizations 
in their field seemingly shift their loyalties to actors that have long been established as the 
movement’s chief target. I also show that while participation in environmental-industry coalitions 
is a relatively new form of action for environmental organizations, on the whole the motivations 
to participate in them are not indicative of acquiescence to movement co-optation by industry 
groups or of narrow self-interest to secure financial resources. Rather, I argue that the motivations 
largely reflect a process of strategic decision-making and adaptation to societal changes over which 
the organizations have no control, and a decision to employ one strategy among others they believe 
to be effective for advancing environmental goals (Delmas and Young 2009).  
1.4 Contributions to the literature 
Through this project, I seek to contribute to the emerging body of work focused on the 
intersection of social movement and organizational theory, and on Whittier’s (2018) research on 
frenemies. In my analysis, I demonstrate that, while a movement-centered approach to analyzing 
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the environmental-industry coalition might emphasize the divergence of preferred strategies and 
tactics between groups in the environmental movement (Bosso 2005), my research suggests that a 
more comprehensive examination of organizational characteristics, social movement dimensions, 
and field-level factors is necessary to understand the circumstances that underlie the coalition’s 
formation and the conflict among environmental groups that followed (Davis et al. 2005; Fligstein 
and McAdam 2012). While directly engaging with industry is a relatively new form of action for 
environmental organizations, on the whole the motivations underlying this tactic are not indicative 
of acquiescence to movement co-optation by industry groups or of narrow self-interest to secure 
financial resources, but rather an effort to mutually advance field level goals and organizational 
imperatives. Additionally, my case offers empirical evidence to reveal how a field level framework 
engenders a deeper appreciation for the underlying structures that incite the reactive mobilization 
of challenger groups. A field-level perspective transcends the traditional focus in social movement 
studies on these groups’ contempt for institutionalized politics to an emphasis on the uncertainty 
these groups face when organizations in their field seemingly shift their loyalties to actors that 
have long been established as chief enemies of the field.  
Finally, my research contributes to the empirical literature on social movement coalitions. 
Despite the scholarly attention to the formation of coalitions among social movement 
organizations (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010), little work examines factors that influence 
organizations to pursue extra-movement, and in some cases, contentious, alliances. Whittier’s 
(2018) research on frenemy alliance structures between feminist and conservative activists 
opposed to sexual violence is a critical contribution to this literature. My case provides another 
unique opportunity to study the rare phenomenon of extra-movement and contentious alliances, 
and to evaluate the potential impact such alliances can have on a movement’s stability. 
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2.0 Theoretical foundations and analytical methods 
2.1 Introduction 
Any research project that focuses on the dynamics of social movements and the 
organizations that comprise them rests fundamentally on insights gleaned from the literature on 
collective action. Theories of collective action are germane to understanding the mobilization of 
groups and alliance structures, and therefore should inform the research methodologies adopted 
for a project of this scope. In this chapter, I provide an overview of the key works that constitute 
the literature on collective action, and the different analytical frameworks that support the 
empirical foundations of this field. Additionally, I offer a brief discussion on the merits and 
limitations of the various methodologies utilized in this discipline, explaining why I adopted a case 
study approach for my study. Finally, I describe the data collection methods and analytical 
framework utilized for my project. 
2.2 Collective action for environmental protection 
A growing body of literature within sociology and political science analyzes the complex 
relationship between the world’s ecosystems and the diverse social systems that utilize and rely on 
them. Researchers within this field seek to evaluate the social and contextual factors that underlie 
environmental problems and the proposed solutions to address them (Janssen 2002; Berkes et al. 
2003; Young et al 2008). Much of this literature highlights the importance of mobilizing social 
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structures that help to facilitate the processes of collective action needed to effectively solve 
environmental problems (Davidson-Hunt and Berkes 2003). Mobilizing structures are the 
“collective vehicles”, such as networks and organizational structures, “through which people 
mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996). In other words, mobilizing 
structures provide the vehicles through which individual behavior is coordinated into group action. 
My project is broadly situated in this paradigm of scholarship as my research considers the social 
and political processes that inform the emergence of collective action to address environmental 
problems associated with natural gas development in Pennsylvania and the surrounding region 
(Young 2002; Young et al. 2008).  
2.2.1 Social movement coalitions and collective action 
From a general perspective, social movements “consist of shifting coalitions of constituents 
from varying backgrounds who typically form a number of different social movement 
organizations” (Staggenborg 1986: 374). In other words, social movements are comprised of 
organizations that cooperate with other groups working toward mutual goals. Interorganizational 
collaboration is typically motivated by the presence of external threats or opportunities that signal 
a need for new strategies to meet organizational objectives (Gray 1989). Brokering new 
relationships and pooling resources enable organizations to navigate turbulent environments or 
pursue more ambitious goals. But organizations are dynamic entities with competing interests and 
capacities (Kanter 1981), and research demonstrates that coalitions are most easily fostered among 
groups with similar preference structures, ideological orientations, and resource levels (Van Dyke 
and McCammon 2010; Zald and McCarthy 1987). These similarities help to smooth the pathways 
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to coalition work by engendering norms of trust and reciprocity necessary for cooperative action 
(Ostrom 2005). 
Empirical studies on environmental coalitions indicate that a primary motivation for 
environmental organizations to coalesce with organizations outside of their field is to gain access 
to arenas from which they are normally excluded. This is for the purpose of creating transparent 
and participatory decision-making structures to advance environmental imperatives (Fung and 
Wright 2003). Advocates of this strategy argue that conflictual and adversarial approaches to 
solving environmental problems lead to insufficient outcomes, and that collaboration with cross-
sector partners engenders deeper and more sustained progress toward environmental goals (Sabel 
et al. 2000).  
Yet a fuller appreciation of the capacity of organizations to coalesce in an unlikely – and 
in this case contentious – alliance requires attention to research in the collective action field. This 
research highlights the critical social processes that must be present to enable diverse organizations 
to overcome their structural, ideological and resource-based differences to coalesce in pursuit of a 
common goal. Such insights are critical not only for providing a deeper understanding of the 
factors that motivate cooperation among unlikely partners, but also for guiding the research 
methodologies adopted for a project of this focus.  
2.3 Foundations of the collective action research paradigm 
Foundations of the collective action research paradigm can be traced to Mancur Olson’s 
(1965) The Logic of Collective Action and Garrett Hardin’s (1968) “The Tragedy of the 
Commons.” Olson (1965) stressed the “free-rider” problem, the idea that social actors perceive the 
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costs of mobilizing for a common good to outweigh the benefits, thereby creating one of the most 
fundamental challenges to mobilization and collection action. Hardin (1968) furthered this theory 
by arguing that rational actors lack individual incentives to cooperate and therefore will use the 
commons to the point of its destruction. These pessimistic viewpoints established the early 
theoretical foundations of the collective action field.  
A number of years later, Russell Hardin (1982) expanded on these foundations by arguing 
that collective action problems must be analyzed in the context of dynamic social relationships. 
He explained that in ongoing social interactions, an individual’s anticipation of future interactions 
impacts one’s present decisions, and thus, any decision to mobilize or not must take into 
consideration the effects of an actor’s strategic decision-making processes in dynamic contexts. 
Axelrod (1984) sought to empirically test Hardin’s (1982) premise that cooperative behavior must 
be understood as a socially dynamic process. By executing a series of iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma 
games via a “computer tournament” in which individuals repeatedly “competed” over the course 
of time, Axelrod (1984) found that cooperative behavior tends to voluntarily emerge when 
individuals can expect to meet one another in future social interactions. 
In her groundbreaking analysis of a community-managed water table resource, Elinor 
Ostrom (1990) furthered Axelrod’s (1984) theory on collective action. Ostrom (1990) helped to 
debunk G. Hardin’s (1968) theory of the tragedy of the commons by illustrating numerous case 
studies from around the world of successful collaborative environmental management alliances. 
One of her key findings is that even among actors with conflicting interests, effective collective 
action has the potential to take shape if the following social criteria exist: the existence of frequent 
and extensive communication among resource users, the development and use of specific resource 
management rules, and the inclusion of sanctioning mechanisms to punish non-conformers. 
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Ostrom and her colleagues (1994) offered further evidence through formal laboratory experiments 
to demonstrate that structured opportunities for communication and information sharing are critical 
in these instances because it enables the creation of a shared understanding and system of rules for 
the management of resources, as well as sets expectations for future group interactions. These 
insights helped pave the way for empirically based analyses of collective action.  
2.3.1 Reconciling rational actors and collective action 
Fundamental to research on collective action is the understanding that individual interests 
must be “reconciled” with collective choices to effect cooperative behavior (Lichbach 1996). This 
notion primarily grounds analyses of collective action in the rational actor paradigm of human 
behavior (Ostrom 2005; Lichbach 1996). The primary assumption underlying the rational actor 
approach to human behavior is that individuals act in order to maximize their personal welfare 
(Lichbach 2003). However, scholars of collective action have effectively demonstrated that 
individual behavior in cooperative situations is influenced by social interaction, and therefore, they 
argue that theories of rational behavior must be modified to reflect this reality.  
In particular, Ostrom (1998) argues that theories on collective action and mobilization need 
to engage a behavioral theory of “bounded rationality” (c.f. Simon 1957). The concept of bounded 
rationality underscores the notion that individuals rarely (if ever) possess complete information 
about others’ future behavior and cannot perfectly calculate the consequences of choosing 
alternative courses of action in social situations. Yet bounded rationality also assumes that 
individuals have a dynamic ability to utilize heuristics, learn norms, and craft rules to aid in 
decision making in social interaction. These abilities, in turn, often orient one towards agreeing to 
cooperative ends (Ostrom 1998). Ostrom (1998) adds that bounded rationality better explains the 
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tendency for individuals who interact with one another to develop trust and norms of reciprocity. 
It also facilitates an incentive to maintain one’s reputation in social interaction. When mutual 
commitments increase individual returns to cooperative behavior, interest in maintaining a 
reputation among group members is also enhanced, thus deepening commitment to that group. 
Communication encourages the exchange of information among individuals and can reduce the 
uncertainty of future interaction (Ostrom 1998). When participants have the opportunity to 
communicate, they tend to discuss how to build norms to encourage compliance with more 
collectively beneficial arrangements and outcomes (Ostrom et al. 2007).  
Overall, conclusions from both case study analysis and laboratory experiments 
demonstrate that dynamic social processes, and especially frequent and extensive communication, 
are germane to engendering opportunities for collective action and the formation of strategic 
alliances. Ongoing communication and interaction enable actors with competing values, interests 
and resource levels to exchange information, develop new perspectives and engage in deliberative 
processes for the creation of mutually beneficial outcomes. Additionally, evidence demonstrates 
that while specific contexts and histories matter for the emergence of collective action, when a 
coalition implements formal mechanisms that facilitate the development of trust, norms of 
reciprocity, and an incentive to maintain one’s reputation within the alliance, cooperative 
outcomes have a tendency to emerge (Ostrom 2005; Poteete et al. 2010). These insights are critical 
for understanding how unlikely – and in this case contentious – coalitions have the capacity to 
form.  
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2.4 Merits and limitations of the primary methodological approaches 
A critical step in my research process was evaluating the methodological approaches that 
supported theoretical advancements in the field of collective action and identifying the most 
promising research design for my study. Taking into consideration the uniqueness of my case, my 
proximity to research participants relevant to the coalition, and my focus on the meaning making 
that research participants afforded to their experiences related to shale gas development and the 
coalition, I describe below the methodology adopted for my dissertation.  
2.4.1 Strengths and limitations of case studies for analyzing collective action 
Case study research has been important for drawing attention to unexpected relationships 
between different variables of interest in collective action. In particular, Poteete et al. (2010) state 
that case study research has helped to reveal the different ways heterogeneity impacts outcomes 
for environmental protection. They claim that in-depth knowledge of the situation and related 
characteristics is necessary to help decipher complex processes and contingent relationships that 
lead to specific outcomes in particular cases (Poteete et al. 2010: 54). Furthermore, Whittier’s 
(2018) analysis of frenemy alliance structures involving feminist and conservative movement 
activists highlights the importance of contextually specific factors that inform each of the three 
cases she analyzes. In her analysis, she presents three types of frenemy relationships: collaborative 
adversarial relationship, narrow neutrality, and ambivalent alliance. Because each of these types 
of relationships “rest on constructions of meaning,” i.e., on beliefs about the effectiveness of 
frames, the ideological implications of relevant policies, and the capacity to trust frenemy 
intentions, Whittier’s (2018) study demonstrates that case studies are important for providing 
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access to the rich data required to depict the meaning making participants ascribe to their decision-
making and behavior. Thus, the case study approach plays a critical role in supporting the 
development of nuanced understandings of the dynamics of collective action across diverse 
situations. 
2.4.2 Case studies for environmental coalitions  
The case study approach maintains several strengths over other available methods. First, 
empirical field-based research is often the only available option for the analysis of coalitions that 
are context specific and involve complex rules and arrangements. Case study research in these 
instances enables researchers to utilize place and situation specific knowledge to tease out causal 
processes in explaining the emergence of certain outcomes in different environmental management 
situations (Snow and Trom 2002; Young et al. 2008).  
Additionally, case study research has allowed researchers to engage in important testing of 
some the classic theoretical assumptions of collective action. Indeed, such research has helped to 
debunk some of the assumptions of Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons and of Olson’s (1965) 
free-rider problem. Poteete et al. (2010) explain that case study research challenged the 
conventional wisdom on collective action by demonstrating that: (1) cooperation could occur in 
the absence of state regulatory schemes; (2) collaborative arrangements often reflected ‘secure’ 
agreements that incorporated sanctions for noncompliance; and (3) in some cases, efforts of the 
coalition resulted in superior environmental outcomes than did conventional state/regulatory based 
approaches.  
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2.4.3 My research design 
I chose the case study approach because of the exceptionality of the case of the Center for 
Sustainable Shale Development, an unusual coalition of adversarial participants with competing 
interests and ideologies. To my knowledge, no other environmental-industry alliance exists to 
address the impacts of shale gas development. While Corbett’s Marcellus Shale Gas Advisory 
Committee could be classified as a narrowly neutral collaborative effort involving industry and 
environmental participants, that the alliance was commissioned by the state and focused only on 
developing high-level recommendations for shale gas policy distinguishes it from the contentious 
nature of the CSSD. Further, the exceptionality of the CSSD case is reinforced by the awareness 
that industry and environmental actors in the state of Texas attempted to form a coalition that 
modeled the CSSD. Due to the participant’s lack of commitment to the collaboration, the effort 
fizzled not long after the alliance was initiated (Interview, September 9, 2014). 
Conclusions in the methods literature for studying collective action suggest that a coalition 
like the CSSD is a highly unusual phenomenon that requires in-depth analysis. As Maxwell (2005: 
90) explains, the selection of ‘extreme’ cases can provide critical opportunities to test established 
theories in ways that representative cases cannot. Thus, identifying the CSSD as my case of choice 
based on its exceptionality supports my ability to test certain conclusions that have been 
established in the literature on collective action and interorganizational collaboration.  
Furthermore, a case study approach reflects my interest in understanding the locally 
relevant aspects of my study (Maxwell 2005). Not only does this methodology enable me to 
develop a rich understanding of the unique contextual factors of the case, but additionally, it 
enhances my capacity to evaluate the complex and dynamic social processes that support its 
formation and associated contention. Finally, the case study method supports my ability to evaluate 
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the meaning-making coalition participants and opponents attribute to the alliance’s formation and 
to the impact it has on the environmental field and the organizations within it.  
2.4.4 Limitations of the case study approach  
Despite the strengths of the case study method and the important role this approach has 
played in advancing the field of collective action, scholars point to several limitations of this 
methodological approach. One of the primary limitations of the case study method is the inability 
to generalize analytical conclusions (Snow and Trom 2002). Often case study research involves 
only one or a few cases. This condition lacks the statistical power necessary for making generalized 
assumptions and for systematically comparing and synthesizing conclusions (Ostrom 2005). 
However, Snow and Trom (2002) contend that while case studies lack statistical generalizability 
of their conclusions, what they do offer is the ability to empirically test particular theories, thus 
helping to do the work of theoretical development and refinement.  
Additional weaknesses of the case study approach include indeterminacy and selection 
bias. Indeterminacy refers to an analysis in which “observations are consistent with more than one 
hypothesis” (Poteete et al. 2010: 36). Indeterminacy in case studies does not usually result from a 
lack of data, but rather “generally arises from the close correlation of conditions of interest” 
(Poteete et al. 2010: 36). Given the small sample size and limited degrees of freedom inherent in 
case study methods, analysts are unable to control for different variables in order to conclusively 
determine causality. Furthermore, indeterminacy poses a challenge because of the dynamic nature 
of social processes and of the non-linear progression of outcomes in cooperative resource 
management cases. Thus, while the case study approach can be a useful method for teasing out 
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complex social processes, making determinate conclusions of causality can be a challenge when 
conditions of interest may be closely correlated.  
Selection bias is also a risk inherent to the case study approach. Indeed, the analysis of 
successful cases of collective action of unlikely partners are not only more easily identifiable than 
non-successful ones, but also failures of collective action can often be attributed to non-action 
rather than to a break-down of social processes that can undermine cooperative efforts (Poteete et 
al. 2010). Thus, selection bias through the case study approach can lead to the over-representation 
of successful occurrences of collective action and can bias analytical conclusions related to the 
study of general relationships in this field (McAdam and Boudet 2012). 
2.4.5 Other methodological options for studying collective action 
Just as case study research helped to debunk conventional theories of collective action, 
laboratory experiments exposed the theoretical limitations of the rational-choice model of 
individual behavior in these situations (Poteete et al 2010). In essence, laboratory experiments 
revealed that individuals pursue a variety of behaviors across different situations, and that most 
commonly, individuals tend to engage in bounded rationality and adopt ‘conditionally cooperative’ 
behavior in collective action situations. Laboratory experiments also helped to reveal that 
cooperative behavior typically arises when individuals have the opportunity to communicate with 
one another, and even more frequently when they have the opportunity to devise sanctioning 
schemes to encourage compliance (Ostrom et al. 1994). These findings ultimately engendered 
important theoretical extensions to the traditional rational-actor model of individual behavior and 
helped to foster a better understanding of what social factors most likely lead to cooperative 
outcomes.  
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There are significant limitations of the laboratory experiment approach. One of the main 
limitations is that laboratory experiments tend to oversimplify the complexity inherent in complex 
environmental management scenarios. While simplification in laboratory experiments is a 
necessity for enabling the control of particular variables, some analysts argue that this structure 
thus fails to capture important dynamics that are affected by complex resource characteristics and 
social relationships (Poteete et al. 2010).   
A more recent methodological development in the field of collective action is the use of 
formal mathematical modeling and simulation techniques to evaluate the conditions under which 
cooperation tends to emerge. This technique is called agent-based modeling, a methodology that 
utilizes computational representations to evaluate how micro-level mechanisms impact the 
development of macro-level patterns in social situations (Poteete et al. 2010). Agent-based models 
are constructed from information-processing algorithms that specify various assumptions about 
individual behavior and patterns of social interactions. Agents are represented in the models by 
dynamic variables that are capable of interacting with other agents and of engaging in goal-oriented 
behavior (Poteete et al. 2010: 174). Given its capability of capturing dynamic processes, agent-
based modeling represents a cutting-edge methodology for analyzing the relationship between 
individual behavior and social outcomes.  
However, a primary weakness of agent-based modeling is the inability for agent-based 
models to test hypotheses in a rigorous way. This challenge is underscored by the “lack of widely 
practiced protocols for documenting work in agent-based modeling carefully so that scholars can 
check and build upon each-other’s work” (Poteete et al. 2010: 177). Given these realities, few 
resources exist for analysts who use agent-based modeling and who wish to validate their models 
or cross-reference other’s work to aid in the development of new research. Other limitations of 
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agent-based modeling include the inability for models to capture the complexity associated with 
real life situations (Janssen and Ostrom 2006). While scholars are currently attempting to develop 
new ways of adding levels of complexity to the models, these efforts remain in their nascency. 
In sum, analysts cautiously offer that the choice of methods available for research on 
collective action and unlikely alliances will naturally involve tradeoffs (Poteete et al. 2010). These 
trade-offs include choosing between rich and contextually specific case studies and more 
systematic and generalizable analyses. While each method entails unique merits and limitations, 
scholars underscore that choosing an approach should be based on a number of factors: the 
availability and quality of data, the resources and timeframe accessible to the researcher, and the 
nature of the questions proposed for analysis (Maxwell 2005). Regardless of which method is 
chosen, scholars add that no single methodology should monopolize the research agenda and that 
each of the various methods has different and important contributions to make for advancing 
knowledge within the collective action field. 
2.5 Methodological framework of my project 
Taking into consideration the strengths and limitations of the different research 
methodologies described above, the methodology chosen for my project is a case study of the 
Center for Sustainable Shale Development (CSSD). Utilizing the case study research 
methodology, I evaluate from a field-level perspective the constellation of factors that facilitated 
the formation of the environmental-industry alliance, and the contention that ensued in the 
environmental movement as a result.  
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2.5.1 Research methods 
Data collected for my project include twenty-seven in-depth semi-structured interviews 
conducted between August 2014 and December 2015, organizational documents from 
environmental groups represented in my sample, and media documents from news outlets in which 
the CSSD is discussed. Seventeen of the interviews are with key-decision makers (executive 
directors, regional directors, and attorneys) from nine environmental organizations active in the 
Pennsylvania region that either participate in, support but do not participate in, or oppose the 
CSSD, as well as four interviews with informants from three gas companies that participate in the 
CSSD, two interviews with board members of the CSSD, one interview with the current and one 
with the former director of the CSSD, and two interviews with government representatives. 
2.5.2 Participant selection 
Participants in my study were purposively chosen in order to develop a robust description 
and understanding of my case (Maxwell 2005). To evaluate the motivations behind the 
organizational decision to join the CSSD, the social processes that facilitated its formation, and 
the field and organizational level factors that engendered the contention, I identified the following 
informants as critical participants to the study: 
1. Leaders of participating environmental organizations who possess decision-making 
authority over the organization’s participation in the CSSD 
2. Leaders of non-participating environmental organizations who possess organizational 
decision-making authority and oppose the CSSD 
3. Representatives of gas corporations participating in the CSSD 
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4. Key neutral arbiters and government representatives that participate in the CSSD 
Environmental informants are representatives of organizations that fall within any one of 
the four classifications below. When appropriate, I specify the organizational classification 
throughout my dissertation to provide further clarity on the field-level framework adopted for the 
project.  
 
 Coalition participants Coalition non-participants 
 
 
 
Incumbent organizations 
 
 
 
 
• Environmental Defense Fund  
• Pennsylvania Environmental 
Council  
• Clean Air Task Force  
• Citizens for Pennsylvania’s 
Future (PennFuture)  
 
 
• Western Pennsylvania 
Conservancy 
• Nature Conservancy 
• Sierra Club 
• Natural Resource Defense 
Council 
 
Challenger organizations 
 
 
 
 
• Group Against Smog and 
Pollution (GASP) 
 
• Marcellus Protest 
• PennEnvironment 
• Clean Water Action 
 
Figure 3. Organizational Classification 
 
Furthermore, because a central focus of my study was on understanding the meaning-
making and motivations behind the environmental organizations’ decision to participate in or 
oppose the CSSD, engaging decision-makers of environmental organizations was critical to 
gaining insight into the purposeful strategies that each organization adopted.  
Additionally, I attempted to address selection bias by interviewing leaders of non-
participating organizations. This allowed me to systematically compare data from both types of 
sources to minimize the prevalence of “key informant bias” wherein my conclusions could have 
been skewed in the favor of the participating organizations had I only interviewed informants from 
those organizations (Maxwell 2005). Furthermore, by including industry representatives and 
neutral arbiters as participants in my study, I was also able to comparably analyze participant 
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depictions of the dynamic social processes that occurred among actors within the CSSD. This 
purposive approach to selecting participants for my study helps to increase the validity of my 
research conclusions.  
2.5.3 Interview methods 
For the study, I conducted semi-structured, open-ended and intensive interviews. This 
structure enabled me to evaluate how my informants make meaning out of the contextual factors 
of the case, and their interpretation of the broader political climate and field environment. Semi-
structured and open-ended interviews also enabled me to identify and tease out the dynamic 
processes of social interaction that influenced the coalition’s formation and the contention that 
followed. Questions developed for the interview were based on key insights established in the 
collective action literature, and on my own understanding and awareness of the case at hand.  
2.5.4 Analytical methods 
Interviews for my study were recorded with the informant’s permission, transcribed in full, 
and uploaded into the qualitative analysis software program MaxQDA. Subsequently, I reviewed 
the material to identify patterns and anomalies in the data. Patterns that emerged in the data were 
categorized and established as analytical codes in the qualitative analysis software program. Codes 
were formulated from key theoretical concepts utilized in the social movement and organization 
theory literatures. The goal of coding is to “fracture” the data (Strauss 1987) so it can be arranged 
into categories that facilitate comparison and aid in generating explanations based on patterns that 
emerged in my analysis. Relationships that emerge between codes were key to informing my 
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analytical conclusions. The use of MaxQDA enabled me to organize and systematically compare 
categories of data to identify relationships and establish conclusions for the study.  
2.5.5 Validation 
Throughout the study, I tried to remain as aware as possible to my own inherent biases as 
a researcher, and how this could have impacted the validity of the results of my study. On the one 
hand, my position as an environmentalist with a long history in the field provided me with both 
easy access to key informants in the field, as well as enhanced my ability to generate rich data with 
minimal reliance on inference that may otherwise been a hinderance to my analysis (Maxwell 
2005: 110). This long-term and intensive involvement in the field also enabled me to more deeply 
understand the meaning making participants generated as a result of the contextual dynamics and 
realities of operating within the environmental field.  
While my long-standing position in the field may have improved my credibility among 
environmental informants, this history may have hampered my credibility with industry 
informants. To minimize perceptions that I was an adversarial researcher, I did express my general 
positive perception of the coalition to most informants. While this may have impacted how some 
informants expressed their views, I attempted to minimize my reactivity to all informant responses 
and made a concerted effort to react neutrally to the communication, whether I agreed or not with 
what was being offered (Maxwell 2005).  
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2.6 Conclusion 
Considering the merits and limitations of each methodology for the study of collective 
action and unlikely coalitions, in addition to the availability of contextually rich data that my case 
offers, this chapter describes the reasons I chose to adopt a case study approach for my project. By 
utilizing this methodology, I am able to evaluate specific contextual factors of my case to tease out 
causal processes in explaining the emergence of the CSSD and contention within the 
environmental field that surrounded its formation (Poteete et al. 2010; Young et al. 2008). While 
a case-study approach may limit the generalizability of my conclusions, this study is ultimately 
most relevant for explaining the nuanced dynamics of the particular case at hand, and for testing 
specific conclusions established in the collective action, social movements and organization theory 
literatures. Analyses that consider exceptional cases like the CSSD are critical for revealing what 
factors are key to engendering cooperative action to better address environmental problems in a 
world where resource management and environmental protection is a complex process rife with 
competing interests, limited resources, and a diversity of actors (Young et al. 2008).  
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3.0 Conceptual framework: strategic action fields 
3.1 Introduction 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) argue that central to understanding collection action is the 
need to conceptualize a meso-level social order that links individual interests with coordinated 
group behavior. To this end, they claim that fields are the ‘basic building blocks’ of modern 
political and organizational life that serve to coordinate individual behavior into (relatively) 
ordered arenas of social action (2012: 3). Within these arenas, motivations to seek and maintain 
order in a given field rest on material interests and power, as well as, according to Fligstein and 
McAdam, existential concerns.  
In the field of sociology, and social movement studies in particular, a key preoccupation of 
analysis is evaluating the factors that incite mobilization during periods of instability and 
uncertainty in previously settled social arenas. Taking this preoccupation one step further, a core 
question that Fligstein and McAdam seek to address with their theory of fields is: What makes 
actors cooperate with one another, even when conflict is prevalent? While sociologists would 
typically focus their analysis on the conditions in which actors resist certain structures and ‘create 
alternative worlds’, organizational theorists usually pay attention to the emergence of formal 
organizations that engender stability and to the rules and conventions formed to resolve the 
contention (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 5-6). Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) theoretical 
framework seeks to draw on key insights from both literatures to provide a comprehensive 
analysis. 
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3.2 A theory of fields 
Fligstein and McAdam’s theory of fields delineates a framework for analysis that draws on 
the central tenants of each of the sociological and organizational literatures. They claim that a 
robust analysis of collective action and social life must consider the influence of contextual forces 
occurring at both the micro and macro levels, as well as the interdependence of agency and 
structure. From a field perspective, social life is best understood by evaluating the complex web 
of relationships that shape organized groups and how these groups define and transform their social 
arenas (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Accordingly, field analysts must first specify elements of 
the field of interest (structure) in addition to the social processes that engender collective action 
(agency) to gain a comprehensive picture of social life, especially during episodes of contention. 
They state: 
Strategic action fields are the fundamental units of collective action in society. A 
strategic action field is a constructed mesolevel social order in which actors (who can 
be individual or collective) are attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of a 
shared (which is not to say consensual) understandings about the purposes of 
the field, relationships to others in the field (including who has power and why), 
and the rules governing legitimate action in the field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 9).  
Subfields are embedded within broader strategic action fields, similar to how social 
movement scholars define social movement organizations as existing as a part of a social 
movement community or industry (i.e. environmental organizations are fields unto themselves 
embedded within the broader field of the environmental movement), or the way organizational 
scholars would identify a private college as a field in and of itself embedded in the larger field of 
higher education. Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 10) see strategic action fields as “socially 
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constructed arenas within which actors with varying resource endowments vie for strategic 
advantage.” The key takeaway is that the dynamics of field relationships are the primary drivers 
of stability, contention and change within social life (Fligstein and McAdam 2012).  
3.2.1 The social construction of strategic action fields 
 Fligstein and McAdam (2012) contend that strategic action fields are socially constructed 
by three important processes. The first is that membership within a field is based more on 
subjective interpretation than on objective criteria. The second is that the boundaries of strategic 
action fields are malleable and can shift depending on the issue at hand and actors involved. 
Finally, fields are delineated by the shared meanings that field actors create over time to define 
field membership. The shared meanings among field members reflect an awareness of the field as 
a legitimate space for coordinated social action, an understanding of who the more and less 
powerful actors are in the field, and an appreciation for the general rules of appropriate behavior 
within the field.  
However, Fligstein and McAdam (2012) clearly point out that groups within a field may 
not necessarily possess consensus on universal standards of behavior for all field actors, but rather 
hold loose interpretive frames for defining appropriate action based on more self-reinforcing 
parameters. Additionally, they contend that chronic and mild contention is always present among 
more and less powerful field actors (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Less powerful actors are 
consistently looking for opportunities to improve their position within the field, and more powerful 
actors to maintain the status quo. 
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3.2.2  Actors within strategic action fields   
A strategic action field is comprised of three classes of actors that operate within the field 
- incumbents, challengers, and external actors (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Incumbent actors 
(referred to as “dominant” actors in McAdam and Scott 2005; see also Gamson 1975) are the 
groups and organizations that wield the greatest influence over activities that occur within the field 
and whose interests the field order generally benefits. Their perspectives tend to be the dominant 
viewpoints held within the field - to be sure, they are often the very actors whose actions led to the 
original formation of the field - and the shared meanings of field membership and purpose tend to 
legitimate their superior position within the field. Challengers, on the other hand, are groups that 
“usually articulate an alternative vision of the field and their position in it” and at times attempt to 
disrupt the position of incumbent actors in the field to bolster their own standing (Fligstein and 
McAdam 2012: 13). While challengers typically are aware of and adhere to the dominant logic 
upheld by incumbents within the field, they are quick to capitalize on any opportunity to question 
the prevailing order and mold the field to their own logics.  
Additionally, strategic action fields are embedded in a wider context that contains external 
actors and fields that, while not central to the field of study, can influence the course of action of 
organizations within the field of interest. A significant external actor that influences activity in 
most fields is the state, reflected in the extent to which a strategic action field and the organizations 
within it are dependent on state action for carrying out their activities (Fligstein and McAdam 
2012: 19). The degree of interdependency between fields determines whether the field is a 
‘proximate’ or ‘distant’ field to the field of interest. For instance, both the state and fossil fuel 
industry are proximate fields to the environmental field, while the professional sports industry 
would be classified as a distant field to the environmental field.  
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3.3 The field of environmental organizations  
While actors in the environmental movement all seek to address environmental pollution 
and problems, a closer look at the goals, ideologies, and preferred strategies of groups in the 
environmental movement reveals a broad field of diverse groups and organizations. A common 
way this diversity is categorized is to describe the movement as consisting of, on the one hand, a 
network of national environmental organizations that operate primarily via professionalized and 
conventional political channels, and, on the other hand, grassroots groups that are rooted locally 
and engage in more disruptive and less conventional political activities (Bosso 2005; Ogrodnik 
and Staggenborg 2016). While this distinction reflects an overgeneralization of the actors and 
organizations that constitute the movement, it nonetheless serves as an apt way to categorize the 
incumbents and challengers within the strategic action field of environmental organizations.  
3.3.1 Incumbent actors in the environmental field 
As mentioned earlier, incumbents in a strategic action field are those organizations 
typically endowed with the greatest level of resources relative to other actors in the field, and 
around which the status quo of the field generally benefits. In conceptualizing the strategic action 
field of environmental organizations, national environmental organizations like the Clean Air Task 
Force, Environmental Defense Fund, as well as PennFuture and the Pennsylvania Environmental 
Council, represent the incumbents of the regional environmental field, with their formalized 
structures, large resource base, and access to political circles (Bosso 2005). These organizations 
are hierarchal in nature and possess a professional staff of scientists, lawyers, and administrators. 
Their professional structure not only enables them to function like interest groups in lobbying for 
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national policy issues and develop extensive political networks, but it also maintains their “good” 
standing with foundations willing to provide funds for their ongoing activity and advocacy (Bosso 
2005; Rudel et al. 2011).  
3.3.2 Challenger groups in the environmental field 
Grassroots environmental groups, with their decentralized structures and limited access to 
financial resources and decision-makers (Schlosberg 1999), represent the challengers in the 
strategic action field of environmental organizations. Regional examples of challenger groups 
include Group Against Smog and Pollution (GASP), PennEnvironment, Marcellus Protest and 
Clean Water Action. Grassroots groups are typically characterized by a diffuse network of 
community members and activists bound by common experience and geographical location. 
Because their access to funding is limited, they are usually supported by volunteers and few paid 
staff (Gottlieb 2005; Rootes 2007). Their challenger orientation is manifest in their outspoken 
criticism of national groups, condemning them for being “too institutionalized” and concerned 
with organizational maintenance to be effective, and too willing to compromise on environmental 
issues and policies (Bosso 2005; Dowie 1995). Indeed, some have argued that the success of 
grassroots groups rests on their “uncompromising” stance on issues and ability to mobilize mass 
numbers of constituents (Dowie 1995; Rootes 2007). While grassroots groups will sometimes ally 
with national organizations for specific campaigns (Della Porta and Rucht 2002), e.g. GASP 
choosing to join the CSSD, many still question the intentions and accountability of national groups, 
often accusing them of undermining local struggles in pursuit of their own narrow interests (Dowie 
1995). 
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3.3.3 Field rules and internal governance units 
Many strategic action fields are held together by a system of rules and expectations for 
behavior. These governance units refer to localized arrangements that manage “compliance with 
field rules” and facilitate “the overall smooth functioning and reproduction of the system” even if 
they do not inherently resolve the ongoing tension among field actors (Fligstein and McAdam 
2012: 13-14). Field stability is usually attained by either the imposition of a coercive order 
established by a dominant field actor or by the reluctant willingness of a number of field members 
who coalesce for a larger purpose. The most stable field structure is one built on alliances between 
field actors, especially among those with different resource endowments – this structure helps to 
mitigate coercive tendencies of more powerful field actors.  
Indeed, it could be argued that given the acceptance of challengers of a hierarchical field 
order, and of incumbents for the inevitable and ongoing contention with their field counterparts, 
field orders reflect many of the same characteristics as political coalitions (Fligstein and McAdam 
2012). Both incumbent and challenger groups within a field must be willing to overlook their 
irritations with one another and strategically cooperate to deliver mutually valued ends to their 
members. Often, cooperation is based on the recognition of shared goals that inform a broader 
collective identity, even if there is underlying tension among cooperating actors. Cooperation also 
helps to provide both material resources and existential rewards to field members which – in turn 
– help to structure and bring order to a field.  
Coalitions at the field level, however, may over time evolve into recalcitrant arrangements 
wherein incumbents continue adapting field rules to reinforce their power. Not only does this limit 
the availability of material resources to challengers for organizational survival, but it also 
undermines the collective identity of field members for inspiring broad and coordinated efforts. In 
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this light, one can understand the threat less powerful field actors are faced with when their more 
powerful counterparts exploit field rules for their benefit.   
3.3.4 Internal governance unit of the environmental field 
The internal governance unit of the environmental field is informed by the understanding 
(not withstanding criticism) between national/incumbent and grassroots/challenger groups of the 
strategies and tactics each are expected to pursue and engage in to meet collective goals. National 
groups are primarily concerned with larger policy issues, so their strategies tend to revolve around 
“insider tactics” and conventional political activities like legislative advocacy and lobbying 
(Dalton 2015). Additionally, because they staff legal expertise and are often endowed with 
sufficient financial resources, national/incumbent organizations often rely on litigation for 
advancing environmental goals. Grassroots/challenger groups, on the other hand, typically engage 
in more disruptive tactics such as protests and sit-ins (Cable and Cable 1995; Rootes 2007). Their 
activities are centered on “outsider tactics” in that they eschew working via conventional political 
channels given that negotiation and compromise often characterize such strategies. Some 
challenger environmental groups aim to advance goals by utilizing more radical tactics such as 
illegal direct action and other attention-grabbing strategies (Gottlieb 2005).  
While much literature suggests that the distinctive strategies of national and grassroots 
groups causes fragmentation within the movement and undermines its collective power (Dowie 
1995; Shabecoff 2003; Gottlieb 2005), others argue that it is precisely the diversity of approaches 
and practices among the organizations that gives the environmental movement its remarkable 
staying power and capacity for mobilization (Bosso 2005; Della Porta and Rucht 2002; Ogrodnik 
and Staggenborg 2016). Despite differing perspectives on the impact of this diversity on movement 
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outcomes, an understanding of the different strategies and logics of the groups that constitute the 
movement nonetheless sheds light on the organizational practices and routines that govern the 
order of the field of environmental organizations.  
3.4 Field stability and change 
Despite low-level contention that is prevalent in all fields, more serious disruptions have 
the potential to upset the balance of relationships within a field and threaten its established order 
and viability. Central to analyses of strategic action fields is a concern for conditions that engender 
stability, incremental change, or transformation of a field. While the perspective in organizational 
studies underscores the tendency of fields to gravitate toward stability (Dimaggio and Powell 
1983), and social movement studies highlight episodes of conflict and change (McAdam and Scott 
2005), Fligstein and McAdam (2012) seek to combine both perspectives in arguing that while 
fields may generally reflect stability, that stability is a fragile balance constantly negotiated 
between organizations in the field.  
While field dynamics can be understood to be settled along a continuum, with more settled 
fields exhibiting less contention and less settled fields exhibiting more, Fligstein and McAdam 
(2012: 13) offer: “The stress on the essential contentious character of fields and the constancy of 
change pressures within strategic action fields is one of the distinctive new elements that we bring 
to this theoretical project.” What is at stake when the contention increases to heightened levels is 
the meaning actors’ attribute to field membership, leading to questions about the ultimate purpose 
of the field, rules of the game, and what position everyone in the field holds. Indeed, these are 
important considerations of my project. 
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3.4.1 Episodes of contention 
While internal field processes can disrupt the balance of dynamics within a field and 
escalate tension among field actors, a far more common culprit of field contention is the result of 
actions involving other proximate fields. In the modern world, the state is ubiquitously tied to most 
other fields given its authority to govern the activities of society. Proximate nonstate fields can 
also directly affect the dynamics and stability of a field. In Fligstein and McAdam’s words (2012: 
19), “The stability of any given field is largely a function of its relations to other fields. While 
fields can devolve into conflict as a result of internal processes, it is far more common for an 
‘episode of contention’ to develop as a result of change pressures emanating from proximate and/or 
nonstate fields.” An episode of contention refers to conflict generated among social actors as a 
result of an event that is disruptive to field dynamics (see also McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).  
The degree to which an episode of contention escalates conflict among field actors is 
largely dependent on how the episode may or may not affect the balance of power within a field. 
The impacts of these types of events are, by default, large enough to disturb the fragile balance 
established within a field to introduce uncertainty about expectations for behavior and overall field 
purpose. Field members will either coalesce to settle an episode of contention and revert back to 
the status quo or refine ways of operating within the original scope of field’s purpose. On the other 
hand, members may form alternative alliances to reorganize the field or reorient its ultimate 
purpose. As Fligstein and McAdam (2012) point out, in evaluating the impact of an episode of 
contention within a field, it is important to consider not only the perceived threats to a field’s 
structure, but also to the deeper existential concerns that the event may cause within the hearts and 
minds of the field’s members.  
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3.4.2 External fields to the environmental field 
The state is a key external actor to the strategic action field of environmental organizations, 
as most environmental organizations direct their grievances and advocacy efforts toward the state 
in pressing for regulations and laws (Bosso 2005; Dalton et al. 2003; Kraft 2011). To be sure, 
progress of the movement is typically gauged in terms of the quality and quantity of environmental 
policies enacted and enforced. In an analysis of the activities of organizations within the 
environmental movement, Dalton et al. (2003) show that a majority of groups cite activities that 
are oriented towards government officials as one of their primary strategies. These include meeting 
with government representatives, contacting local officials, and working with government 
commissions.  
The link between the strategic action field of environmental organizations and the state has 
long been established, as federal laws passed in the late 1960s and early 1970s encouraged, and in 
some instances mandated, public participation in legislative hearings (Ogrodnik and Staggenborg 
2016). Environmental policies proliferated throughout this time, with the creation of federal 
statutes “for the regulation of environmental pollutants, action-forcing provisions to compel the 
use of particular technologies by specified deadlines, and tough sanctions for noncompliance” 
(Kraft 2011: 95). Many national environmental organizations emerged during this “era of 
heightened legislative activity” (Carmin 1999: 125), capitalizing on political opportunities to 
recruit members, raise funds, and fill various policy niches (Bosso 2005). These organizations 
have remained active in this arena and continue to “engage in the full range of activities common 
to interest groups active in the policy process” such as collecting and disseminating information 
on policy proposals, lobbying members of Congress, and participating in administrative processes 
of government agencies (Kraft 2011: 99).   
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Grassroots groups also proliferated during the late 1960s and early 1970s, not only in 
response to political opportunities created by the new laws, but also in reaction to several high-
profile events such the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster and the Love Canal toxic waste site, 
demanding recourse from state actors to deal with such events and prevent future threats (Ogrodnik 
and Staggenborg 2016; Szasz 1994). Recent issues such as natural gas drilling and Keystone XL 
Pipeline have motivated grassroots groups to press for laws protecting local communities from the 
impacts of such processes. While grassroots groups typically do not have the structure or resources 
to formally participate in the policy process like their national counterparts, they frequently engage 
with local officials to press their claims and mobilize mass demonstrations to protest against 
polluters and advocate for environmental laws (Dalton et al. 2003). Thus, because of the 
dependence of both incumbent and challenger environmental organizations on the state for 
advancing and “certifying” their claims and goals, the state represents a “proximate” field to the 
environmental field. Organizations within the environmental strategic action field have “recurring 
ties to” and are “routinely” affected by the actions of the state (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 18).  
3.4.3 Industry groups, direct targeting and changing field ties 
Industry also represents a key external field relevant to the strategic action field of 
environmental organizations. To the extent that environmental organizations are dependent on the 
state to monitor and enforce environmental compliance with industry actors, industry is considered 
a proximate field to the environmental field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 18). While the nature 
of the relationship between environmental and industry strategic action fields has historically been 
indirect, this orientation has been transforming to some degree with environmental groups 
choosing with increasing frequency to engage in the practice of “direct targeting” industry as a 
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strategy (Sasser et al. 2006). Direct targeting involves the use of activist pressure on specific 
companies to leverage market forces for influencing behavior change and improved environmental 
performance among targeted companies.  
The rise of direct targeting as a strategy of the environmental movement is understood to 
have come about for a variety of reasons. First, globalization and the prominence of multinational 
corporations have undermined the efficacy of traditional state focused efforts for addressing 
environmental problems (Gereffi et al. 2001). Davis and Zald (2005: 339-40) explain, “the growth 
of a global economic system has shifted the poles of power - and thus to some extent the objects 
of contention - from nation-states to transnational corporations” leading some activists to “treat 
corporations as analogous to states, and thus as appropriate objects of contention.”  
Related to this is the entrenchment of the neoliberal economic paradigm and increasing 
reliance on industry self-regulation for monitoring environmental performance at both domestic 
and global levels (Bartley 2007; Fiorino 2006). The combined effect of these factors has 
encouraged some environmentalists to “co-evolve with changes in states and markets” and 
strategically exploit the reputational capital of private companies by “naming and shaming” them 
into adopting more socially and environmentally acceptable practices in their production processes 
and supply chains (Bartley and Child 2014). The trend in use of direct targeting as a political 
strategy has shifted the strategic action field of industry groups to a more proximate field such that 
environmental organizations maintain explicit ties to and can directly affect and are affected by 
the actions of industry groups in this context. 
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3.4.4 Reactive mobilization  
In the occurrence of a significant shock or destabilizing event to a field, the “reactive 
mobilization” that occurs among field actors determines whether and to what extent conflict and 
contention will ensue within the field (McAdam and Scott 2005). The process of reactive 
mobilization is shaped by three mechanisms. The first is the degree to which organizations 
interpret the event as a threat to or opportunity for their larger collective interests and goals 
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012). The second is the capacity for organizations perceiving the threat 
or opportunity to galvanize resources, such as financial resources or organizational networks, to 
sustain activity and promote their position or logic as the dominant one in the field. The final 
mechanism is the extent to which organizations in the field deviate from established practices and 
engage in innovative or unconventional forms of collective action (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). 
If new strategies, tactics, or frames are employed, the ensuing uncertainty regarding the nature of 
previously taken-for-granted rules and routines in the field create ongoing conflict, or an episode 
of contention, until a new settlement among organizations within the field emerges (Fligstein and 
McAdam 2012).  
At times, a renegotiated settlement can engender the creation of an emergent field, “a social 
space where rules do not yet exist” and where new identities and practices are introduced and 
contested among organizations with dependent interests in the field (Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 
11). Thus, the purpose of field level analysis is to “understand better where such orders come from 
and how they are continuously contested and constantly oscillating between greater or lesser 
stability and order” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 12). This focus offers the ability to gain a deeper 
understanding of which changes occurring in a field are incremental and typical, and which ones 
present greater risk to the existing social structure.  
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Whittier (2018) provides a typology that illustrates the relative degrees of conflict that 
different frenemy relationships can generate within a field. She argues there are three types of 
frenemy relationships: collaborative adversarial relationship, narrow neutrality, and ambivalent 
alliance.  
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Alliances that fall within the collaborative adversarial and narrow neutrality categories tend 
to generate the most conflict among actors in a field or movement. Frenemy interactions in these 
structures are typically based off unstable relationships in which one side has greater access to elite 
circles, and generally more leverage and power than their alliance counterparts. In particular, 
participants in collaborative adversarial interactions are ideologically opposed, and the overt 
tension among actors in these structures must constantly be navigated. Disputes among activists 
over frenemy relationships center around concerns over movement co-optation and the idea that 
“any achievements [are] more likely to serve the interests of the powerful and to discourage 
ongoing movement mobilization” (Whittier 2018: 147). Indeed, these concerns were explicitly 
expressed in my interviews with informants in the environmental field who opposed the CSSD 
and will be discussed in the following chapters. These tensions are moderated in narrow neutrality 
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relationships since the neutral umbrella under which actors coalesce usually guides participants 
toward cross-ideological consensus on narrow goals. The third classification poses the least risk 
to field stability since these types of interactions are often mediated by actors’ relationships with 
the state and the ‘routinized’ engagement participants have with one another over specific 
legislative goals. 
3.5 Shifting coalitions in the environmental field 
Especially relevant to illustrating the shift in the relationship between the environmental 
and industry strategic action fields is the decision among some environmental organizations to 
collaborate with, rather than challenge, private companies. Such a strategy is evident, in particular, 
in the increasing prevalence of private certification schemes like the Forest Stewardship Council 
and Marine Stewardship Council wherein environmental organizations directly negotiate with and 
certify companies who agree to adopt environmentally superior performance standards negotiated 
by environmental groups and industry organizations. 
Cooperative direct targeting efforts are viewed as an aberration from the usual repertoire 
of environmental activities given the collaborative orientation towards traditional movement 
adversaries that such a strategy requires, in addition to the absence of state action for enforcing 
compliance (Cashore et al. 2004). Environmental groups that oppose cooperative direct targeting 
with industry worry that collaborating with “the enemy” compromises the ability of other 
environmental organizations to challenge industry and make sustained progress towards 
environmental goals. Opposing groups also perceive such strategies as undermining the 
accountability of environmental organizations, suggesting that groups are lured into alliances with 
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industry organizations with financial incentives in exchange for activist acquiescence and green 
cover to industry practices.  
Disagreements among organizations in the environmental field over this tactic reflect not 
just the underlying power dynamics of the field order negotiated between national/incumbent and 
grassroots/challenger groups, but also suggest a “crisis” of collective identity and understanding 
surrounding appropriate “rules” for organizational practice in the environmental strategic action 
field. As Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 110) explain, strategic action fields are created “not so 
much of shared interests as of a creative cultural process that binds field members together through 
a constructed narrative account of the…collective identity that unites them and the shared mission 
that is at the heart of the field.” Thus, they argue it is critical that analysts pay more attention to 
“the issues of meaning, membership, and identity that shape fields” in addition to “conventional 
accounts stressing only the narrow analytic concepts of power and interests” (Fligstein and 
McAdam 2012: 139). In other words, it is important to examine not only the instrumental 
motivations that underlie the activities of environmental organizations in the strategic action field, 
but also the ideological and “existential” factors, as well. Analysis of this scope will help shed 
light on the contention within the environmental field that the coalition created and risks to the 
field order that it created. 
3.5.1 Roadmap for my project 
To help guide analysis, Fligstein and McAdam (2012) offer key questions for researching 
contentious collective action at the field level: 
1. What are the factors and processes that precipitate the episode of contention or crisis?
2. Who are the actors and events that shape the contention over time?
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3. What are the interactive dynamics that bring the contention/crisis to a close?
4. What mix of exogenous shocks and internal processes precipitate the field 
contention/crisis?
5. What specific social processes mediate between the destabilizing events and the actual 
mobilization of challengers?
6. With what forms of action and collective action frames do incumbents and challengers 
respond to the developing crisis? How do these change over the life of the episode?
7. What role do key external actors and fields play in precipitating the episode, shaping its 
trajectory?
8. What are the terms of the new settlement? And to what extent does it alter the prior 
power structure of the field of interest?
9. How do the contention/crisis and new settlement affect proximate fields?
These questions will be addressed in the pages that follow as I analyze the contention that 
ensued within the environmental field upon formation of the Center for Sustainable Shale 
Development. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) argue that fields are the ‘basic building blocks’ of modern 
political and organizational life that serve to coordinate individual behavior into (relatively) 
ordered arenas of social action. Within these arenas, the motivations of incumbent and challenger 
groups to seek and maintain order within their field rest on material interests and power, as well 
as existential concerns. Often, the fragile balance established within a field can be destabilized by 
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events that occur in external fields. Of significance is the degree to which these disruptions impact 
the meaning-making field members ascribe to their collective identity and to the mutually agreed 
upon routines and logics for operating within the field. If conflict persists, emergent field crises 
can spawn new social arenas in which contentious alliances take shape. This outcome can 
undermine the boundaries and internal structure of the field order, threatening not only the survival 
of challenger groups in that field, but also jeopardizing the field as a whole.  
Adopting a field level analysis for my project allows me to analyze the source and degree 
of contention occurring within the environmental movement as a result of the environmental-
industry alliance. This framework also enables me to consider larger forces at work like 
globalization and lax regulatory environments related to shale gas development, as well as the 
orientations and preferred tactics of incumbent environmental organizations and challenger groups 
to gain a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the case at hand.  
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4.0 Field rules and organizational survival 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I situate the details of my case in the literatures described in Chapters Two 
and Three and analyze the contention among organizations in the environmental movement as a 
result of the environmental-industry alliance. I demonstrate that, generally speaking, while the 
emergence of fracking inspired divergent goals among organizations in the environmental 
movement, with some groups calling for stronger regulations to monitor the process and others 
insisting on a moratorium on any further development, these divisions were an accepted part of 
the dynamics of the environmental field.  
I further illustrate that the formation of the environmental-industry coalition disrupted rules 
upon which the environmental field had been settled, as well as undermined the capacity of 
grassroots/challenger groups to coalesce with national/incumbent organizations for advancing 
their goals. I show that these outcomes have the effect of creating uncertainty about the rules upon 
which the environmental field had been settled, threatening the viability of challenger groups who 
are resource poor relative to their incumbent counterparts, and ultimately may undermine the 
ability for the environmental movement as a whole to effectively address the impacts of natural 
gas development. 
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4.2 Fracking and the pennsylvania environmental movement 
A common theme expressed in my interviews with key-decision makers from 
environmental organizations active in the region is that shale gas development in Pennsylvania 
happened so rapidly and one-sidedly that they were blindsided by its arrival. As one leader of a 
long established and well-respected environmental organization explained:  
When the shale gas industry first started to move in Pennsylvania no one knew – I didn’t 
even know how to spell the word. I remember looking it up and looking geographically 
where it occurred, etcetera, and it was here. And then we were all trying to catch up on, 
what is it? How do they do it? And what the heck is fracking? (Interview, September 30, 
2015).  
This sentiment highlights the awareness among environmental activists of the need to act 
quickly to mobilize information and resources to mount an effective response. It also underscores 
the defensive position even leading environmental organizations were forced into as a result of the 
development’s rapid and widespread onset in the region. While Corbett sought to appease 
burgeoning environmental concerns about fracking by forming a 30-member Marcellus Shale 
Advisory Commission, the group included only four representatives from environmental groups 
and was dominated by industry representatives. This industry-leaning Commission contributed to 
the development-friendly legislative package put forward in Act 13, Pennsylvania’s overarching 
oil and gas legislation (Rabe and Borick 2013: 328).  
Such factors galvanized the environmental community, inspiring most well-established 
environmental organizations active in the region to create advocacy and educational programs 
surrounding natural gas issues, as well as prompting the formation of new citizen groups who 
sought to protest the development. As the advocacy and activism on fracking grew in response to 
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the development, divergent goals and frames for action among organizations in the movement 
became increasingly salient. Incumbent and challenger groups tended to fall into their expected 
patterns for action, utilizing frames and strategies that supported their respective roles in the field. 
On the one hand, incumbent groups – dominant actors within the field that tend to engage in 
‘insider’ tactics – such as Pennsylvania Environmental Council and Citizens for Pennsylvania’s 
Future (PennFuture) – generally called for stronger regulations and governmental oversight 
without outright opposing the development. On the other hand, challenger groups – grassroots 
organizations within the field that usually rely on disruptive tactics – such as Clean Water Action 
and PennEnvironment – pressed for a full moratorium on any further drilling.  
Groups also tended to engage in their usual repertoire of strategies, with incumbents 
focusing on lobbying congress for stricter laws, commenting on proposed regulations, and 
litigating cases on permits granted to industry for development; and challengers on mobilizing 
constituents, organizing demonstrations, and actively protesting the development. Despite the 
differing frames and strategies employed, the environmental strategic action field remained in its 
stable state, as incumbents and challengers generally followed the implicit “rules” of the field, 
tacitly sharing an understanding that each set of organizations was employing “appropriate” logics 
and practices common to the negotiated order of the field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 12). As 
one challenger acknowledged:  
We are not a unified group of environmental activists. We have different approaches…so 
one is very black and white – we want a moratorium tomorrow, if not yesterday. We want 
to stop everything now. And there are others who are saying we can use our energies better 
if we be this back up regulator type of thing…[we] recognized that [difference] (Interview, 
August 6, 2014).  
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Similarly, in addressing challenger groups, an incumbent stated: 
I think they are entitled to their views. I understand why they have those views. And in 
some places of the country like New York state, and in some countries like Germany and 
France, their view has been adopted, and in some municipalities in places as diverse as 
Texas and Colorado. And there are places that I would agree shouldn’t be drilled from a 
scientific standpoint where the aquifer is too close to the resource. I would also agree that 
communities and even states should have the ability to say no. I agree that municipalities 
should have the ability to have a full moratorium. I think that sort of ability to say yes or 
no is a great incentive for companies to develop the resource in a much more careful way 
than what has happened. So, I respect the views of those that call for a moratorium 
(Interview, October 14, 2015).  
Throughout my interviews, most informants from challenger and incumbent groups 
expressed the general sentiment that no organization was necessarily acting outside of their “fixed” 
roles in responding to the development, and that all were adhering to the mutually accepted rules 
of the field that had been tacitly negotiated between grassroots and national organizations 
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 90). In this sense, the environmental strategic action field remained 
stable with national organizations pursuing more institutional routes for their activities and 
grassroots groups engaging in more confrontational tactics to protest the development. Despite 
these divergent approaches, both sets of actors in the environmental field depended on the other to 
execute on their objectives and deliver mutually valued ends to address impacts of the rapid 
development. 
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4.3 Crisis in the environmental field 
It was not until the actions of an “institutional entrepreneur” (DiMaggio 1988) that the 
environmental field experienced crisis. Institutional entrepreneurs are actors “who invent new 
cultural conceptions” in order to “fashion a political coalition under a new banner that unites 
disparate groups” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 109-110). Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 46) refer 
to these entrepreneurs as “skilled social actors” who can “relate to the situations of other people, 
and, in doing so, are able to provide those people with reasons to cooperate.” The intentions of 
skilled social actors include both instrumental motivations such that they may attempt to induce 
cooperation among actors either in a field or between fields to advance their own group’s goals or 
position in a field, and for meaning making purposes to create and “affirm” new collective 
identities (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 47). While the actions of skilled social actors are often 
aimed at reestablishing stability within a field, occasionally their undertakings are the very things 
that induce crisis in a field. Such was the case in the environmental field in Pennsylvania, as a 
socially skilled actor, John Hanger, initiated the formation of the Center for Sustainable Shale 
Development, disrupting the fragile stability that had been maintained in the regional 
environmental field.  
4.3.1 The Center for Sustainable Shale Development  
The Center for Sustainable Shale Development was not publicly announced until two years 
after its formation, based on fear of backlash from both the environmental community and industry 
trade group headquartered in Pittsburgh, the same city in which the coalition operated. Indeed, 
Whittier (2018) argues that one of the key factors that distinguishes collaborative adversarial 
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frenemy relationships from movement coalitions is the reputational risk participants are faced with 
by coalescing with unsavory allies. This concern often leads participants to keep the collaboration 
covert from other activists and field actors in an attempt to avoid stoking contention. Informants 
from both environmental organizations and industry groups in the coalition suggested that the 
ability to negotiate with industry without external scrutiny and criticism from environmental allies 
in the field helped to generate a difficult-to-achieve sense of trust among coalition participants. 
According to one participant from an industry group: 
So, when you sort of put honesty on the table which is not typically something that is done 
in that kind of environment because it comes with a healthy skepticism. I think that was 
where things started to build trust. We had continuity of people. We had the understanding 
that what was spoken in the room stayed in the room, so you could say, ‘well, this is my 
problem with that’ or ‘this is why I can’t do that’ or ‘this is what I would like to do.’ Then 
people could begin to understand that you were there in good faith. And that took a lot of 
sweat equity and a lot of commitment by each of the participants. And so, it really did build 
a unique level of trust that nobody was shining anybody on, nobody was trying to push 
anybody. The roles are always kind of expected, right? One’s gonna push and one’s gonna 
resist (Interview, September 4, 2014). 
Another industry participant stated: 
That is the value of CSSD…we can say things that we usually can’t say in Harrisburg, or 
DC, or Columbus, and we know we can trust. I have had conversations with [a participating 
environmental organization] that if I didn’t fully trust this would stay within the 
conversation, then it’s very difficult to be absolutely all eyes open and exposed (Interview, 
August 26, 2014). 
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This sense of trust offered assurance that sensitive information shared during the 
negotiations would not be used for political or organizational gains outside of coalition purposes. 
By operating under the radar, coalition participants could hash out the performance standards 
without outside pressure and come up with a comprehensive and detailed plan for implementation.  
That the alliance and performance standards were created in secrecy, however, raised 
questions about the coalition’s credibility. Adding fuel to fire was the fact that at some point during 
those two years of under wraps negotiations, the name of the coalition changed from the Institute 
for Gas Drilling Excellence to the Center for Sustainable Shale Development (CSSD). This 
generated outcry within the environmental community because the word “sustainable” was used 
to describe processes of fossil fuel extraction, an inherently unsustainable process. One 
environmental challenger stated: 
[Members of our organization] believe that climate disruption is the overarching issue 
globally and throughout the U.S., and so gas drilling and unconventional wells contributes 
to that because of fugitive methane emissions that are occurring and not being regulated in 
our state, and by the EPA adequately at this point. So, when it comes to the biggest single 
issue globally and nationally, it’s climate disruption. And what’s happening in PA is not 
improving things because we have such a serious problem with methane emissions being 
released as a result of natural gas production…and methane is 20 times more potent that 
carbon dioxide in the short term as a greenhouse gas (Interview, September 18, 2014). 
An informant from a participating environmental group corroborated this sentiment by 
stating: 
I can understand the position of environmental groups who say, you know, ‘this legitimates 
the act’ in some ways…One of my regrets is that we didn’t insist on a different name for 
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the organization because sustainability ‘a’ doesn’t really mean anything; and ‘b’ to the 
extent it means anything, it sort of means, it implies some kind of absolute standard. And 
obviously, nothing is risk free. So, the original name probably would have been a lot better, 
which was The Center for Gas Drilling Excellence, which is a must more honest name in 
some ways. But, anyway, that’s an issue that we, that’s gonna be very hard for us to reverse 
course right now until there is decent time to do it. Um, so I take the criticism on board. I 
understand where people are coming from (Interview, September 8, 2014). 
Moreover, the reactive mobilization of challenger groups is also borne of the fear of shifting 
ties occurring within the environmental field between industry and environmental actors. The 
following principles are stated on the Center’s website which reflect a commitment to these 
shifting alliance structures (www.responsibleshaledevelopment.org): 
• The best interests of society are advanced by collaboration and leadership among interested 
parties representing diverse points of view. 
• Industry demonstrates leadership by practicing the highest level of environmental 
performance; environmental and community organizations demonstrate leadership by 
insisting on it. 
• Aggressive standards and demonstration of their results will raise performance 
expectations throughout the industry and society. 
• Independent, third-party certification programs for responsible operators allow shale gas 
developers the opportunity to earn public trust and support, and to differentiate themselves 
by their superior environmental attributes  
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According to leaders from several challenger groups, the coalition created significant 
uncertainty around appropriate rules for behavior and alliance structures within the environmental 
field. One informant stated: 
There was a lot of cynicism [about the CSSD] frankly. In fact, I had to defend our 
relationships with some of the organizations brought into the Center process…because we 
had such a longtime relationship with them working in concert on common goals and so 
on. There was some pushback. There was cynicism about the industry’s participation and 
a lot of them just could not believe that [two participating organizations] would have 
participated in this. And they were convinced there was some kind of financial quid pro 
quo that those groups got in order to buy into this process…I mean, there were some folks 
like that with sympathy, but the overwhelming reaction was cynicism amongst our 
[organization’s] members and our decision-making board (Interview, September 18, 2014). 
Additionally, one informant from a participating organization that attended an anti-
fracking event offered the following: 
People knew I was from [a participating organization] and people came up to me and were 
complaining about [another participating organization] of being in support of [the CSSD]. 
They said ‘We wrote letters to them, and op-ed letters to the paper. They are scoundrels, 
how could they do something like that? They have given up their mandate!’ And I said, 
well, you should send the same letter to [my organization] because they are a part of the 
same group. Well, they said they were tiptoeing around me because ‘we know you are a 
part of [a participating group], and we didn’t want to insult you’…So in a way the activist 
groups feel a little co-opted because they know me…And then others who are not as local 
said, ‘You should quit! You should hand in your resignation from [your organization]!’ I 
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said, actually I am considering it. I don’t know what effect that would have on anything 
because if it were up to me, I wouldn’t [join CSSD] because you can use that argument of 
keeping your enemies closer, but they are so much more powerful than us. The oil and gas 
companies have more money and power than God! So, are you going to make a difference 
in their lives? Maybe for PR. In fact, a lot of the activists call it green washing (Interview, 
August 6, 2014).  
4.4 Movement divisions and field instability 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 99) argue that fields can be destabilized by exogenous 
shocks stemming from three sources: large-scale macro-events, changes in dependent fields, and 
invasion by outside groups into a field. To some degree, all three sources of shocks are relevant to 
the case at hand. Undoubtedly, the macrolevel processes of both globalization and neoliberalism 
have undermined the capacity of the state – a field on which environmental groups have 
traditionally been dependent – to pass and enforce environmental laws. This reality has generally 
forced the environmental movement to adapt its approach and find new ways to advance its goals. 
In this context, some environmental organizations have chosen to shift their attention away 
from lobbying the state to directly engaging with industry for pursuing their objectives (Bartley 
and Child 2014; Sasser et al. 2006). While adversarial methods of direct targeting, such as boycotts 
and picketing, have been accepted in the environmental movement as legitimate tactics for 
advancing environmental goals, cooperatively negotiating with industry has yet to be seen as an 
appropriate strategy to pursue. One primary concern is the belief among some actors that 
collaborating with industry serves to appease environmental opposition and undermine the 
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collective capacity of the environmental movement for challenging industry practices. If we apply 
Fligstein and McAdam’s framework, we can more explicitly understand this concern to reflect a 
perception among some actors that cooperatively engaging with industry represents a form of 
invasion by industry groups into the environmental strategic action field.  
Invasions by outside groups into a strategic action field can have the impact of generating 
uncertainty among field actors about the rules upon which the field has been established and 
maintained (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). This sense of uncertainty is manifest in my interviews 
with informants from environmental groups who oppose the Center for Sustainable Shale 
Development. Fundamentally, some informants worried that the coalition would create divisions 
and polarization within the environmental movement beyond the tacitly accepted ones that already 
existed between challenger and incumbent groups. One challenger informant from a non-
participating group said: 
I don’t really have any way of knowing what was in the minds of the industry folks when 
they did this, but if their goal was to disrupt the environmentalists, they picked the right 
tactic to do that. Because there was a flurry of finger pointing and so forth as to ‘why are 
you in’ and ‘why are you out’; ‘we think this is the right thing to do,’ ‘well, we think that 
you are kidding yourselves’ (Interview, September 18, 2014). 
Another challenger from a non-participating group commented on the alliance’s impact on 
the environmental movement in the following manner: 
You have to ask yourself two questions – how does this affect [the movement’s] unity? 
And, two, how can I use it to build unity? ... So, [the Center for Sustainable Shale 
Development] is not the issue, but rather what does it do to help you build more power. 
And joining a coalition with the boss – that doesn’t do anything. And, in fact, it violates 
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the first question – how does this affect the environmental movement’s unity? And people 
are pissed off…The Center has created disunity in the environmental movement. So, why 
would we do that to ourselves? (Interview, August 11, 2014). 
Despite entrenched disagreements between grassroots and national groups over the most 
effective frames to adopt and strategies to pursue for advancing environmental causes, one long 
established understanding is an acknowledgment among all environmental groups that industry is 
the movement’s chief enemy. Indeed, mobilizing to address the effects of industrial practices was 
the genesis of the environmental movement that formed more than 50 years ago. Therefore, when 
environmental groups choose to engage in coalition work with the enemy, uncertainty settles in 
regarding field rules that provide meaning to field membership, collective identity, and appropriate 
repertoires of action. Ultimately, such transgressions can have the effect of disrupting the fragile 
balance established between actors within a field. These sentiments are reflected in my data. As a 
leader from a challenger group stated: 
To me the CSSD has been disruptive to the opposition [to fracking]…And I think what 
CSSD did was they divided the environmental community – more than it was already …I 
don’t think that the CSSD ever started off even as a well-intentioned effort on 
everybody’s part…it’s strictly a diversion, it’s window dressing, green washing, 
whatever you want to call it…I can’t fault [participating environmental 
organizations] for say ‘selling out’, I don’t blame them for what they did. I blame them 
for allowing their name to be used in the press for ‘see, the environmentalists are in favor 
of this.’ And they should have known…that their name was going to be abused to 
further somebody else’s agenda (Interview, September 18, 2014).  
Another leader from a non-participating challenger group offered: 
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[The CSSD] could have been exploited to give frackers green cover to convince legislators, 
the decision makers, to say ‘don’t worry. We’ve got this covered. You don’t have to engage 
on the policy side, we’re working with the environmental community and the free market 
will solve all of your problems. We have them as a safety net.’ And they have the deep 
pockets to get that message out. Right? They have PR machines, they can run adds, 
newspaper adds, and TV adds, and billboards, and could have just milked it saying, ‘Look! 
Of course we care about the environment!’ As a measure of how legitimate and serious we 
are about the environment – ‘Look, all these environmental groups are supporting our 
efforts to protect the environment. And we’re actually working collaboratively with them 
to ensure we are doing it in a way that those abject outsiders, the environmentalists, are 
happy with!’  (Interview, September 3, 2014). 
Recall that in Whittier’s (2018) frenemy typology, adversarial collaborations have the 
potential to generate the highest level of conflict within a movement or field. Because participants 
in these types of frenemy structures are opposed ideologically, when field members choose to ally 
with ideological opponents, the collective identity of field actors is called into question, potentially 
leading to movement factionalism and thereby calling into question the boundaries of the field as 
a whole.  
4.4.1 The state as a dependent field for certifying environmental claims  
A key concern expressed by informants relates to the historical dependence of 
environmental organizations on the state for legitimizing and “certifying” their claims and goals. 
My data reveal that a significant source of contention over the coalition is due to the “voluntary” 
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nature of the standards for industry to implement, and the lack of state involvement in enforcing 
their compliance. As one informant from a non-participating incumbent organization explained: 
We had serious concerns about what we kind of viewed as a public relations gimmick if 
you will. The Center being created and funded in part by the shale gas industry, and some 
foundations, but the fact is that it was all voluntary. And that was one of our biggest 
concerns, is that there was nothing in the Center’s work that would move what they were 
working on towards adoption of regulations. It was all voluntary. That was our biggest 
concern, was we didn’t see it as having a meaningful role because…it was all voluntary 
(Interview, September 18, 2014). 
Another informant from a non-participating challenger group succinctly questioned: 
These so-called standards, who’s regulating? Who has oversight? So, you can have these 
things in place, but will anyone be called to task? (Interview, August 6, 2014). 
Moreover, these worries extended beyond the unenforceable nature of the standards to 
concerns that the coalition would undermine the political will among legislators for creating new 
laws to advance environmental causes. In a hypothetical example, one challenger informant from 
a non-participating group played the role of an industry representative lobbying a lawmaker, 
claiming the industry representative would say the following: 
‘Hey, we are already doing this voluntarily. No need for regulation. We are making 
progress on this just fine as we are, we don’t to have the costly duplicative set of 
regulations.’ (Interview, November 18, 2015).  
Another non-participating challenger informant exclaimed: 
Because there are so many companies that are creating huge problems related to shale gas 
drilling in any number of ways, whether it’s air pollution, groundwater contamination, 
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drinking water contamination, loss of habitat, the list goes on and on, the whole approach 
about voluntary is a way for the industry to be able to fend off more stringent mandatory 
regulations. So, we don’t believe that working on these voluntary programs helps, it 
actually undercuts efforts to get stronger regulations in place that everybody would be 
required to adhere to (Interview, September 18, 2014). 
In Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012: 71) words, “the presence of state fields creates the kind 
of predictability and security that allows nonstate actors to create new fields without fear of having 
themselves or their property threatened.” The lack of state involvement in legitimizing and 
enforcing agreements reached in the coalition understandably generates a sense of vulnerability 
for field actors who may refuse or lack the capacity to participate in such alliances. While 
incumbents may have the resources and wherewithal to effectively pursue new strategies with 
industry for advancing their goals without the state’s endorsement, challengers may be left 
questioning their ability to adapt to new field rules and routines. 
4.4.2 Unstable relationships among interdependent field actors 
Because the survival and maintenance of challenger groups is typically more tenuous than 
incumbent organizations, challenger groups in some ways are reliant on incumbent organizations 
for their own survival. In particular, challenger groups often ally with incumbent groups to pool 
resources to advance mutual goals and secure their own viability (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 
98). According to Dalton et al. (2003), alliance formation between environmental groups ranks 
third among their most frequent activities, behind media strategies and mobilizing public opinion. 
Further, Della Porta and Rucht (2002) show that environmental alliances are often forged between 
groups of different forms, ideological orientations, and resource bases. Using environmental 
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protest campaigns as their units of analysis, Della Porta and Rucht (2002: 1) demonstrate that to 
improve chances of favorable outcomes, environmental actors tend to form broad alliances with 
one another that “resemble loose coalitions of groups that act in an implicit division of labor, 
thereby playing on their respective backgrounds, foci and experiences.” Accordingly, if resource 
rich national organizations ally with industry, uncertainty settles in regarding the ability for 
grassroots groups to coalesce with nationals for advancing their causes within their own field and 
ensuring their own survival.  
One incumbent involved with the Center explicitly expressed the viewpoint that discord 
over the coalition stems from the need for grassroots groups to advocate for their own organization 
and survival: 
One of the things [grassroots groups] would say is ‘These mainstream, these co-opted 
establishment environmental groups’ or whatever, ‘That they are chortling over having a 
seat at the table’ is the phrase that [they] would use. And that somehow not only are we 
compromised, but that ‘All we ever wanted was to be able to play with the big kids. Being 
in a room with DEP [Department of Environmental Protection] decision makers, or with 
Shell, that was all we wanted. Now we’ll just sit back and be obedient and let them destroy 
the planet’ is [their] way of looking at it. And, really, I think the reason [they] can perceive 
things like that is first [they’re] really interested in promoting [their own] organization 
(Interview, August 8, 2014). 
Overall, my data point to the sense of uncertainty that the environmental-industry alliance 
created among interdependent actors in the field. On the one hand, challengers view such actions 
of incumbents as a violation of established field rules and an overarching threat to the movement’s 
capacity. On the other hand, incumbents perceive the reactions of challenger groups to be grounded 
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in self-interest and ignorance. What both viewpoints reveal is that the ‘invasion’ of industry actors 
and retreat of the state in negotiating new structures within the environmental field exacerbates 
internal divisions among interdependent field actors. While environmental incumbents may feel 
secure in their ability to weather such changes, challengers are left questioning their position within 
the field and ultimately their ability to survive.  
4.5 Conclusion 
The degree to which external shocks affect field stability depends on the capacity for field 
actors to adapt to and endure the changes occurring within their field. While the advent of fracking 
engendered significant activity among organizations within the environmental movement, most 
grassroots and national groups initially followed their established patterns for action and 
maintained stability in the environmental field despite their divergent approaches to addressing the 
development. Nevertheless, the formation of the Center for Sustainable Shale Development and 
its associated contention destabilized the environmental field as a whole. 
Recall that the degree to which an episode of contention escalates conflict among field 
actors is largely dependent on how the episode may or may not affect the balance of power within 
a field. Field members will either coalesce to settle an episode of contention and revert back to the 
status quo or refine ways of operating within the original scope of field’s purpose. Alternatively, 
members may form alternative alliances to reorganize the field or reorient its ultimate purpose. As 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) point out, in evaluating the impact of an episode of contention 
within a field, it is important to consider not only the perceived threats to a field’s structure, but 
also to the deeper existential concerns that the event may cause within the hearts and minds of the 
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field’s members. Though participating incumbent organizations perceived their involvement in the 
CSSD to be an appropriate tactic for their organization in the context of the macrolevel processes 
at hand, challenger groups viewed the coalition as a disruption to the environmental movement as 
a whole.  
Deeper examination of the concerns expressed by challenger groups reveals that underlying 
the contention may be less a fear that the coalition would fail to deliver valued ends, and more of 
a concern over the transgression of field relationships that the alliance represents. In this context, 
not only does the coalition undermine the ability of challenger groups to pool resources and 
coalesce with their national counterparts in their efforts to address fracking, but even greater is the 
fear that the new alliance structure will undermine the capacity for the movement to address other 
environmental concerns, such as climate change. Such fears throw into question the capacity of 
challenger groups to withstand the impact of external shocks like invasion by industry groups into 
their arena, and their ability to survive in a seemingly shifting field order.  
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5.0 Political opportunities, threats, and policy innovation 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I argue that while challenger groups perceived the formation of the coalition 
to be a threat to the environmental movement’s capacity for advancing goals on fracking and to 
their own organizational survival, participating organizations and other incumbent groups 
welcomed it as an opportunity to fashion a “winning coalition” that could generate new collective 
action frames and identities to advance environmental interests (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 
107). My data show that participants perceive the coalition to be an important innovation to their 
tactical repertoire, a potential catalyst for creating solutions to a complex problem and for 
implementing environmental protections in a constrained political climate.  
5.2 Political opportunities and collective action frames 
The organizational and social movement literatures have stressed that collective action and 
social movement mobilization is fundamentally dependent on the existence of shared systems of 
meaning and communication among actors in a field (Lounsbury et al. 2003). Shared systems of 
meaning and discourse are used to form “frames” that “help to render events or occurrences 
meaningful and thereby function to organize experience” and facilitate collection action (Benford 
and Snow 2000: 614). Framing processes represent “the shared meanings and definitions that 
people bring to their situation” which help to incite mobilization because shared understandings 
80 
legitimate, motivate and direct behavior (McAdam et al. 1996: 5). Key to framing processes is the 
presence of actors that are engaged in a deliberate effort to shape others’ understandings of issues 
and political developments. Actors within organizations interpret and disseminate frames, which 
serve as the bridge between ideas and action (McCarthy, Smith and Zald 1996). Often, efforts to 
shape frames stem from the perception that, by adopting a certain frame, the relative costs to 
collective action are low and potential for delivering valued ends high. Such conditions often arise 
when there is a perceived opening in the political system to influence policy or structural change 
to achieve collective goals. Social movement scholars conceptualize such circumstances as 
political opportunity structures which, when perceived to be present, tend to encourage 
mobilization among like-minded actors (McAdam et al. 1996).  
At the field level, frames also help to determine the boundaries of strategic action fields by 
focusing actors’ attention on shared meanings that “stabilize power arrangements, interaction 
patterns and particular arrays of practices” that “provide order and meaning to fields of activity” 
(Lounsbury et al. 2003 pp. 76-77). Contention can arise, however, when actors within a field are 
not in agreement with the most effective frame to adopt to guide collective action. When field 
frames are unsettled, actors within a field often “engage in political struggles to either establish 
dominance within a frame or to alter or deinstitutionalize a frame in order to more easily attain 
their interests” (Lounsbury et al. 2003 pg. 77). Such struggles can impact the nature of interaction 
and collective identities of field members, generating prolonged periods of conflict within a field, 
which can ultimately undermine the stability of a field as a whole (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 
54).  
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5.2.1 Unsettled frames for collective action in the environmental field 
One of the primary factors underlying the contention over the formation of the Center for 
Sustainable Shale Development stems from disagreements between challenger and incumbent 
groups in the environmental field over the appropriate frame to adopt to effectively mobilize to 
address fracking. According to my informants from challenger groups, fracking signified a major 
threat to the environment that had to be eliminated in its entirety. Activists within these groups 
expressed the view that nothing short of a full moratorium on fracking would satisfy their 
grievances. This frame thus guided the approach challenger groups adopted for collective action, 
setting them at odds with incumbents and other groups in their field who pursued alternative 
frames.   
Incumbent organizations, while not necessarily disagreeing with a moratorium on fracking, 
did not adopt this frame as a platform for collective action. In particular, several informants 
described fracking as “inevitable,” not only because the development was already well under way 
in the state, but also because of Corbett’s “comfortable relationship” with the industry. As a result, 
many incumbents believed that the economic and political climate surrounding the issue rendered 
the moratorium frame ineffective, and, therefore, felt it was critical to focus on getting protections 
in place immediately. As one participating informant described: 
We were working with a very challenging legislature and administration that is very pro 
oil and gas drilling. And I guess our perspective is that there are folks out there…who need 
protections in place right now. So, by only working on a moratorium, we aren’t addressing 
the development that exists out there and getting those protected who are near and dealing 
with the health impacts and the problems associated with the development (Interview, 
November 18, 2015). 
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Another informant from a participating incumbent organization expressed the same 
sentiment: 
For most places in this country, I don’t think it is likely that a moratorium will be enacted. 
And I care deeply about neighbors of the development in those places. And hence that’s 
why [our organization] has engaged so vigorously in the effort to upgrade the rules … [and 
participate] in efforts like the CSSD (Interview, October 14, 2015). 
Additionally, an informant from an incumbent participating organization pointed to the 
legal constraints of adopting the moratorium frame: 
There’s gas development going on out there and it ain’t going to stop in Pennsylvania, I 
mean if for no other reason than for legal reasons. I mean, the state can’t stop it. I mean, 
it’s private property, and so there are statutes that authorize it. So, unless the General 
Assembly – and then they’re going to be facing constitutional takings claims and, you 
know, so it’s not going to happen. So…I guess my perspective is that [we] try to influence 
the activities that are actually going on on the ground (Interview, August 21, 2014). 
Once again, frames form the bridge between ideas and action (McCarthy, Smith and Zald 
1996). Mobilizing around the moratorium frame, incumbents and participants believed, would 
serve to distract and undermine the ability for environmental organizations to make real advances 
in addressing the environmental impacts of a process that was already well underway and strongly 
supported at the political level. This shared belief among incumbent and participating 
organizations that opportunities to advance a moratorium on fracking lacked openings in the 
political and legal system thus rendered it for them an unviable frame for action. 
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5.3 Leveragng industry to create political opportunities 
In addition to the perception of political and legal constraints for advancing the moratorium 
frame, participating organizations also viewed the coalition as an opportunity to create an 
alternative policy mechanism that could, at least at a minimum, help fill the void of state action on 
fracking. More significantly, many informants communicated the hope that the coalition would 
help generate openings in the political system to eventually enable movement on legislative 
protections. The coalition’s members were explicit in expressing this mission on the CSSD 
website: 
The CSSD Performance Standards were developed to drive leading industry practices and 
to set a bar that goes above and beyond the regulatory requirements established by 
Appalachian states (specifically, Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia) and the federal 
government.  The goal is to ensure that each performance standard, on the whole, requires 
a level of environmental performance that exceeds the regulatory minimums established 
by the states and the federal government. We believe that by setting this high bar, CSSD 
serves as a complement to strong regulatory frameworks and can help inform ongoing 
efforts to ensure environmental protection (www.sustainableshale.org).  
In light of this perspective, one incumbent informant explained his organization’s decision 
to participate:   
Our theory is that if you can get a set of these companies to operate to a measurable 
quantifiable higher set of standards, then that can create a leading or a pulling function on 
the regulatory environment generally, so you can set a high bar (Interview, October 21, 
2015). 
Another offered similar views: 
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It’s no secret, and I think people are aware and we’ve talked about it with the other 
members of CSSD, that we do hope through these demonstrations of what’s technically 
and economically feasible, that we can demonstrate to regulators what some of the next 
logical steps are in the process of improving the rules and raising that minimum floor for 
everybody in industry (Interview, October 14, 2014). 
Additionally, one informant offered that regulatory changes are rare (if not impossible) 
unless there is a clear demonstration of their feasibility:  
Even if you are trying to promote regulatory improvements, you still have to have dialogue 
with industry. You still have to be able to explore the feasibility of getting things done. 
Regulations don’t change unless it’s clear that the kinds of practices that you are trying to 
get into a regulatory framework can actually be done. So, the only way to do that is to 
engage in dialogue with industry (Interview, September 30, 2015). 
What is significant about these comments is that they reveal the deeper and more strategic 
motivations that underpinned environmental organizations’ decision to participate in the coalition. 
Despite the perceived constraints in the current political climate for advancing environmental goals 
on fracking, participating organizations nevertheless sought to utilize the coalition as a tactical 
way to generate political openings for future regulatory action. By demonstrating that some firms 
were capable of implementing improved practices, environmental organizations could strategically 
leverage this information to pressure the state to adopt the same measures. Indeed, Whittier (2018: 
203) supports this idea by arguing that “frenemy relationships often emerge around movement 
goals of state intervention.” 
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Perhaps more significant is that participating groups were not shy in revealing to the 
industry collaborators their motivations to leverage the coalition for political and regulatory 
pressure. An industry participant corroborated: 
The NGO community has been very clear that they want to see these standards get picked 
up and put into regulation, so whether you voluntarily decide to come in and be a part of 
this or you [will] get it required of you anyway later (Interview, September 4, 2014). 
Moreover, coalition participants sought to continue ratcheting up the political pressure by 
encouraging more industry players to join the coalition. According to a key neutral figure who 
participated in the coalition: 
The goal was to demonstrate that standards that were higher than existing regulations could 
be adopted and could be achieved with the hope then that more companies would do that, 
and then, in turn, that regulations would be further updated and strengthened (Interview, 
October 9, 2015). 
Again, statements from the CSSD’s website suggests this understanding: 
Just as operator field performance and regulatory frameworks must undergo a process of 
continuous improvement, so will the CSSD performance standards. With input from 
operators, regulators, CSSD auditors, environmental groups and other stakeholders, the 
CSSD Standards Committee will regularly review the performance standards – adding new 
standards over time, and updating the existing standards to ensure they continue to drive 
leading practices (www.sustainableshale.org). 
Thus, participating organizations not only viewed the CSSD as a mechanism to advance 
the goals of environmental protection in a politically strained climate, but they also believed that 
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efforts at this level could help facilitate openings in political and regulatory arenas on fracking that 
environmental actors otherwise wouldn’t have been able to create on their own. 
5.4 Political opportunities and policy innovation 
In addition to the long-term goals of participating organizations, most also believed that 
the short-term gains of working with industry to establish new standards of conduct for gas 
development justified their involvement in the coalition. Generally speaking, all participants 
viewed the CSSD as a key innovation to their tactical repertoire, an opportunity to use market 
forces to “divide the laggards from the leaders” and inspire a “race to the top” for environmental 
performance across the industry (Prakash and Potoski 2007). One informant stated:  
When you get to the CSSD, you’re dealing with groups that are willing to push beyond 
what’s required. And I think that’s the real benefit for us here, is that the regulatory world 
to us then becomes the floor. That you have to do at least this. And the ceiling, we want to 
keep pushing higher and higher, as we do with these new standards (Interview, August 15, 
2014). 
Another informant expressed his thoughts: 
Well, we’re trying to change the world and businesses and the marketplace is a big part of 
the world. And so, if you want to change the world, then changing the world through 
businesses has got to be a part of that. They are producing the products and often times the 
pollution or the effects that we are concerned about. So, working with them directly has 
proven to be one – not the only – but one very effective way to have an impact (Interview, 
October 14, 2015). 
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According to Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 51), “one of the most important vehicles for 
framing is the direct authority to tell someone what to do.” By securing a “seat at the table” with 
industry, environmental actors are afforded an opportunity to participate in framing and directing 
the discourse around industry practices and environmental goals. Participants believed that such 
an opportunity was not otherwise available in the political arena. Whittier (2018) supports this idea 
by arguing that frenemy relationships can increase the likelihood that activist participants will gain 
access to powerful elites. 
5.4.1 Alternative environmental governance systems  
At a broader level, the formation of the coalition and motivation to participate in it reflects 
a larger trend occurring in the field of environmental activism. Beginning with efforts in the forest 
sector in the early 1990s, a number of environmental organizations frustrated with the lack of 
progress at the governmental level on developing regulations for the logging industry sought to 
develop their own program to encourage and reward lumber firms willing to adopt sustainable 
business practices (Auld 2014). In what became known as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), 
environmental organizations worked directly with willing lumber firms to create a program to 
certify compliant companies under the FSC label, promising enhanced reputational capital and 
market access in return. Since the establishment of the FSC, other arrangements that adopt the 
certification model have been applied to the fishing, food production, construction, mining and 
other environmentally intensive industries (Auld 2014). The Center for Sustainable Shale 
Development represents ones of the most current (and only) certifying programs attempting to 
address impacts of the energy sector.  
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Criticism of these programs largely reflect concerns over the perception that they are 
“greenwashing” stunts designed for companies to leverage reputational and market benefits from 
the environmental certification, while co-opting and undermining the ability for environmental 
activists to demand more substantive protections at the state level (Bernstein 2001). Recall that 
Whittier (2018) corroborates this notion in arguing that movement co-optation is a primary concern 
of activists who oppose frenemy structures. Alternatively, supporters of these programs generally 
view these systems as a potentially effective way to supply environmental oversight and 
governance in a globalizing world. This belief is well captured by the following analysis: 
Faced with shortfalls in the capacity of governments and intergovernmental regimes to 
supply governance, as well as pressures to shrink the role of government through measures 
emphasizing privatization and deregulation, many analysts have begun to think about the 
prospects for meeting the demand for governance without relying on governments…Given 
the fact that over half of the 100 largest economies in the world today are associated with 
multinational corporations, it makes sense to direct attention to the role of corporations and 
industry associations in meeting the demand for [environmental] governance (Young 2009: 
24).  
The rise of environmental certification systems, also called in the academic literature “non-
state market-driven governance programs,” can be understood to represent an emerging arena 
within which environmental and industry actors negotiate new systems of meaning, identities and 
behaviors around reciprocal interests, however minimal the reciprocity may or may not be. The 
important point as it relates to this study is that these emerging arenas of environmental governance 
represent new institutions spawned typically during contentious times, and that constitute one of 
many potential tactics that environmental organizations choose to employ in an attempt to advance 
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their interests. In this context, a key question is why certain organizations choose to employ this 
particular tactic while others do not.  
Bosso (2005: 125) argues that the tactics employed by environmental organizations are 
conditioned on several factors – the nature of the issue at hand, internal characteristics of the 
organization, and the existence of political opportunities or threats. He notes, however, that despite 
knowing empirically that political opportunities are especially critical in informing the strategic 
decision-making of organizations, we know little about how changes in political systems or 
processes influence the way organizations seek access to new decision-making arenas or judge 
certain tactics worthwhile (Bosso 2005: 125). I contend that in the case presented here, the 
“interpretive frame” that each organization utilizes to evaluate the CSSD as a tactic rests on the 
existence of a shared understanding that engaging in environmental certification schemes is 
“legitimate” and therefore ultimately is in line with cultural norms around which the environmental 
field has been built and settled (Cashore 2002).  
According to Bernstein and Cashore (2007: 348), non-state market driven certification 
programs are “defined as deliberative and adaptive governance institutions designed to embed 
social and environmental norms in the global marketplace that derive authority directly from 
interested audiences, including those they seek to regulate, not from sovereign states.” Programs 
of this sort are by definition not universally viewed as legitimate because of two reasons: they 
bring together unequal actors with competing interests, calling into question the program’s 
credibility; and more significantly, they are not backed by the authoritative capacity of the state. 
Bernstein and Cashore (2002: 351) argue that generating legitimacy for these systems is dependent 
on “the normative environment and interactions of actors” involved in the alliance, and on the 
historical experiences and understandings of those actors for solving environmental problems. In 
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other words, perceptions of legitimacy of environmental certification programs rest on the 
ideological orientations of the actors involved, on their prior experience in similar situations, and 
on a shared understanding of the most effective way to solve complex environmental problems in 
a changing world.  
Just as challengers may view a collaborative relationship with industry to be a direct 
violation of environmental field rules and norms, supporters view it as an important tool in the 
overall toolkit of environmental advocacy in a changing world. Informants from participating 
organizations expressed views to support this conclusion. As one stated: 
You know, I think in some ways the more technical understanding you have of this issue, 
the less scared you get. Frankly, that’s where I’ve gone with nuclear power, is the more I 
understand about nuclear the less I am concerned. But, there’s that. I think it’s also the 
organizational DNA – is not just technical depth, but it’s also just political pragmatism. 
And not just political pragmatism, but also a fairly deep understanding of the energy system 
at the level of, no, we are not going to abolish fossil fuels. And, yes, gas has all kinds of 
advantages over coal from an emissions control standpoint. So, it’s also partly that. We are 
not, it was never in our DNA to be an anti-fossil fuel organization (Interview, September 
8, 2014). 
Another informant noted similar sentiments about the legitimacy of the coalition: 
[Compromise] is the only way you really do make any progress. Otherwise it’s just the 
polemical people in the trenches and you don’t get any public credibility, which is really 
central. What does this mean on the ground, in communities in which these operations are 
done? And I also don’t argue that there should be one, singular way forward. There should 
be a proverbial basket of ways forward. And all should inform one another, there should 
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be cross pollination. So, I see CSSD fitting into that, as one cog in a very complex 
mechanism (Interview, August 29, 2014). 
A third offered his view that the coalition is a good strategy among imperfect ones: 
So, I guess the shorthand is our goals are, I mean to the extent [gas] is displacing coal, it’s 
a good thing. To the extent it is displacing renewable development, which I think is a totally 
valid concern, it’s not a good thing. So, what are our ultimate goals for natural gas? I guess 
in an ideal world I guess we would obviously have renewable everything, but 
technologically, and in terms of generating capacity, available land, we’re not anywhere 
near that being a reality at this point. It’s just numbers, it’s not an ideological thing on my 
part, it’s just we really don’t have a way to provide the power needs we need with 
renewable energy, no matter how much stuff we build right now. We need better 
technology, we need different laws on distributed generation, all kinds of things. We’re 
just not there. So, if nothing else, natural gas has been billed as this bridge fuel. So, I think 
the goal [of our participation in the CSSD] would be to at least try to hold people to the 
bridge fuel promise (Interview, August 8, 2014). 
The critical takeaway from these statements is that the informants’ positions rest on beliefs 
that compromise is necessary in a world with competing priorities and that environmental-industry 
alliances can be a politically pragmatic tactic among imperfect options to advance environmental 
goals. These reflect fundamental belief systems regarding the nature of how environmental 
problems can be solved.  
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5.4.2 Globalization and environmental problem solving 
Since the rise of environmentalism in the 1960’s and 70’s, organizations and activists have 
primarily focused on lobbying the state to enact legislation to address environmental problems. 
Environmental problems during this era were largely the result of “point-source” pollution 
problems, where the source of the pollution could be traced back to particular entities, typically 
industry actors (Kraft 2011). Point-source pollution problems were relatively easy to resolve, both 
because there were specific technical fixes that could be deployed at a polluter’s facility, and also 
because the scope of industry activity was generally contained by national boundaries. Based on 
these factors, the environmental movement focused on advocating for the passage of federal and 
state laws to regulate industry and to successfully address many environmental problems 
throughout this time.  
Since the 1990’s, the advent of globalization and technological advancements that have 
come along with it, however, have significantly changed the landscape of environmental problems 
and the solutions to address them. Not only do industrial activities span national boundaries, 
making regulating these entities a challenging task, but environmental problems as a whole have 
become more complex and varied. These problems include pollutants that come from a multitude 
of sources that are hard to identify and regulate from the conventional command-and-control 
approach. In light of these changes, new understandings have emerged that indicate that the 
“conventional response of relying on government” to solve many environmental problems may be 
ineffective (Delmas and Young 2009). Moreover, a globalizing world has given rise to the idea 
that the goals of economic growth and environmental protection should be merged into the singular 
agenda of sustainable development, framing one goal as dependent on the other (Bartley 2007). 
Such conditions have generated interest in alternative forms of environmental governance that 
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serve to address both the limited scope of government in a globalized world as well as the societal 
imperatives of economic growth and environmental protection.  
Understood in this context, environmental certification programs are based on the premise 
that “we cannot rely on governments alone” to address environmental problems, and that “there 
are circumstances under which private actors – especially large corporations – can become part of 
the solution rather than part of the problem to meet the rising demand for governance in today’s 
world” (Young 2009: 25). One informant from a participating environmental organization 
corroborates this viewpoint: 
I’ve always felt the way forward had to include all stakeholders, and in particular industry. 
I had a colleague earlier in my career who used to say ‘industry is the big lever. If you want 
to really change the world, you need industry to do it. They’re the ones that make things. 
They’re the ones that pollute the water. They’re the ones who emit pollution into the air. 
They’re the ones who screw up the land. So, if you really want to change things, you’ve 
got to change their behavior, like it or not.’ You could do it through regulation. You could 
do it through taxation. You could do it through collaboration. And they are not mutually 
exclusive, of course (Interview, September 8, 2014). 
Another informant stated: 
So, I came to this with a pre-conceived bias that the collaboration approach is the most 
sensible way to go. And I think that people who are participating in CSSD share that view 
that if you simply take the position that gas extraction is all good or all bad, you’re not 
going to advance the conversation much. You are going to ensure the status quo or a 
standoff, and there’s going to be winners and losers. And so, the best shot that you have – 
I am not going to say everybody is going to be a winner, but maximize the benefits and 
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minimize the impacts, is to talk to one another and try to identify ‘what do you know about 
the science? What do I know about the science? What do the scientists tell us? What can 
we do that implements what we know recognizing that there is a lot that we don’t know - 
what can we do to find out more?’ That seems to me the most logical way to go (Interview, 
August 25, 2014) 
What these sentiments reflect are fundamental ideas about how to address the priorities of 
environmental protection and sustainable development in a globalized world. They also reflect a 
shared understanding about what are the appropriate “rules” for organizational practice in the 
environmental field.  
The challenge is that these fundamental belief systems about how environmental problems 
can be solved are at odds with the views and understandings of other actors in the environmental 
field. According to Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 11), strategic action fields exist “not so much of 
shared interests as of a creative cultural process that binds field members together through a 
constructed narrative account of the…collective identity that unites them and the shared mission 
that is at the heart of the field.” If globalization and the imperative of sustainable development 
generates different understandings among field members about how to advance environmental 
goals, the capacity for environmental organizations to coalesce under a collective action frame and 
facilitate mobilization could be at risk. This not only has the potential to undermine the capacity 
of the environmental movement to advance the common goal of environmental protection, but 
more significantly, as new collective action frames, identities, and practices emerge, uncertainty 
may seep into the shared understanding of the cultural processes and missions on which the field 
has been built as a whole.  
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5.5 Power dynamics and framing processes 
It is important to recognize that “frames are always embedded in power relationships that 
authorize certain actors and perspectives, while neglecting others” (Lounsbury et al. 2003: 96). 
While my data reveal that participating groups perceived the moratorium frame to be unviable due 
to the lack of political opportunities available to advance it, their decision to engage with industry 
in the CSSD nonetheless undermined the shared identities and systems of meaning established 
among organizations in the environmental field. Beyond disagreement over the viability of the 
moratorium frame and the appropriateness of directly engaging with industry, several challengers 
expressed what was really at stake was the ability for the movement to address the more urgent 
goal of fossil fuel extraction and climate change. As one challenger stated: 
To me what it comes down to is climate change. And no matter if we could get natural gas 
out of the ground without doing any damage, we can’t use it. We’ve got more than enough 
carbon fuel right now to destroy our environment and there’s no reason to have an entire 
industry looking for more sources of carbon fuel. So, to me, fracking is simply the next 
level of addiction after you have run out of all the easy stuff. Your more and more desperate 
for more sources of the thing you are addicted to and fracking is the next level of 
desperation (September 18, 2014). 
To challengers, the immediate environmental impacts of fracking were secondary to the 
larger issue of fossil fuel consumption and climate change. An informant from a participating 
group recognized this: 
Well, one thing was we made a big blunder I think with the choice of the name. The word 
sustainable in our title really angers a lot of people because it connects directly to the major 
reason why people are opposed to CSSD, and that’s cause they are opposed to fossil fuels 
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in general, or all fossil fuels. So, the idea that any fossil fuel could be ever declared 
sustainable, even if you talk about the process by which it’s being exploited, is really 
offensive to that part of the environmental community. And I understand that. But I 
disagree with it. So, I think, I know that’s what it is all about – being driven by concerns of 
climate change and the absolute belief that we must get off fossil fuels as soon as possible. 
And having a relatively cheap and clean equivalent fossil fuel is adding to our addiction 
rather than getting us off of them. That’s the argument. And, they’re not going to change 
(Interview, September 29, 2015). 
To reiterate, framing processes represent “the shared meanings and definitions” that people 
bring to a situation which help to incite mobilization because shared understandings legitimate, 
motivate and direct behavior (McAdam et al. 1996: 5). The broader concern over the CSSD centers 
on some groups’ belief that by adopting a cooperative stance with industry over fracking, the 
movement’s efforts to develop a cohesive frame for action on climate change would be affected. 
To be sure, if participating in the coalition signified that fracking was a sustainable practice if done 
more responsibly under the auspices of the CSSD, then broader efforts to minimize fossil fuel 
extraction and advance renewable energy initiatives may fail to generate sufficient political 
opportunities in other important arenas, such as the state.  
Nevertheless, most incumbent groups did not share this concern. On one level, many 
incumbents believed that engaging with industry would actually provide them with more 
opportunities and resources that could be leveraged down the road to advance environmental 
interests on climate change. This idea will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
More immediately, most participating organizations expressed appreciation for the challenger 
groups’ stance on a moratorium because it helped to bolster their bargaining power within the 
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coalition. This idea is known as the “radical flank” effect in the social movement literature. As one 
incumbent stated:  
One of the things that helps make groups like [ours] more able to get things done now is 
there’s these other entities out there that are pushing for even more. And it moves what 
people see as the middle, what the compromise point is, and it means that, ultimately, we 
can get more done. I don’t want the [challenger] groups to go away because I think, 
ultimately, they help us. And I think ultimately even if they think we are taking the sell-
out weak compromised position, well, ultimately, we are doing things that are in their 
interest, too. And some of them see that (Interview, August 8, 2014). 
According to Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 49), “action depends on both the structural 
position and opportunities actors have and their ability to recognize how they can mobilize others 
in order to maximize their chances for both narrowly instrumental and broader existential gain.” 
Political opportunity structures can take on different forms for different organizations within a 
field, ultimately shaping the way incumbent and challenger groups act upon perceived openings 
or constraints in the political system. While incumbent groups typically seek to affirm shared 
meanings and courses of action that serve to sustain their dominant status within a field, deeper 
analysis reveals their dependence on challenger groups’ for making particular tactics worthwhile 
pursuits. In this light, the environmental movement may benefit to recognize that the divergent 
approaches of environmental groups are in fact interdependent and beneficial for advancing both 
narrow organizational interests as well as broader existential goals of the environmental field.  
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5.6 Conclusion 
As new strategies, tactics, and frames are employed by organizations in the environmental 
movement, the ensuing uncertainty regarding the nature of previously taken-for-granted rules and 
routines of actors within the field will undoubtedly engender ongoing conflict among 
environmental organizations. Whether participating in nonstate market driven environmental 
governance mechanisms will gain legitimacy as an appropriate strategy for environmental 
organizations to pursue is a question still unresolved. At stake is whether environmental 
organizations will be capable of transcending their own “narrow group interests” in order to “take 
the role of the other as a prerequisite for shaping a broader conception of the collective rooted in 
an emergent worldview and shared identity” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 17-18; c.f. Meade 
1934).  
Indeed, I argue that actors would benefit from the realization that contested identities, 
frames and routines are in fact beneficial to the viability of the environmental field as a whole. 
Given the interdependency of national/incumbent organizations and grassroots/challenger groups 
for framing issues, mobilizing diverse constituencies, and attending to environmental problems at 
all levels of society, fashioning a new consensus on appropriate rules for action for a diversity of 
environmental groups is essential for the movement’s continued relevancy and capacity to inspire 
the level of collective action necessary to address current environmental problems of 
unprecedented scale.   
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6.0 Resource mobilization and organizational learning 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I analyze the resource incentives that influence the motivations of 
environmental organizations to participate in the coalition. My findings reveal that, while financial 
support encouraged initial decisions to join the coalition, participating organizations remained 
invested in the alliance even after the elimination of funding. Several informants explained that 
the organizational learning and access to insider information that occurs from dialogue with 
industry helps them strategically plan for future campaigns. They also stated that cooperatively 
engaging with industry increases their credibility vis-a-vis the state, creating greater access to 
decision-makers at the political level. Such resources are particularly critical for incumbent 
environmental organizations since their strategies are largely focused on lobbying state officials 
and attempting to advance environmental goals via conventional political channels. Overall, my 
findings reveal that organizations value the coalition primarily for the strategic advantages it offers 
for mobilizing informational and network resources to enhance organizational capacity and 
efficacy in meeting environmental goals. 
6.2 Resources for mobilization  
A basic assumption among skeptics of the CSSD is that environmental organizations 
participate in the coalition because they receive the financial support to do so. To be sure, one of 
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the supporting foundations of the Center, the Heinz Endowments, is a major funder of 
environmental groups in Southwestern Pennsylvania and offered funding to organizations to 
participate in the coalition. According to one informant, this support motivated the initial decision 
to participate: 
I mean it wasn’t even so much ‘hey, would you like to participate in this’ it was kind of 
like ‘you really need to participate in this and the Heinz Endowments and the funders are 
going to make it worth your while to participate in this.’ So there was funding provided 
initially to the non-profit groups to spend time and to send people and to get involved with 
the formation of the Center…So the decision to participate in the Center was not voluntary 
on some level…I think it was a process of why would we not want to be at this table. This 
is where all the major players are. We have an opportunity to influence what the outcome 
is. And we are getting funded to do it, so why not? (Interview, September 25, 2015). 
Another informant from a participating organization stated this kind of direction from 
funders was not unusual: 
That’s the reality of the nonprofit world…private foundations are not supposed to guide 
their grantees that way, but the reality is that grantees don’t make pitches for work out of 
the blue, you know? They’re guided towards interests of [their funders] … So, I’m not 
saying it’s so black and white. You don’t change your mission to suit who’s going to fund 
you. It’s not that way. But obviously within certain reason you’d be somewhat short sighted 
to not have ongoing communications with your large funders to make sure that you are 
continuing to do work with their support (Interview, August 21, 2014). 
Much scholarship exists on the necessity and impact of foundation funding for supporting 
and channeling the activities of social movement organizations (e.g. see Bosso 2005; Dowie 1995). 
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For better or worse, social movement organizations often rely on foundations to support their work 
and overall viability. Given this reality, organizations often adapt their goals and tactics to appease 
potential funders and garner critical financial support (Bosso 2005). This strategy can lead 
organizations to adopt more conventional strategies, even if those strategies put them at odds with 
other members in their field (McCarthy and Zald 1977).  
Overall, most informants of participating organizations agreed that at least initially what 
helped to motivate participation was the support they received from the Heinz Endowments to do 
so. As a result, much of the initial contention within the environmental field over the CSSD 
centered on challengers’ claims that participating organizations “sold out” to industry in exchange 
for monetary resources. Such contention highlights challengers’ concerns regarding appropriate 
tactics to adopt and strategies to pursue within the environmental field. From their perspective, if 
an environmental organization can be ‘bought out’ by industry and appeased with financial 
incentives, the whole premise on which the environmental field operates is called into question.  
6.3 Resource infrastructure and tactical diversity 
My data reveal that while financial support may have helped to encouraged initial decisions 
to participate in the CCSD, it does not explain the organizational motivations for continued 
participation after funding ceased. For starters, three years into the coalition’s operation and after 
a contentious shake up at the Heinz Endowments in response to environmental backlash against 
the CSSD, the foundation suspended its funding to environmental organizations for their 
participation. Yet, despite the termination of funding, participating organizations remained 
invested in the coalition. One informant stated: 
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Now I don’t have any funding to continue working on it because Heinz is not interested in 
funding it anymore. But I just don’t want to completely drop it because we’ve invested so 
much work and it’s right at the point where they are starting to do these evaluations 
(Interview, August 8, 2014).  
For many informants, the sunk costs associated with the time invested in the negotiations, 
as well as a desire to see the certification process through to implementation, offered justification 
for remaining in the coalition even without financial incentives to do so.  
Additionally, incumbent organizations typically have more capacity than challenger groups 
to spend precious resources on diverse tactics and goals “without exhausting their existing 
infrastructure and resources” (Soule and King 2008: 1576). This allows them to try different 
approaches without the threat of overextension. To be sure, an informant expressed this sentiment: 
At least historically we have the resources to have a sort of complex approach to issues. 
Not only does our position tend to be nuanced, more nuanced than some organizations, but 
we have a communications person on staff, [a] legislative person who’s up in Harrisburg 
who is amazing and really knows his way around the halls of the General Assembly and 
knows a lot of people up there, and we have attorneys on staff statewide…and so it allows 
us to reach out with different tools in the toolbox and to approach any issue in different 
ways (Interview, August 21, 2014).  
Resources afford organizations the ability to pursue a diversity of strategies and tactics, 
which, in turn, helps to support organizational nimbleness. Nimbleness allows organizations to 
take advantage of unique opportunities and use them to shape the system and field more in their 
favor (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Occasionally, these efforts include the coordination of new 
social spaces, like the CSSD. At question is the degree to which new alliance systems may shift 
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decision-making arenas and ultimately undermine the capacity for collective action among 
organizations in the field at large.  
6.4 Mobilizing informational networks for policy change 
Weible et al. (2012) explain that there are three primary strategies for influencing policy 
change: (1) developing a deep understanding of the issue at hand; (2) creating new networks; and 
(3) remaining committed to these strategies over a long period of time. Indeed, my informants 
expressed the view that that the coalition promoted all three factors, which ultimately solidified 
their decision to remain in the coalition after the cessation of funding. All informants in one way 
or another expressed the significance of the opportunity for organizational learning that occurs 
from the direct exchange of information with gas industry representatives within the coalition. 
Such processes enable participating organizations to develop a deeper understanding of shale gas 
development and about what issues are most critical for industry to help scope their activist efforts. 
One informant stated: 
From my perspective there was an incredible amount of education that comes out of 
participating with the industry and having those discussions for me and for our 
organization, that you just don’t get when you’re sitting on the outside…I just gained a lot 
of knowledge. You understand [industry’s] perspective with issues that are sensitive to 
them (Interview, August 21, 2014). 
Another succinctly explained: 
I mean that’s part of the personal benefit to me and the benefit to [our organization] of 
being involved, is I have been able to get information I otherwise couldn’t have, and also 
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just the insights into how industry works, what their concerns are (Interview, August 8, 
2014). 
Similarly, one informant described how the information sharing and learning that occurred 
in the coalition reduced the costs of pursuing other adversarial tactics, in particular litigation: 
So, there’s a piece of this which is, um, which I think it’s hard to pin down completely. 
But, it’s this knowledge development. It’s the co-production of facts, as opposed to the 
adversarial production of facts. Which in my experience makes a negotiation process a 
problem-solving process in a way that a traditional litigation situation is almost counter to 
that, because if you admit any weakness or, you know, show any ambiguity then it has 
legal consequences, so I’d say that has almost independent value. And I think there is 
something more than a zero-sum here. There’s co, there’s value creation, there’s 
cooperative value creation here of some kind that goes on in this process. And I think that 
that occurred here (Interview, September 8, 2014). 
Lin and Darnall (2010) explain that in cross-sector alliances, organizations that make an 
effort to obtain a nuanced understanding of their counterparts’ strategic priorities are better 
positioned to develop valuable organizational competencies as a result of the alliance. Such 
competencies enable organizations to effectively interpret new and ambiguous information and 
deploy it to their advantage during future interactions. An industry informant supported this 
sentiment in offering: 
For the NGOs, [the CSSD] gives them really close access to the data and the best minds 
and what is possible, what the realities are, what the issues and hurdles are. I was just in 
DC last week talking to [a participating environmental organization] about these very 
questions, and really getting into the weeds on where the hiccups have come. So, it’s really 
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important for the NGOs to get inside the tent and see these intricacies and challenges 
(Interview, August 26, 2014). 
Insights from the venue shopping and policy process literature support these ideas. 
According to Pralle (2003: 235), advocacy organizations often expend significant amounts of 
energy seeking venues that provide them with “access to decision-making processes and adequate 
leverage over their opponents.” Such venues help to develop the skills and capacity of advocacy 
organizations to impact the pace and extent of policy reform in a targeted policy arena, particularly 
when organizations are unable to advance their agendas in other arenas. In this context, 
organizations are most successful at affecting policy change when alternative understandings about 
an issue are created, and new rules enforced by venue participants who can collectively leverage 
sufficient resources to circumvent traditional policy making avenues. Absent such productive 
venues, the ability for advocacy organizations to effect policy change is limited since they do not 
traditionally possess access to decision-making authorities where policy challenges occur (Bosso 
1988; Pralle 2003; Whittier 2018). 
6.4.1 Organizational learning and future campaigns 
In the same vein, several informants explained that the organizational learning that occurs 
from dialogue with industry helps them plan for future campaigns. In particular, possessing an 
understanding of what issues opponents are most sensitive to can inform how to strategically 
leverage those sensitivities for other gains. According to one informant: 
It’s useful to understand what’s happening in the field right now. It is just sort of one more 
piece of information that wastewater discharge is an issue. Northern tier counties contain 
a large percentage of our special protection waters, streams. You know, they’re headwater 
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streams in our state forests that are exceptionally sensitive to change in terms of their water 
quality. And to know that there is this pressure for the industry to get rid of their wastewater 
in a more economical way and one of the things they are looking at is trying to find a way 
to discharge it into what would be pretty sensitive waters in all likelihood, it’s some 
indication where we may want to look in the future for concerns (Interview, August 21, 
2014). 
Access to insider industry information, like the wastewater issue mentioned above, can 
create an awareness about critical points of leverage and help organizations plan for future 
campaigns. This awareness allows organizations to more appropriately frame strategies and devise 
tactics that are winnable, thereby reducing the costs of mobilization and increasing the chances of 
success.  
In her analysis of private forest certification schemes, Sasser (2003: 241) demonstrates that 
engaging with industry helps environmental organizations to become “more attuned to the 
dynamics” of the industrial sector and therefore better able to identify “the most vulnerable points 
in the supply chain” to launch “targeted campaigns that inflict maximum damage” to these firms’ 
reputations. Thus, venues like the CSSD potentially provide a win-win situation for participating 
organizations. In the case of forest certification, environmental organizations were able to secure 
cooperation from several large lumber corporations who agreed to use more sustainable practices. 
Such an agreement had the effect of creating a new market for sustainable forestry products, 
thereby influencing the scope and processes around which future conflicts in this sector were 
shaped (Pralle 2003). On the other hand, if groups within the coalition are unable to mobilize 
sufficient resources to effect policy change, at the very least participating organizations gain access 
to sensitive industry information that can help inform effective adversarial campaigns in the future. 
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6.4.2 Resource mobilization and the development of new networks 
Another important strategy for participating organizations is the new networks the coalition 
helps to generate, not only with other participating environmental organizations, but particularly 
with industry groups. One informant discussed the advantages of the new networks his 
organization has formed as a result of the coalition: 
You know, these energy companies aren’t doing just shale gas. And we’re not doing just 
shale gas. We’re doing other issues and we can call somebody and say, ‘hey do you have 
somebody doing small hydro projects somewhere that we can talk to?’ Or ‘what can you 
really tell us about solar thermal?’ So, I think it opens up those resources. And the same 
with NGOs. You know, we are working a lot with [another participating environmental 
organization] which means we can call them, and they’ve got resources that they can point 
us to, somebody on all kinds of issues. And they can call us about anything…so it’s a two-
way street which is really nice (Interview, August 15, 2014). 
Another stated that the relationships formed with industry support future work on other 
environmental issues: 
I would say that the [CSSD], it’s plugged us in, I think our networks are now better with 
the companies, so we now have a, now we can actually have people to bounce ideas off of 
(Interview, September 8, 2014).  
Weible et al. (2012) explain that developing networks is critical to influencing the policy 
process because networks help to overcome collective action problems by reducing the costs 
associated with mobilization. Lubell (2002) offers the same idea, stating that actors who participate 
in different types of organizations “gain experience with collective action and exposure to 
recruitment networks that also reduce the costs of environmental activism” (437). In other words, 
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organizations that accrue “social capital” are in a position to more readily leverage new 
relationships and call on their networks to facilitate mobilization in future instances (Tarrow 1998). 
Moreover, relationships formed in new arenas can serve as mobilizing structures for the 
accumulation of additional resources. Soule and King (2008) explain that as an organization’s 
networks expand, so does the appeal of that organization to a diversity of constituents and 
supporters. This mass appeals tends to assist organizations in attracting additional resources for 
mobilization. Soule and King (2008) find that organizations that pursue a variety of tactics have 
“survival advantages” over groups that adopt a more specialized tactical repertoire in resource-
scarce environments. For instance, the learning that occurs in collaborative and information-
sharing processes sets up organizations to be poised for participation in similar coalitions in the 
future (Lin and Darnell 2010). Not only does this enhance the opportunity for further 
organizational learning, but it also sets up new opportunities for mobilization and supports a 
continuous cycle of organizational adaptation and diversification.  
6.5 Mobilizing reputational capital as a resource 
Political arenas like the CSSD help environmental organizations fulfill a “backup 
regulatory role” in the void of government action, which also improves these organizations’ access 
to the state. Indeed, Whittier (2018) argues that frenemy relationships not only tend to emerge 
because of a movement’s goal of state intervention (or lack thereof in this case), but also that these 
structures can improve the participants’ access to elite decision-making circles. As one informant 
from a participating organization stated: 
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The Corbett Administration has not really liked [our organization] very much, but I think 
at least now when they are pigeonholing the environmental organizations, they probably 
put us in the one that means well. This kind of goes back to what I was saying earlier how 
people on the other side tend to assume the very worst of intentions in everyone that 
disagrees with them. Again I don’t think any environmental organizations deserve to be in 
the category of actively trying to perpetuate evil in the world, however DEP [Department 
of Environmental Protection] would think of it, but, for instance, at least we are out of that 
category and with people that have good intentions in their mind (Interview, August 8, 
2014). 
Another informant from a participating organization explained: 
It’s given us some credibility – we’ve learned so much that I think we are just much more 
credible in Washington now. So, we are really serious players at the table…we are bringing 
a lot of expertise to the table (Interview, September 8, 2014). 
As Pralle (2003: 256) explains, “groups choose venues not only to win substantive policy 
benefits, but also to mobilize supporters to create, maintain, or re-create organizational identities. 
Over time, the use of a particular policy venue can become part of the narrative and ideology of 
an advocacy group, a key component of their organizational image and identity.” Indeed, 
organizations garner socio-political legitimacy by conforming to legal rules and by gaining 
endorsement from elite actors (Rao et al. 2000: 241). In the case of shale gas development, being 
perceived as an organization that possesses deep technical knowledge and that is willing to 
compromise with major economic players helps to establish participating organizations as credible 
and ‘legitimate’ players in the policy process. As one informant with prior experience in 
government states: 
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Unless you have good contacts [within government] that you can call up and talk to on the 
side, or convince [the government] that you are part of the public and that they should be 
talking to you - you know, they don’t view it that way, though - you know, they view you 
as an adversary, they’re more likely to talk to industry than to talk to citizen’s groups 
because they view [citizen’s groups] as adversaries (Interview, August 21, 2014). 
In this light, the CSSD can be viewed as a strategic venue that allows organizations to 
mobilize reputational capital to generate political openings with the state that otherwise would not 
have been available to them. Indeed, while directly engaging with industry is increasingly relevant 
in a globalizing world, continuing to rely on the state to ‘certify’ and enforce environmental 
demands remains a critical task. By strategically choosing the environmental-industry coalition as 
a venue for participation, organizations can leverage their newly acquired technical wherewithal 
and socio-political endorsement from elite industry players to signal to the state that they are 
legitimate stakeholders and therefore deserve to be included in the policy making process. 
6.6 Organizational learning in collaborations 
Organizational learning in a coalition does not happen in a vacuum, but rather is an 
outcome of the structural and social characteristics that guide the dynamics of the alliance. The 
literature on this topic indicates that devising successful coalitions of diverse participants with 
conflicting interests is an iterative process in which individual behavior and decision making are 
affected by the course of social interaction (Ostrom et al. 1994). In social situations, individuals 
often utilize contextual cues and informational feedback in forming expectations about the future 
behavior of others and thus about the efficacy of committing to cooperative action (Axelrod 1984). 
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Research also shows that individuals often seek to institutionalize cooperative behavior by 
developing rules to govern behavior and ensure ongoing commitment to the creation of mutually 
beneficial outcomes. This process helps to minimize the costs associated with engaging in 
cooperative action by reducing the uncertainty of the future behavior of others (North 1990). 
Hardin (1982) explains that in ongoing social interactions, an individual’s anticipation of 
future interactions impacts one’s present decisions. Based on this notion, he concludes that the 
prospects for collective action are greatest under the influence of a “contract by convention.” 
Contract by convention is a form of coordinated behavior in which self-interested individuals agree 
to cooperate contingent on the expectation that others will cooperate in return. Conventions are 
constructed through the exchange of tacit knowledge that communicates one’s interest in and 
willingness to conform given that others will do the same. Conventions are maintained via the 
mutual commitment to sanction or punish those who do not. In this sense, Hardin (1982) claims 
that problems of collective action become problems of coordination, which are easier to resolve 
than problems of collective action. This is because conventions can arise simply out of overlapping 
networks in which individuals possess some level of knowledge about other’s expected behavior.  
Achieving coordination is therefore dependent primarily on the ability for groups to 
establish sanctioning schemes that are less costly to implement than engaging in cooperative 
behavior in which the outcomes are uncertain. Axelrod (1984) found that, through coordination, 
cooperative behavior can voluntarily emerge when individuals can expect to meet one another in 
future social interactions. Accordingly, when this necessary condition is satisfied, the occurrence 
of reciprocal behavior usually contributes to further reciprocity.  
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6.6.1 Collective action and bounded rationality 
Ostrom (1998) contends that bounded rationality can explain the tendency for individuals 
with competing interests that interact to develop trust, norms of reciprocity, and an incentive to 
maintain one’s reputation in social interaction. In this light, research indicates that if actors can 
expect that cooperative behavior will be reciprocated then a commitment to cooperation develops. 
Further, when mutual commitments increase individual returns to cooperative behavior, one’s 
interest in maintaining a reputation among group members is also enhanced, thus deepening one’s 
commitment to that group. Indeed, several informants supported this understanding regarding their 
commitment to the CSSD and to learning through the process. According to one participant: 
It was two full years of a lot of collaborative dialogue and a lot of meetings. You know, a 
lot of meetings. You can’t meet three or four times a year and build that (kind of trust). I 
mean we were meeting three or four times a week sometimes!...And so when you are sort 
of pushed into that kind of prioritization for all of us, cause we all have day jobs, when you 
push in that kind of prioritization, that meant every one of us had pulled our seat up to the 
table and said, ‘yeah, we’re gonna see this through.’ And I think that made a big difference 
(Interview, September 4, 2014). 
As Ostrom et al. (2007) explain, when participants have the opportunity to communicate 
frequently and over time, they tend to discuss how to build norms to encourage compliance with 
more collectively beneficial ends. These outcomes are strengthened particularly when actors 
engage in substantive and face-to-face communication and form relationships with one another. 
These conditions allow trust to develop and thrive. Trust, in turn, facilitates the exchange of 
sensitive information, which enhances the opportunities for learning.  
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For instance, in research on the development of collaborative resource management 
programs involving the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, citizen groups, and 
commercial users in complex watershed, forestry and fishery cases, Blann et al. (2003) find that 
candid and extensive communication was central in developing trust to overcome collective action 
challenges among these participating groups. They assert that “in complex systems, relationships 
form the basis for all communication, motivation, and action. Trust is critical” to learning from 
one another, and to facilitating cooperative ends (Blann et al. 2003: 228).  
Several of my informants communicated this same idea, that the extensive communication 
and engagement that the coalition fostered help to develop working relationships, generate feelings 
of trust among the group, and therefore facilitated the exchange of sensitive information. An 
industry participant offered an example that expounded upon this idea: 
The original [issue] was greenhouse gas emissions from well completions, and we would 
loggerhead, you know some people yelling at each other, not getting anything done, and 
we went back to the industry and said, ‘look, let’s put the numbers on the table and have 
that break the ice.’ So, we went in – and it took me six weeks to get approval through [my 
corporation] – and got those numbers released, and then we just slid them across the table 
and said those are our greenhouse gas numbers.’ And their eyes bugged out and [an 
environmental participant] said, ‘wow, well, you guys were willing to share’ (Interview, 
August 26, 2014). 
Additionally, an informant from a participating organization emphatically offered: 
Over time it got to the point where it was like companies were providing us with pretty 
sensitive information that really takes quite a bit of trust to share, very detailed operations 
stuff (Interview, August 8, 2014).  
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Transparency and reciprocity reinforce the development of trust among participants which 
lead to a greater willingness to share sensitive information and data. This learning, in turn, 
facilitates the potential for finding common ground in complex issues, even among actors with 
competing interests (Blann et al. 2003). One informant offered another example to illustrate this 
idea: 
At one point we went into the bowels of [one gas corporation] and met with their deep tech 
people, you know, like a day-long work session. It was actually kind of funny how that 
happened…We were arguing about [a technical solution]. And it just went back and, there 
was all this fog and just talking past one another. And we were just gridlocked. And I 
happened to be over at a meeting in Warsaw, the IEA [International Energy Agency] was 
doing a report on the topic of shale gas. It was the ‘Golden Age of Gas’ report. And, so, 
they had a work session. So, I was there, and [the gas corporation’s] guy was there. And, I 
don’t know, we were just kind of stuck on this. And we had this corridor conversation and 
we said ‘well, let’s just get so and so together with so and so.’ And [we] got to the bottom 
of it (Interview, September 9, 2014). 
Trust that had been established among participants in the CSSD enabled one leader from a 
participating organization to effectively engage with a key industry representative in a venue 
outside of the CSSD to resolve a critical issue in a critical moment. The norms of reciprocity and 
trust that had been established by participating in the coalition enabled further learning and 
communication between these actors to reach mutual goals. 
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6.7 Institutions and cooperation 
Nevertheless, research demonstrates that substantive and face-to-face interaction and trust, 
though necessary, are not sufficient for engendering cooperative outcomes, especially in the 
context of contentious issues (Ostrom et al. 1994). In addition to communication and trust, the 
creation of sanctions is also essential for facilitating sustained collective action (Ostrom 1998). 
While communication and trust allow for individuals to exchange information and devise rules for 
future behavior, the threat of sanctions for noncompliance helps to reduce individual incentives to 
defect. Sanctions also reinforce expectations that group members will follow through on mutual 
commitments (North 1990). Organizational learning in a coalition does not happen in a vacuum, 
but rather is an outcome of the structural and social characteristics that guide the dynamics of the 
alliance. Several of my informants explained that devising a robust auditing system in which the 
environmental organizations had full visibility into industry operations was essential for 
facilitating their participation and cooperation. As one industry informant stated: 
The auditor guy said: ‘How often do you go on the ground? What documents do you need 
to see for evidence of conformance?’ We did that as a package all together in about nine 
months. And that was really hard. In many ways that was harder than the standards 
themselves because that was when the operators had to say, ‘Hey the curtain is open. Come 
in, come on the ground and see what we are doing.’ And the NGOs were like ‘Wow, now 
we get to see! And if we see something else, we are here to see an air question, if we see a 
water issue, do we call them out?’ It was like a candy store problem [i.e. there would be a 
lot of issues to point to]. We didn’t want to let the curtain aside too much. So, a really tough 
moment where the sides were very disjoined. And the NGOs said, ‘Look this is our 
reputation. If this is not really fully all eyes open, then we can’t take it to our public and 
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say hey we’re inside a candy store.’ So really important for all sides [to have an auditing 
program]. That’s why I was saying it was in many ways more difficult than the standards 
themselves to write (Interview, August 26, 2014). 
Generally speaking, the CSSD certification program satisfies the need for an industry 
sanctioning mechanism to ensure transparency and commitment to the goals developed within the 
coalition. Moreover, participants were hopeful that the certification scheme would serve as a 
sanctioning mechanism for industry non-participants by demonstrating to the public the lack of 
commitment on the part of industries that defect, that is, that don’t agree to the auditing. This, they 
hoped, would help to scale the performance standards to all operators across the industry, as well 
as demonstrate to the state what was feasible from a regulatory perspective. 
Moreover, my data indicate that without a certification program to reward conforming 
firms, and without the ability for environmental organizations to ‘peek under the hood’ of industry 
operations, the communication and trust-building that occurred in the CSSD would never have 
gotten the traction necessary to facilitate collaborative outcomes. In this light, not only was the 
auditing program essential to garnering commitment to the coalition and commitment to action in 
the field, but so was the work of a neutral facilitator in the coalition. According to one informant 
about the coalition: 
You needed strong leadership. Someone who really could - it’s not just a facilitator, the 
Executive Director role here, it would be a grave mistake to think about that as just a 
facilitator. You’ve got to be a real driver of the process, for several reasons. One is a 
practical reason. You’ve got to have someone whose mission is to get the ball over the 
finish line. But that person – I was thinking about this this morning before our meeting – 
is the only person in this who is really trusted by all sides, and can put stuff on the table 
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that wouldn’t be as well received if it came from one side or the other; knows intimately 
each person’s - not only their organizational requirements and needs, but also the individual 
requirements and needs and how they work, how they think. You’ve got to understand all 
the relationships, and you’ve got to have continuity, you’ve got to have folks that are in 
this month after month, year after year, so the Executive Director and also the partners get 
to know who they are and what the issues are, and how to get them to closure. 
In this light, it is critical to recognize the central role institutions play in facilitating 
collective action by structuring social interaction (North 1990). They do so by providing guidelines 
for behavior, by facilitating communication and the development of trust, and by offering a 
mechanism through which sanctions can be imposed on defectors or non-compliers (Knight and 
Sened 1995). As Rao et al. (2000: 247) argue, “new organizational forms can explicitly be created 
by activists to discredit exiting arrangements and can provide a vehicle for those who feel excluded 
from access to the existing system.” Thus, participating organizations sought to use the coalition 
not only as an alternative vehicle to gain new information and networks for advancing their efforts, 
but also as a strategic venue for pursuing broader goals.  
6.8 Conclusion 
Effectively mobilizing resources is a critical task for all organizations. Overall, my findings 
demonstrate that organizations value the coalition primarily for the strategic advantages it offers 
for mobilizing informational and network resources to enhance organizational capacity and 
efficacy in meeting environmental goals. By collaborating with industry groups, environmental 
organizations acquire key resources that enable them to plan for future campaigns and leverage 
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new identities for access to elite policy circles. Moreover, when participants have the opportunity 
to communicate frequently and over time, they tend to discuss how to build norms to encourage 
compliance with more collectively beneficial ends. These outcomes not only strengthen an 
organization’s position in the environmental field, but also satisfy concerns for advancing 
environmental goals.   
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7.0 Conclusion 
If we accept Fligstein and McAdam’s premise that fields are the ‘basic building blocks of 
organizational life,’ then attention to contention in a given field is relevant for understanding the 
processes of stability and change in society at large. Additionally, if we support Whittier’s (2018: 
196) argument that “the story of social change is a story of frenemies,” then a focus on contentious 
alliances is important sociological work. My case reveals interesting dynamics within the 
environmental field as actors navigated the emergence of a new industry and a contentious alliance. 
A field level perspective helps to contextualize the strategic decision-making that environmental 
organizations engaged in as they surveyed broader level societal and political conditions for 
deciding whether to support or oppose the coalition for advancing their goals. Additionally, 
Whittier’s (2018) conceptualization of frenemy relationship structures assists in linking the 
interaction of environmental actors with the dynamics of contention that occurred within the field 
as a result of the collaboration. 
By situating organizational factors, such as resource mobilization and the framing 
processes of individual groups, in a wider network of potential alliance and conflict systems 
(Klandermans 1997) and proximate fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012), my analysis shows that, 
as new collective action frames, identities, and practices emerged within the environmental field, 
uncertainty seeped into the shared understanding of the cultural processes and mission upon which 
the environmental field (and movement) had been built. As such, suspicions about aberrant 
activities and the organizations that employed them exacerbated existing divisions within the 
movement, threatening to unravel the tacitly agreed upon rules for action and interaction among 
organizations within the field. However, my analysis also reveals that participating organizations 
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valued the coalition as an important addition to their tactical repertoire and a necessary strategy to 
advance the movement’s goals in a politically constrained environment and globalizing world.  
7.1 Strategic action fields: the link between agency & structure 
From a social movement perspective, one may conclude that contention within the 
environmental movement over formation of the CSSD played out along the classic lines of 
disagreement regarding the preferred strategies and tactics of grassroots/challenger groups and 
national/incumbent environmental organizations. Conclusions from a movement-centric 
perspective most likely would have overshadowed the nuances of strategic decision-making that 
the organizations pursued as they made the difficult decision to either join the alliance or oppose 
their movement counterparts for participating. On the other hand, an organizational theorist may 
have underscored the emergence of the CSSD as a new form of organized life that helps to resolve 
conflict between the environmental and industry fields, while underappreciating the contention 
that this new structure created within the environmental field. 
Overall, my case offers empirical evidence to reveal how a field level framework engenders 
a deeper appreciation for the underlying structures and social processes that incite the reactive 
mobilization of groups within the environmental field as a result of the alliance, and the motivation 
of organizations who joined it. My case also offers support for Whittier’s (2018) conceptualization 
of frenemy alliance structures and the impact these relationships have on broader movement 
dynamics. Through the analysis presented in this paper, I show that while participation in the 
environmental-industry coalition represents a relatively new form of action for environmental 
organizations, on the whole the motivations to participate in this new social structure are not 
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indicative of acquiescence to movement co-optation by industry groups or of narrow self-interest 
to secure financial resources. Rather, my case demonstrates that the motivation to participate 
largely reflects a process of strategic decision-making and adaptation to societal changes over 
which environmental organizations have no control, and a decision to employ one strategy among 
others that some organizations believe to be effective for advancing environmental goals in a 
changing world (Delmas and Young 2009).  
Additionally, a field level framework engenders a deeper appreciation for the underlying 
structures that incite the reactive mobilization of opposing groups, transcending the traditional 
focus on their contempt for institutionalized politics to an emphasis on the uncertainty these groups 
face when organizations in their field seemingly shift their loyalties to actors that have long been 
established as one of the chief enemies of the movement. As new collective action frames, 
identities, and practices emerge, uncertainty seeps into the shared understanding of the cultural 
processes and missions on which a field has been built. Ultimately, such processes not only 
threaten the viability of less powerful actors in the field, but also undermine the ability for field 
members to “deliver valued ends”, thus potentially jeopardizing the long-term stability of the field 
as a whole (Fligstein and McAdam 2016: 176). 
7.2 Roadmap for understanding strategic action in organizational fields 
According to Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 7), there has been little concern in the literature 
regarding how opportunities and constraints in the social and political environment are 
fundamentally dependent on the “complex lattice work of relations” that connect one 
organizational field to another. By paying attention to key processes that occur within and between 
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strategic action fields, they argue that one can develop a meso-level theory of social action that 
links agency and structure. When actors within their local fields of action operate on the basis of 
a shared understanding about the purpose of a field, collective action that occurs within and 
between organized groups either maintains, changes or transforms the existing field order, 
ultimately impacting organized social life. 
The analysis presented in this project follows the methodological roadmap Fligstein and 
McAdam (2012) offer to support researchers in their study of social life. They contend that fields 
exist along a continuum of three states: formation/emergence, stability, and crisis/rupture. When a 
field is in the third state, a state of conflict or crisis, analysts must evaluate the following: 
1. What are the factors and processes that precipitate the contention?
2. Who are the actors that shape the contention over time?
3. What are the interactive dynamics that shape the contention?
4. With what forms of action and collective action frames do incumbents and
challengers respond to the contention? 
5. What role do key external actors and fields play in precipitating the contention,  shaping
its trajectory, and ultimately helping to affect a new field settlement? 
6. What are the terms of the new settlement? And to what extent does it alter the prior
power structure of the field of interest? 
7. How do the contention and new settlement affect proximate fields?
My research utilized these key questions as I analyzed contention within the environmental 
field as a result of the formation of the coalition. Below I provide a summary of the research 
presented in this paper that follows Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) roadmap for a field-based 
study of organized social life and collective action. 
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7.2.1 Factors and processes that precipitated contention in the environmental field 
The factors that precipitated the contention within the environmental field over the 
formation of the coalition include both long-term and short-term processes. Long-term processes 
that are relevant include the historical processes of globalization that gave rise to the neoliberal 
economic paradigm as the organizing principle for contemporary environmental policymaking, as 
well as entrenched multinational corporations as key actors in a globalized world. These factors 
facilitated the retreat of the state in dealing with environmental problems and inspired the 
formation of environmental-industry alliances as a novel attempt to fill the void in global 
environmental governance.  
Short-term processes that precipitated the contention include technological advancements 
in natural gas drilling and the lax regulatory environment that facilitated rapid development of 
fracking in various regions of the country. Pennsylvania was a “first mover” in enacting statewide 
legislation to encourage development of the industry (Rabe and Borick 2013). By the time 
environmental activists mobilized in opposition to the development and its impacts, fracking was 
already an established part of Pennsylvania and the surrounding region’s energy and economic 
portfolios, leaving few political opportunities for advancing environmental goals.  
7.2.2 Actors and events that shaped the episode of contention over time 
Regional actors, such as the Environmental Defense Fund, Pennsylvania Environmental 
Council, Clean Air Task Force, and Citizens for Pennsylvania’s Future (PennFuture) represent the 
incumbents of the environmental field, with their formalized structures, large resource base, and 
access to political circles. Their professional structures enabled them to draw on resources and 
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expertise to participate in the coalition, as well as supported their “good” standing with foundations 
willing to provide funding for their involvement in the coalition (see Bosso 2005; Rudel et al. 
2011).  
Grassroots environmental groups, with their decentralized structures and limited access to 
financial resources and decision-makers (Schlosberg 1999), represent the challengers in the 
environmental field. Their challenger orientation is manifest in their outspoken criticism of 
participating groups, condemning them for being too willing to compromise on environmental 
issues and for ‘selling-out’ to industry for what they perceive to be financial and instrumental gain 
(see Bosso 2005; Dowie 1995).  
7.2.3 Interactive dynamics that shape the conflict 
As activism on fracking grew in response to gas development occurring in the region, the 
presence of divergent goals and frames for action became increasingly apparent. Incumbent and 
challenger groups tended to fall into their expected patterns for action, utilizing frames and 
strategies that supported their respective roles in the field. On the one hand, incumbent groups 
generally called for stronger regulations and governmental oversight without outright opposing the 
development, while challenger groups pressed for a full ban or moratorium on any further drilling.  
Contention within the environmental field peaked with the formation of the Center for 
Sustainable Shale Development. Opposing groups in the environmental field challenged their 
counterparts not only because some organizations chose to cooperate with industry rather than 
their environmental counterparts calling for a moratorium, but also because the coalition did not 
secure the state’s endorsement for enforcement of the performance standards. Whitter (2018) 
argues that movement factionalism is a primary concern for activists who believe that collaborating 
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with the enemy only helps to strengthen the enemies’ position. Furthermore, she (2018: 203) 
claims that “frenemy relationships often emerge around movement goals of state intervention.” 
This notion supports the views of participating and incumbent groups that the CSSD could serve 
as a ‘back-up regulator’ in the absence of state oversight for fracking. On the other hand, it also 
underscores challenger concerns about the lack of state involvement in the CSSD. Conceptualizing 
environmental actors and their interaction with the CSSD helps to specify the environmental field 
as it relates to the coalition and the conflict it created.  
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7.2.4 With what forms of action and collective action frames do incumbents and 
challengers respond to the developing contention?  
Environmental groups that oppose the CSSD were concerned that collaborating with “the 
enemy” compromises the ability of other environmental organizations to challenge industry and 
secure the state’s support to make sustained progress towards environmental goals. Opposing 
groups also perceive such strategies as undermining the accountability of environmental 
organizations, suggesting that groups are lured into alliances with industry organizations with 
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financial incentives in exchange for organizational acquiescence and green cover to industry 
practices.  
Participating organizations and other incumbents welcomed the coalition as an opportunity 
to fashion a “winning coalition” that could generate new collective action frames and identities to 
advance reciprocal interests (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 107). Additionally, incumbents 
expressed that participation in the environmental-industry coalition enabled their organization to 
fulfill a “backup regulatory role” in the void of government action, and that such strategies also 
help to generate important outcomes for improving access to the state. 
7.2.5 What role do key external actors play in precipitating the episode, shaping its 
trajectory, and ultimately helping to affect a new field settlement? 
Because of the actions of John Hanger, an “institutional entrepreneur” (DiMaggio 1988), 
the environmental field experienced conflict. Institutional entrepreneurs are actors “who invent 
new cultural conceptions” in order to “fashion a political coalition under a new banner that unites 
disparate groups” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 109-110). John Hanger, former head of 
Pennsylvania’s Department of Environmental Protection, initiated the formation of the CSSD, 
inciting contentious reaction in the environmental field. Recognizing the Corbett administration’s 
cozy relationship with the gas industry and lack of environmental concern for fracking, Hanger 
sought to create an alternative mechanism for implementing environmental protections. Thus, he 
approached a select few foundations, several environmental organizations, a handful of major gas 
companies, and professional allies to form a coalition with the purpose of creating environmental 
performance standards for the gas industry to voluntarily implement.  
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7.2.6 What are the terms of the new settlement? And to what extent does it alter the prior 
power structure of the field? 
Despite entrenched disagreements between incumbent and challenger environmental 
groups over the most effective frames to adopt and strategies to pursue, one long established field 
rule is an acknowledgment that industry is one of the movement’s chief enemies. Thus, when 
environmental groups chose to engage in coalition work with the enemy, it violated a central rule 
of the environmental field that provides meaning to field membership, collective identity, and 
appropriate repertoires of action. In Whittier’s (2018) frenemy relationship typology, adversarial 
collaborators are ideologically opposed, which can create confusion and concern among other field 
members about who is in and who is out of their field in question. Furthermore, environmental-
industry alliances are a particular concern for grassroots groups who are resource poor relative to 
their national counterparts. Because the survival and maintenance of grassroots groups is usually 
more tenuous than national organizations, grassroots groups in some ways are reliant on national 
organizations for sustaining the viability of the field as well as their own survival on some 
occasions. 
Incumbents believed that engaging with industry not only provided them with access to 
insider information and industry networks, but also with resources that increase their credibility 
vis-a-vis the state. Such resources are particularly critical for incumbent environmental 
organizations given that their strategies are primarily focused on lobbying state officials and 
attempting to advance environmental goals via conventional political channels. By collaborating 
with industry groups, incumbent environmental organizations acquire key resources that enable 
them to do what they typically do even better and solidify their dominant position in the field.     
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7.2.7 How does the contention and new settlement affect proximate fields? 
Overall, contention over the formation of the CSSD did not disrupt the viability of the 
environmental field, even if it disrupted some internal rules upon which the environmental field 
had been established. For a variety of reasons, contention over the coalition subsided as gas 
development waned due to forces of the global market. These forces were the result of widespread 
development that created an oversupply of natural gas in the global market, plummeting gas prices 
and undermining the ability for companies to continue extracting the resource in a profitable 
manner. These larger scale processes had the impact of shifting the attention of environmental 
organizations to other conflicts more relevant to their broader work. While the coalition is still in 
existence, participating and opposing organizations in the environmental field no longer view the 
CSSD as a threat to the movement’s larger goals and therefore to the stability of the environmental 
field as a whole.  
Moreover, every participating organization with the exception of one – PennFuture – 
remains in the coalition (now named the Center for Responsible Shale Development) to this day, 
reflecting the ongoing benefits to their organizational work the coalition offers. Regarding 
PennFuture’s departure, one informant stated that the organization recently left the CSSD to spend 
organizational resources on other activities. Perhaps one could also argue that because the Heinz 
Endowments is a major supporter of PennFuture, the foundation’s eventual opposition to the CSSD 
inspired PennFuture to cease their involvement in order to appease their funders.   
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7.3 Global environmental problems and collective action 
While global market forces may have diminished the potential relevance of the Center for 
Sustainable Shale Development, analyzing the processes of collective action within the 
environmental movement from a field level perspective is critical in light of the scope of 
environmental problems that society faces today. Effectively addressing issues such as climate 
change and loss of biodiversity requires an unprecedented level of collective action by actors, 
organizations, and governments across the globe whose activities span countless numbers of 
organizational fields. The environmental movement plays a key role in leveraging societal forces 
required to address these problems.   
Due to the influence of macrolevel processes such as globalization and entrenchment of 
the neoliberal economic paradigm on structuring state-society relations, environmental-industry 
governance mechanisms are becoming increasingly prevalent as the state’s capacity to address 
environmental problems declines (Young 2009). In this light, research on environmental-industry 
alliances is indeed “motivated at least in part by desire to improve our ability to design regimes 
that will prove effective in solving, or at least managing, specific environmental problems” (Young 
2002: 11). However, making valid conclusions about the impact of any environmental-industry 
alliance requires that researchers take into account a host of factors and variables that influence 
the ability for the coalition to successfully improve the health of the environment and ecosystems 
that society relies on. Indeed, the potential of any governance mechanism to address environmental 
problems is complicated by the contested nature of social values, resource management 
orientations, and environmental perceptions (Richter et al. 2006; Yearly 2005). Research on these 
issues is critical for revealing how cooperative action can occur to better address environmental 
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problems in a world where resource management is a complex process rife with competing 
interests, an array of desired outcomes, and a diversity of actors (Young et al. 2008).  
7.3.1 Collective action to address complex global environmental problems  
Scholars have particularly underscored the need to investigate the challenges associated 
with developing governance systems for the protection of larger and more complex environmental 
resource systems, such as the climate (see Berkes et al. 2003; National Resource Council 2002). 
Edwards and Stein (1998) argue that complex resource systems may complicate prospects for 
collective action because multiple users have competing incentives for cooperative resource 
management. In other words, complex resource systems may be susceptible to the classic problems 
of collective action, and specifically to Hardin’s theory of the tragedy of the commons. Hulme 
(2009) argues that a lack of action towards mitigating complex environmental problems, such as 
climate change, stems not from disputes over the scientific evidence available, but rather from the 
various relationships that different people have toward that scientific evidence. He states that these 
relationships include people’s different orientations toward the role of science in decision-making, 
of the relationship between humans and nature, of one’s responsibility to future generations, and 
of the way to interpret climate risk and uncertainty. These different relationships toward scientific 
evidence are established and reinforced through different institutions and cultural processes that 
define different organizational fields.  
One key variable that affects people’s relationship toward natural resources systems and 
their proper management is risk perception. Fischoff et al. (1981) explain that defining risks, and 
more specifically deciding on which risks are acceptable for society to manage, is a decision-
making process rife with competing values, judgments and beliefs. In other words, “Risks cannot 
131 
simply be described as facts of the natural world; indeed they are the result of a complex process 
of interpretation” (Richter et al. 2006). Thus, risk perception regarding how to address complex 
environmental problems must be understood as a dynamic process that is susceptible to change as 
a result of learning and exchange that can occur during social interaction.  
7.3.2 Risk perceptions, bounded rationality and collective action 
Cultural processes help to define what people perceive as attainable by clarifying options, 
establishing expectations, and creating predictability in social interaction (Douglas 1985: 80). 
Because knowledge is limited and complete certainty about outcomes is impossible, individuals 
utilize social cues – or heuristics – to make decisions about risk. Social cues help individuals to 
simplify complex choices and to set “boundaries on the range of feasible alternatives” (Douglas 
and Wildavsky 1982: 77). This idea is central because it highlights the ability for individual 
orientations toward risk – and therefore towards particular arrangements for environmental 
governance – to evolve and adapt through social interaction. This explanation again underscores 
the role that a modified view of rationality plays in explaining the emergence of collective action 
for addressing global scale and complex environmental problems. While the traditional rational 
actor paradigm assumes that individuals make decisions about risks in simple environments where 
actors are equipped with complete knowledge about the situation and its outcomes, bounded 
rationality more realistically captures the essence of behavior in complex, and thus riskier, resource 
management cases (Janssen 2002).  
Hulme (2009: 326) ultimately argues that our orientations toward environmental progress 
“should be seen as an intellectual resource around which our collective and personal identities and 
project can form and take shape.” This recognition, Hulme (2009: 330) claims, helps to engender 
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the understanding that “the sources of our enduring disagreements about climate change lie within 
us, in our values and in our sense of identity and purpose.” Thus, according to Hulme (2009), 
addressing climate change and other complex environmental problems should be viewed as a 
necessarily collective endeavor among competing actors, and one in which conflicting individual 
interests and values are collectively renegotiated and redefined for engendering the emergence of 
cooperative behavior. 
Ultimately, as Blann et al. (2003: 228) assert, “In complex systems, relationships form the 
basis for all communication, motivation, and action. Trust is critical” for enabling the exchange of 
information about risks related to the resource use, and thus for ultimately effecting optimal 
governance outcomes. As a result of transparent and deliberative processes, individuals are able to 
share perspectives and learn from one another’s diverse orientations and experiences. These 
processes can facilitate the formation of trust among actors and the development of “solid working 
relationships” that ultimately enable actors to come up with robust governance solutions (Blann et 
al. 2003).  
In the final analysis, social institutions play a critical role in structuring the opportunities 
for the collective renegotiation and redefinition of environmental protection. Coalitions like the 
one evaluated in this project offer the ability for social actors with competing values and different 
perceptions to exchange information, develop new perspectives and engage in deliberative 
processes for the creation of collaborative and more robust environmental governance regimes. In 
this sense, lessons gleaned from this study offer useful empirical insights into the organizational 
motivations for supporting or opposing such arrangements, and the risks such arrangements may 
ultimately pose to the viability of the environmental field as a whole.  
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As new strategies, tactics, and frames are employed by organizations in the environmental 
movement, the ensuing uncertainty regarding the nature of previously taken-for-granted rules and 
routines will undoubtedly engender ongoing conflict within the field. Whether participating in 
non-state market driven environmental governance mechanisms will gain legitimacy as an 
appropriate strategy for environmental actors is a question still unresolved. Until organizations 
within the environmental movement can settle on a new consensus for action on this matter, 
conflict in the environmental movement over use of this tactic will ensue (Fligstein and McAdam 
2012: 22). At stake is whether environmental organizations will be capable of transcending their 
own “narrow group interests” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 17-18), or whether the collective 
capacity of the movement will erode under the pressure of contested routines, logics, and identities.  
Given the interdependency of national/incumbent organizations and grassroots/challenger 
groups for mobilizing diverse constituencies and attending to environmental problems at all levels 
of society, fashioning a new consensus on appropriate rules for action that comprehends changes 
occurring outside of, yet relevant to, the environmental strategic action field is essential for the 
movement’s continued relevancy and capacity to inspire the level of collective action necessary to 
address current environmental problems of unprecedented scale. While the overall impacts of 
environmental-industry alliances on environmental and societal health must be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis, social scientists have a key role to play in uncovering the social processes that 
help support the development of more secure and robust environmental protection regimes in a 
globalized world.  
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7.4 Contributions to the literature 
Through this project, I seek to contribute to the emerging body of work focused on the 
intersection of social movement and organizational theory and field level analyses. In my analysis, 
I demonstrate that while a movement-centered approach to analyzing the environmental-industry 
coalition might emphasize the divergence of preferred strategies and tactics between groups in the 
environmental movement (Bosso 2005), my research suggests that a more comprehensive 
examination of both organizational and field-level factors is necessary to understand the factors 
that motivated environmental groups to support or oppose the coalition and the conflict that ensued 
as a result (Davis et al. 2005; Fligstein and McAdam 2012).  
My research also contributes to the literature on social movement coalitions. According to 
Staggenborg (1986: 374), “modern social movements are not monolithic entities, but consist of 
shifting coalitions of constituents from varying backgrounds…The ability of these different groups 
to work together is critical to the movement’s chances for success in achieving goals and gaining 
access to power.” Despite the scholarly attention to the formation of coalitions among social 
movement organizations (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010), little work examines factors that 
influence organizations to pursue extra-movement, and in some cases, contentious, alliances 
(Whittier 2018). My research aims to fill this gap in the social movement literature by 
demonstrating that to understand the organizational motivations for joining contentious coalitions, 
analysts must take into consideration the larger network of potential alliance and conflict systems 
within an organizational field. Additionally, researchers must also pay attention to processes 
occurring in proximate fields that impact the political and organizational opportunities for 
advancing movement goals.  
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Further, my findings reveal that intra-movement contention that may occur as a result of 
the formation of environmental-industry alliances rests fundamentally on the existential concerns 
of challenger groups. The viability of challenger groups is threatened when more powerful actors 
in their field spawn new arenas for collective action that transgress previously taken for granted 
rules and routines upon which a field had been settled. Unless members of a field coalesce under 
new collective identities or settle back into the status quo, protracted conflict can threaten the 
shared systems of meaning upon which a field, and movement, have been built.  
Additionally, my study corroborates key aspects of Whittier’s (2018) frenemy typology. 
Understanding the CSSD as an adversarial collaborative relationship among ideologically opposed 
actors helps to contextualize the alliance structure as a phenomenon distinct from social movement 
coalitions. My study also lends empirical support to her argument that frenemy relationships 
exhibit characteristic features, namely: reputational risks as a result of participating; a focus within 
the alliance on more narrow than broader movement goals; collaborative relationships built on 
tenuous trust in which expert knowledge is prioritized over ideology; and opposing identities and 
networks that preclude more extensive collaboration (Whittier 2018: 199). Each of these 
characteristic factors were exhibited in the case analyzed in this thesis.       
An underdeveloped link in the research presented here is the causal identification of the 
specific institutional mechanisms that lead to more cooperative outcomes for environmental 
governance. Factors that matter include an array of micro-level variables such as individual risk 
perceptions, levels of economic endowment, and resource management orientations; meso-level 
variables include the ability for actors to frequently and substantively communicate and devise 
sanctioning schemes; and macro-level variables include the complexity of the resource system in 
question and the social practices that characterize the resource system’s use (Anderies et al. 2011).  
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Following this point, an additional gap in the literature includes research on the role that a 
third-party arbitrator may play in fostering cooperative outcomes in contentious environmental 
governance cases (see e.g., Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). This topic seems to be of primary 
significance in the analysis of environmental coalitions that engage actors with conflicting interests 
and incentives in complex resource systems. If institutions are to be understood as arenas in which 
actors seek to strategically benefit from distributional gains (Knight and Sened 1995), then indeed 
collaborative arrangements are susceptible to mixed-motive behavior in which asymmetrically 
endowed actors co-opt institutional processes for their primary benefit. Thus, an analysis of the 
impact of third-party arbitration on mediating these processes would seem a particularly salient 
research focus. 
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Appendix A 
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 1 
1. Operators shall maintain zero direct or indirect intentional discharges of shale wastewater
(including drilling, flowback and produced waters) to surface water except as provided by
this Standard.
2. In order to facilitate comprehensive wastewater management programs that consider
environmental, safety, health, and economic factors, Operators may send shale wastewater
to a Centralized Waste Treatment facility (CWT) for treatment and discharge if the
Operator demonstrates the following conditions are satisfied at the CWT:
a. The CWT has, and is in substantial compliance with, a NPDES discharge permit to
treat and directly discharge shale wastewater;
b. The CWT meets or exceeds a CRSD shale wastewater effluent performance
standard to be based on current best available technology designed to prevent the
discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts;
c. The CWT must use best available technology for all fluids discharged. Best
available technology requires a combination of distillation and biological treatment,
with the addition of reverse osmosis if CRSD determines based on further analysis
that it provides protection necessary to ensure effluent quality. CRSD may
authorize the use of different technologies or combinations of technologies that
provide equivalent or superior treatment;
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d. The CWT adheres to acceptance procedures designed to assure that the wastewater
delivered by the Operator is compatible with the other wastes being treated at the
facility, treatable by the treatment system, and consistent with the specific waste
stream the facility was permitted to treat and discharge;
e. The CWT does not indirectly discharge wastewater from a CRSD Operator through
a POTW.
3. An uncertified Operator must meet the following obligations prior to certification to this
Standard and a certified Operator must meet the obligations prior to the use of a new CWT
for discharge:
a. Operator shall review, compile, analyze, and deliver to CRSD, publicly available
information pertaining to the CWTs performance and permit compliance to
demonstrate that the CWT satisfies Part 2(a).
b. In order to help assure the permit writer has all information necessary to consider
establishing limits on all pollutants in the expected influent, the permitting agency
shall be provided the current CRSD list of chemicals believed to occur in the
region’s wastewater.
c. In order to confirm the CWT is operating as intended, the Operator shall
demonstrate to CRSD that testing at the CWT satisfies the Initial Confirmatory
Testing Program or a facility-specific Protocol approved by CRSD.
d. In order to evaluate the potential for CWT effluent toxicity, Operator shall complete
WET Testing pursuant to the WET Testing Program or an alternative facility- 
specific Protocol approved by CRSD.  
4. For so long as the Operator delivers shale wastewater to a CWT:
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a. Operator shall conduct effluent monitoring as specified in the CRSD Ongoing
Monitoring Program or facility-specific Protocol approved for that CWT by CRSD.
b. Every six months, Operator shall review, compile, analyze and deliver to CRSD
publically available information about the CWT’s performance and permit
compliance.
c. Unless CRSD determines that ongoing WET testing is not necessary, Operator shall
complete WET testing at a frequency to be determined in the WET Testing Program
or facility-specific Protocol.
5. Operators may not initiate, and will immediately cease, deliveries to a CWT:
a. If the CRSD Board determines that discharges from the CWT may increase the risk
of harm to human health or the environment. This determination may take into
account data and reports submitted to CRSD under this standard, deterioration in
effluent quality, research to be sponsored by CRSD or by other parties, and/or any
other data or available research.
b. That exhibits substantial non-compliance with its NPDES permit.
Deliveries shall not be resumed until the Operator demonstrates to the satisfaction
of CRSD that appropriate corrective measures have been made.
6. Operator reporting under this standard shall be as follows:
a. Data from all testing and any additional information gathering required under this
standard, shall be analyzed, compiled, and submitted to CRSD by the Operator.
b. Where an operator discovers a potential non-compliance with an existing NPDES
discharge permit as part of the monitoring and auditing requirements required under
this Standard, the Operator shall immediately report such findings to the CWT, the
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permitting agency, and CRSD. 
Note: This standard does not apply to nor prohibit disposal of wastewater by deep 
well injection.  
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 2 
1. Operators shall maintain and adhere to a plan to recycle, to the maximum extent
practicable, flowback and produced water for use in fracturing and in drilling wells at
depths below the surface casing.
2. For water withdrawals, operators shall develop an evaluation, monitoring, and action plan
that prevents and/or minimizes site-specific and cumulative adverse impacts to surface and
ground water resources. The plan should include the following:
a. For surface waters, the plan should identify measures taken to protect flow regime
of the waterway, and avoid temporary or permanent impairment.
b. Plans should justify, and describe protection measures utilized, for withdrawals
from any of the following:
i. Waters classified or designated as Tier 3 (or state regulatory equivalent); or
Tier 2 (or state regulatory equivalent) by an appropriate state or federal
authority under the Clean Water Act’s anti-degradation program.
ii. Headwaters or creeks (waters having an upstream drainage area less than
38.61 square miles)
iii. Waters classified or designated as Intermittent by an appropriate state or
federal authority.
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iv. If applicable, any waterway during seasonal or periodic (e.g. drought) low
flow conditions, as identified by state or federal regulatory agencies.
c. For ground waters, the Plan should assess the feasibility and sustainability of the
groundwater source at the proposed withdrawal rate and withdrawal location, and
identify all groundwater management measures taken in order to ensure that there
are no adverse impacts to: groundwater availability (allowing for the rate of
groundwater recharge); hydraulically connected wetlands; private water wells; and
the baseflow of hydraulically connected surface waters.
d. Operators shall meter (or otherwise measure) and record daily the volume of water
withdrawals. Measuring devices and methods shall be accurate to within 5% of
actual flow.
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 3 
1. Any new pits designed shall be double-lined and equipped with leak detection.
2. Operators, by March 20, 2014 or initial date of application for certification (whichever is
later), shall contain drilling fluid, when using oil-containing drilling fluids to drill a well,
in a closed loop system at the well pad (e.g. no ground pits).
3. Operators, by March 20, 2015 or initial date of application for certification (whichever is
later), shall contain drilling fluid and flowback water in a closed loop system at the well
pad, eliminating the use of pits for all wells.
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When utilizing centralized impoundments for the storage of flowback and/or produced 
waters, Operators shall ensure that free hydrocarbons are removed from the water prior to 
storage and that new impoundments are double-lined with an impermeable material, 
equipped with leak detection and take measures to reasonably prevent hazards to wildlife. 
Total hydrocarbons should be substantially removed.  
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 5 
Operators shall establish an Area of Review (AOR), prior to drilling a well, which     
encompasses both the vertical and horizontal legs of the planned well. Within the AOR, 
the Operator must conduct a comprehensive characterization of subsurface geology, 
including a risk analysis that demonstrates the presence of an adequate confining layer 
above the production zone that will prevent adverse migration of hydraulic fracturing 
fluids. As part of the risk analysis, and before proceeding with hydraulic fracturing, the 
Operator must also conduct a thorough investigation of any active or abandoned wellbores 
within such area of review or other geologic vulnerabilities (e.g., faults) that penetrate the 
confining layer and adequately address identified risks.  
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 6 
1. Operators shall develop and implement a plan for monitoring existing water sources,
including aquifers and surface waters (as defined in the CRSD Guidance for Auditors
document) within a 2,500 foot radius of the wellhead (or greater distance, if a need is
clearly indicated by geologic characterization), and demonstrate that water quality and
chemistry measured during a pre-drilling assessment are not impacted by operations.
1.  
1.  
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 4
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2. Operators must conduct periodic monitoring for at least one year following completion of
the well. Such monitoring must be extended if results indicate potential adverse impacts on
water quality or chemistry by operations.
3. In the event that monitoring establishes a possible link between an Operator’s activities
and contamination of a water source, the Operator shall develop and implement an
investigative plan and, if a positive link is established, implement a corrective action plan.
4. The testing and monitoring plan should provide for additional monitoring in the event a
well is re-stimulated.
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 7 
1. Operators shall design and install casing and cement to completely isolate the well and all
drilling and produced fluids from surface waters and aquifers, to preserve the geological
seal that separates fracture network development from aquifers, and prevent vertical
movement of fluids in the annulus.
2. Operators will not use diesel fuel in their hydraulic fracturing fluids.
3. Operators will publically disclose the chemical constituents intentionally used in well
stimulation fluids. Disclosures will include: information identifying the well, the Operator
and the dates of the well stimulation; the type and total volume of the base fluid; the type
and amount of any proppant; all chemical additive products used in a well stimulation,
including the name under which the product is marketed or sold, the vendor, and a
descriptor of additive's purpose or purposes (e.g. biocide, breaker, corrosion inhibitor, etc.);
the common name and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number for each chemical
ingredient used in a stimulation fluid; the actual or maximum concentration of each
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chemical ingredient, expressed as a percent by mass of the total stimulation fluid. Chemical 
ingredients should be disclosed in a manner that does not link them to their respective 
chemical additive products. Disclosure of the above information will be offered to the 
relevant state agency and will also be posted on FracFocus.org. If an Operator, service 
company or vendor claims that the identity of a chemical ingredient is entitled to trade 
secret protection, the Operator will include in its disclosures a notation that trade secret 
protection has been asserted and will instead disclose the relevant chemical family name. 
Operators will implement measures consistent with state law to assist medical professionals 
in quickly obtaining trade secret information from the Operator, service company or vendor 
holding the trade secret that may be needed for clinical diagnosis or treatment purposes.  
4. Operators will also work toward use of more environmentally neutral additives for 
hydraulic fracturing fluid.  
5. Mechanical integrity tests shall be performed when refracturing an existing well.  
6. CRSD will develop a standard relating to the public disclosure of chemicals other than well 
stimulation fluids by September 1, 2013.  
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 8  
1. Operators shall design each well pad to minimize the risk that drilling related fluids and 
wastes come in contact with surface waters and fresh groundwater.  
2. In preparation for any spill or release event, Operators shall prior to commencement of 
drilling, develop and implement an emergency response plan, ensure local responders have 
appropriate training in the event of an emergency, and work with the local governing body, 
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in which the well is located, to verify that local responders have appropriate equipment to 
respond to an emergency at a well.  
3. In addition, in the event of spill or release, beyond the well pad, Operators shall
immediately provide notification to the local governing body and any affected landowner.
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 9 
1. Beginning on January 1, 2014, in accordance with the conditions set forth in Paragraphs 3 
and 4 below, an Operator must direct all pipeline-quality gas during well completion of 
development wells, and re-completion or workover of any well into a pipeline for sales.
2. Any gas not captured and put in the sales pipeline may not be vented and must be flared in 
accordance with Standard No. 10 below.
3. Acceptable reasons for sending gas to a flare and not directing gas into the sales line 
include:
a. Low content of flammable gas. Such low-flammability gas must be directed 
through a flare, past a continuous flame, to insure combustion begins when gas 
composition becomes flammable; For safety reasons.
4. Circumstances unacceptable for sending gas to flare, instead of directing it into a sales line, 
are:
a. Beginning on January 1, 2014, a lack of a pipeline connection except for wells that 
are designated as either exploratory or extension wells using SEC definitions 
(however, companies should minimize flaring and maximize the use of reduced 
emissions completions on exploratory or extension wells, where possible);
b. Inadequate water disposal capacity;
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c. Undersized flow back equipment, lack of flow back equipment or lack of equipment
operating personnel.
5. Any upset or unexpected condition that leads to flaring of gas, instead of directing it into a
sales line, must be documented and records maintained by the Operator, including a
description of the condition, the location, date, and quantity of gas flared.
6. Using the SEC definitions, an exploratory well is a well drilled to find a new field or to
find a new reservoir in a field previously found to be productive of oil or gas in another
reservoir. An extension well is a well drilled to extend the limits of a known reservoir.
Wells with these designations must be consistent with Operator reporting of such
designations to the SEC, if applicable.
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 10 
1. When flaring is permitted during well completion, re-completions or workovers of any
well, pursuant to Standard No. 9 above, Operators must adhere to the following 
requirements.  
a. Operators must either use raised/elevated flares or an engineered combustion
device with a reliable continuous ignition source, which have at least a 98%
destruction efficiency of methane. No pit flaring is permitted.
b. Flaring may not be used for more than 14-days on any development well (for the
life of the well). Flaring may not be used for more than 30-days on any exploratory
or extension wells (for the life of the well), including initial or recompletion
production tests, unless operation requires an extension. If flaring continues beyond
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30-days for an exploratory or extension well, Operators must document the extent 
of additional flaring and reasons requiring flaring beyond the 30-days.  
c. Flares shall be designed for and operated with no visible emissions, except for 
periods not to exceed a total of five minutes during any two consecutive hours.  
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 11  
1. The following standard applies only to nonroad dedicated diesel horizontal drilling rig 
engines at the wellpad. CRSD encourages and supports the conversion of drilling rig 
engines to either dual-fuel, electricity or natural gas. The following emissions standards 
apply to the nonroad dedicated diesel drilling rig engines.  
a. By March 20, 2013, Operator and contractor nonroad engines shall achieve horse 
power-hour weighted average site emissions equivalent to U.S. EPA Tier 2 nonroad 
diesel engine standards or better.  
b. By March 20, 2015, 25% of all Operator and contractor engine utilization (hp) shall 
comply with U.S. EPA Tier 4 emissions standards for particulate matter.  
c. By September 24, 2015, 75% of all Operator and contractor engine utilization (hp) 
shall comply with U.S. EPA Tier 4 emissions standards for particulate matter.   
d. By September 24, 2016, 95% of Operator or contractor engine utilization (hp) shall 
comply with U.S. EPA Tier 4 emissions standards for particulate matter.  
e. All nonroad equipment must use Ultra-Low Sulfur Diesel fuel (15 ppm of sulfur) 
at all times.  
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2. The following standard applies only to dedicated diesel fracturing pump engines at the 
wellpad. CRSD encourages and supports the conversion of fracturing pump engines to 
either dual-fuel, electricity or natural gas.
a. If the fracturing pump is a nonroad dedicated diesel engine powered solely by diesel 
fuel, then the following emissions standards apply:
i. By March 20, 2014, Operator and contractor nonroad engines shall achieve 
horse power-hour weighted average site emissions equivalent to U.S. EPA 
Tier 2 nonroad diesel engine standards or better.
ii. By September 24, 2015, 25% of all Operator and contractor engine 
utilization (hp) shall comply with U.S. EPA Tier 4 emissions standards for 
particulate matter.
iii. By September 24, 2016, 75% of all Operators and contractors engine 
utilization (hp) shall comply with U.S. EPA Tier 4 emissions standards for 
particulate matter.
iv. By September 24, 2017, 95% of all Operator and contractor engine 
utilization (hp) shall comply with U.S. EPA Tier 4 emissions standards for 
particulate matter.
v. These engines must use Ultra-Low Sulfur Diesel fuel (15 ppm of sulfur) at 
all times.
b. If the fracturing pump is powered by a dedicated diesel heavy-duty vehicle engine, 
then the following emissions standards apply:
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i. By March 20, 2013, 50% of the heavy-duty vehicle engines used to power
fracturing pumps must meet U.S. EPA’s Final Emission Standards for 2007
and Later Model Year Highway Heavy-Duty Vehicles and Engines for
particulate matter (PM) emissions.
ii. By September 24, 2014, 80% of the heavy duty vehicle engines used to
power fracturing pumps, must meet U.S. EPA’s Final Emission Standards
for 2007 and Later Model Year Highway Heavy-Duty Vehicles and Engines
for particulate matter emissions.
iii. These engines must use Ultra-Low Sulfur Diesel fuel (15 ppm of sulfur) at
all times.
3. CRSD will develop a standard and implementation date for all other engines located at
the wellpad. 
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 12 
The following standard is only applicable to compressor engines dedicated to 
unconventional activities.  
1. By March 20, 2014, existing compressor engines greater than 100 horsepower may not
emit more than 1.5 grams of NOx per horsepower-hour.
2. Any new, purchased, replacement, reconstructed, or relocated lean-burn engines greater
than 100 horsepower and up to 500 horsepower may not emit more than 1.0 g/hp-hr for
NOx; 2.0 g/hp-hr for CO; 0.70 g/hp-hr for VOCs.
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3. Any new, purchased, replacement, reconstructed, or relocated lean-burn engines greater
than 500 horsepower may not emit more than 0.50 g/hp-hr for NOx; 47 ppmvd at 15% O2
or 93% reduction for CO; 0.25 g/hp-hr for VOCs; 0.05 g/hp-hr HCHO.
4. Any new, purchased, replacement, reconstructed, or relocated rich-burn engines greater
than 100 horsepower and up to 500 horsepower may not emit more than 0.25 g/hp-hr for
NOx; 0.30 g/hp-hr for CO; 0.20 g/hp-hr for VOCs.
5. Any new, purchased, replacement, reconstructed or relocated rich-burn engines greater
than 500 horsepower may not emit more than 0.20 g/hp-hr NOx; 0.30 g/hp-hr CO; 0.20
g/hp-hr VOCs; 2.7ppmvd at 15% O2 or 76% reduction for HCHO.
Note: This standard will be updated to reflect any future determinations from regulatory 
agencies with regard to the NOx limitation.  
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 13 
1. By October 15, 2013, all (existing or new) individual storage vessels at the wellpad with
VOC emissions equal to or greater than 6 tpy must install controls to achieve at least a 95%
reduction in VOC emissions.
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 14 
This standard is applicable to new and existing equipment dedicated to unconventional activities 
unless stated otherwise.  
1. Change rod packing at all reciprocating compressors (both existing and new), including
those at the wellhead, either every 26,000 hours of operation or after 36 months.
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2. By October 15, 2013, pneumatic controllers (both existing and new) must be low – bleed, 
with a natural gas bleed rate limit of 6.0 scfh or less, or zero bleed when electricity (3- 
phase electrical power) is on-site.  
3. New centrifugal compressors may not contain wet oil seals. Operators must replace worn 
out wet seals on existing centrifugal compressors with dry seals.  
4. By March 20, 2014 or date of an Operator’s initial application for certification (whichever 
is later), Operators will implement a directed inspection and maintenance program (DI&M) 
for equipment leaks from all existing and new valves, pump seals, flanges, compressor 
seals, pressure relief valves, open-ended lines, tanks and other process and operation 
components that result in fugitive emissions. Process components subject to DI&M are 
monitored by a weekly visual, auditory, and olfactory check, and once a year by a 
mechanical or instrument check to detect leaks. Once significant leaks are detected, they 
are required to be repaired in a timely manner.  
5. Eliminate VOC emissions associated with the prevention of well-bore freeze-up (only de 
minimis emissions are permitted).  
6. Existing and new compressors are required to be pressurized when they are off-line for 
operational reasons in order to reduce blowdown emissions.  
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 15  
1. By March 20, 2014, 80% of all trucks used to transport fresh water or well flowback water 
must meet U.S. EPA’s Final Emission Standards for 2007 and Later Model Year Highway 
Heavy-Duty Vehicles and Engines for particulate matter (PM) emissions.  
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2. By September 24, 2015, 95% all trucks used to transport fresh water or well flowback water 
must meet U.S. EPA’s Final Emission Standards for 2007 and Later Model Year Highway 
Heavy-Duty Vehicles and Engines for particulate matter emissions. 
3. All on-road vehicles and equipment must limit unnecessary idling to 5 minutes, or abide 
by applicable local or state laws if they are more stringent.  
4. All on-road and non-road vehicles and equipment must use Ultra-Low Sulfur Diesel fuel 
(15 ppm of sulfur) at all times.  
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